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ORDER AND DISORDER IN EARLY CONNECTICUT:
NEW HAVEN, 1639-1701
|
I ROBERT W. ROETGER3f
University of New Hampshire, May, 1982
This dissertation assesses order and disorder in New
Haven, Connecticut from its founding in 1639 to the intro­
duction of Justices of the Peace in 1701. It juxtaposes con­
cepts of the well-ordered society as expressed in puritan 
rhetoric with the reality of behavior as reflected in legal 
documents to illustrate the pre-eminent role assumed by law 
in ordering society. What emerges is a picture of society
not rigidly caught up in the policies of perfection, but one
characterized by responsive lawmaking, equally flexible en­
forcement, and reliance upon formal legal institutions to 
resolve private controversies.
The study begins with a portrait of the well-ordered 
society. It was a God-ordained social order dictated by 
the religiosity of New Haven's founders and based on volun­
tary covenants which defined basic social institutions. Yet 
this picture soon faded as settlers encountered the conditions 
of life in New England. Voluntarism gave way to a new order
vii
as defined through law— local bylaws and colony statutes—  
that departed significantly from the Biblically based notion 
of law that helped delineate order in 1639.
Challenges to order mirrored the growth of law which was 
traditional and secular. An examination of 900 violations 
of local bylaws illustrates that most disorders related to the 
physical adjustments of life in America. Furthermore, the 
petty offenders who violated these ordinances were well-estab­
lished members of the community who were prosecuted with a 
mixture of charity and pragmatism. So were individuals who 
violated colony statutes, thereby threatening moral order. 
Analysis of 550 colony violations indicates that New Haven had 
its share of social deviants who were excluded for their mis­
conduct. But most moral offenders, specifically alcohol 
abusers, thieves, and fornicators, were punished with in­
creased leniency by magistrates who assumed a realistic per­
spective on morality.
Finally, an assessment of 350 civil suits which chal­
lenged social harmony reveals that authorities utilised es­
tablished law to resolve disputes equitably. Formal litiga­
tion promoted social order and was a chosen method of con­
flict resolution by litigants who rejected the "peaceful 
and loving" procedure of arbitration, so symbolic of the 
well-ordered society.
INTRODUCTION
The behavior of puritans has fascinated serious and not- 
so-serious students of history for generations. As a group, 
these religious enthusiasts who settled New England have 
also been frequently misunderstood, if not misrepresented. 
Yet every November they are memorialized as schoolchildren 
participate in pagents where blunderbusses and dreary cos­
tumes are standard props. Indian corn is displayed on door­
ways across the country. And John and Priscilla Alden-like 
figurines embellish Thanksgiving tables. For better or for 
worse, puritans have been characterized as being uncompro­
misingly severe in literary works like Hawthorne's The 
Scarlet Letter and in films, such as Victor Seastrom's 1926 
adaptation of that classic. Indeed, one of the greatest 
attractions for tourists who visit historical sites in New 
England are the stocks and pillory— testimony to an image 
of puritans that pervades the popular mind.
Misimpressions have not been restricted to the general 
public. For years antiquarians and historians have inter­
preted puritan society differently, thus lending credence 
to the notion that every generation writes its own history. 
It is not that historians have disagreed with one another 
consistently, rather that they have had either different in­
terests or training which have found expression in their
2writings. Beginning with the filial pietistic writers of 
the mid-nineteenth century, like George Bancroft who viewed 
puritans as precursors of political and religious freedom, 
historians have portrayed the saints from numerous perspec­
tives. Even in the shadow of the whigs, researchers like 
Brooks and Charles Francis Adams offered different assess­
ments; for the first time, puritans were condemned for their 
apparent intolerance.^
With the turn of the century came still new perspectives. 
James Truslow Adams interjected elements of determinism into 
the growing body of literature on puritans by suggesting that 
the founders of New England communities were motivated more 
by economic considerations than by religious fervor. Adams' 
thesis was challenged by Samuel Eliot Morison who, along with 
others, placed greater emphasis on'what Adams rejected: the
religious orientation of the Great Mirgration. Indeed, the 
1930s signalled a ground swell of intellectual history epit­
omized by the work of Perry Miller. More so than any scholar 
of his generation, Miller argued that puritan behavior was a 
by-product of their ideas. Among other things, this led him 
to conclude that the first three generations of New Englanders 
were wedded to an unbroken unified body of thought. Clearly 
there were other writers during the twenties and thirties 
who blazed new paths of their own by stressing, as did the 
imperial school of historians, the network of relationships 
that tied New England to the mother country. But it was the 
so-called Miller paradigm that has provoked the greatest
3interest— and criticism— by historians in recent decades.
As noted by Edmund Morgan, Miller's monolithic view of New
England has sparked exhaustive research generated "by the
2
insights in a single paragraph."
Just as Morison and Miller departed from the perspectives 
of their predecessors, historians of the sixties and seven­
ties emphasized an aspect of New England history largely ne­
glected by professional scholars— society. Younger writers 
especially began moving away from the puritan's thought by 
analyzing their behavior. This entailed a fresh look at 
sources— tax lists, vital statistics, and court records—  
that had been under-utilized in recent years, but which sud­
denly seemed more manageable with the advent of computer 
technology. If the labors of these social historians have 
been next to monumental, so too have their contributions.
They have taken readers well beyond the "pots and pans" 
social history of the late nineteenth century by providing 
far-reaching insights into the lives of early New Englanders. 
Pioneering studies by John Demos and Philip Greven have 
illustrated how markedly family life changed over time. 
Darrett Rutman and Kenneth Lockridge have documented the 
erosion of utopian ideals characteristic of many communities 
at the outset of settlement. And a host of other studies 
including those by James Henretta, Richard Bushman, and 
David Konig have explored various aspects of New England 
society. All have aided immeasurably ii^-b^r-eaking down 
stereotypes about puritans that for years existed in lay
3
and academic circles. With the exception of Konig's work, 
however, few have focused on law and puritan society exclu­
sively. Nor has a single topic promised to contribute as 
much to our understanding of puritan behavior.
From an historiographical point of view, "legal" studies 
of seventeenth-century New England generally have followed 
three avenues of inquiry. The oldest and most traditional 
is the study of law per se and the way it developed in the 
new world. The earliest of these works were written by 
lawyers and thus in part explains their proclivity for ex­
amining law, but not necessarily other aspects of social 
control. Noteworthy is the work of Julius Goebel Jr., 
who argued that much of the law in early Plymouth, Massa­
chusetts was customary and therefore traceable to practices
4
followed in English rural communities. So too was the
network of courts "transplanted" by the settlers of New
England. Both of these notions were reinforced and expanded
upon by George Lee Haskins whose Law and Authority in Early
Massachusetts: A Study in Tradition and Design is a classic
5
in the field of early American legal history. Haskins' 
analysis displays a deep appreciation for the way various 
sources of law were interwoven within the fabric of puritan 
society. And he is to be credited with the first in-depth 
exploration of written codes which were, by the last quar­
ter of the seventeenth century, well entrenched features of 
the colonial legal milieu. Both these and other works 
helped lay the foundation for the study of law in New
5England. But despite their contributions, they had little 
to say about how law was actually enforced.
This has been the avenue taken by another group of 
writers whose principal interest has been crime and punish­
ment. Again, Massachusetts was the setting for these works. 
The first full-length examination of crime was written by
6Edwin Powers who offered readers a "documentary history." 
But, it was little more than that— a chronological catalog 
of laws, crimes, and punishments which did not help to al­
ter the perception that puritan lawbreakers were socially 
maladjusted criminals whose behavior was punished severly. 
Although his Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of
Deviance tended to reinforce this view, Kai T. Erikson pro-
7
vided readers with a more complex analysis. Wayward Puri­
tans is the product of Erikson's training in the field of 
sociology and it utilizes modern theories of deviance to 
explain the behavior of puritans in Essex County, Massa­
chusetts. Erikson correctly contends that all societies 
single out individuals for deviance through a variety of 
means and for a number of different reasons. However, his 
study is flawed by the assumption that Essex men and women 
who appeared before county authorities were summarily 
labelled as deviants. Once so designated, the argument 
goes, lawbreakers were locked into deviant roles which pre­
cluded reintegration into society. Clearly this was true 
with some, but not all, offenders. Erikson's conclusions 
appear to have been based on a marriage between the theory
6of deviance and an overly literal interpretation of puritan 
theology. This gave rise to the notion that malfeasance was 
a sign of damnation and hence a basis for assessing deviant 
behavior. More recently, however, a study of Middlesex 
County, Massachusetts by Eli Faber suggests a different con­
clusion: most offenders were "treated with leniency after
Q
they had been punished" and few were actually excluded.
David Konig concurs, even though his principal consider-
9ation is not crime and punishment. Indeed, Konig is thus- 
far the lone traveller along the third avenue of legal 
scholarship that twists and turns through the unfamiliar 
landscape of civil litigation. Like Erikson, Konig chose 
Essex County as the setting of his analysis. But unlike 
previous writers who have speculated that legal conflict 
was detrimental to social stability, Konig argues that 
"litigation was a useful agent of orderly and desirable 
social change."10 Law and Society is the most recent in a 
series of legal studies undertaken in the past two decades 
which has broadened our understanding of puritan behavior.
The present analysis of order and disorder in early 
Connecticut merges all three avenues of legal scholarship 
to assess the role played by law in ordering the society 
of New Haven from its settlement in 1639 to the introduc­
tion of Justices of the Peace in 1701. Among other things, 
it will be shown that challenges to order encountered in 
the new world were transcended by imaginative lawmaking and
realistic enforcement that had little in common with the 
solutions envisioned by the founders of New England.
The first of five chapters thus begins with an examina­
tion of the well-ordered society as defined by leading fig­
ures of the errand into the wilderness. Included in this 
group were New Haven's co-founders Theophilus Eaton, a London 
merchant, and John Davenport, the spiritual guide of the 
town for 30 y e a r s .  To their way of thinking success in the 
new world required unswerving adherence to a Biblic iy based 
concept of order that reflected their religious ideals.
They believed that it was possible to erect a "city upon a 
hill" grounded upon a voluntaristic commitment to a God- 
ordained vision of society. And to a large measure they suc­
ceeded. New Haven's early domestic, ecclesiastical, politi­
cal, and legal institutions conformed to what has been des­
cribed as the "policies of perfection." But we also know 
that the ideal, though not the commitment to order, crumbled 
in the face of new world conditions. It therefore seems 
appropriate to ask: If puritan rhetoric alone could not
maintain order, what did?
In part, the question is answered in Chapter 2 which 
addresses the evolution of law and suggests that the majority 
of laws formulated in New Haven bore little resemblance to 
the Mosaic or Biblical law upon which the community rested.
A close look at lawmaking reveals that most laws were not 
adopted to restrain sinners, but were traditional responses 
to disorders adapted to fit conditions of life in New
England. This is seen most explicitly on the local level 
where the town meeting passed bylaws aimed at preserving 
physical order. These ordinances dealt with problems such 
as fire prevention and livestock control considered neces­
sary to sur'.rival in the wilderness. Laws were also passed 
by colony officials and then codified in an effort to pro­
mote order through legal uniformity. It was on the colony 
level that the "fundamental laws” of puritans were delinea­
ted. But even here, Biblically based statutes were in the 
minority. Moreover, it becomes clear that within years of 
settlement the God-ordained vision of the properly ordered 
society was supplanted by one grounded on a combination of 
traditional and homespun secular law.
This view is reinforced by the first of two chapters 
devoted to disorders as seen through law enforcement. 
Chapter 3 analyzes the context of petty crimes— violations 
of town ordinances— which thusfar have been left unexplored 
by legal scholars. Yet patterns of prosecution are crucial 
to an understanding of how order was maintained because
11they illuminate the disorders that gripped the community.
As it turns out, most of New Haven's "criminals" violated 
laws unlike those anticipated by architects of the New 
England Way. The greatest contributors to disorder were 
well established members of the community, recidivists and 
non-recidivists alike, whose lack of attention to bylaws 
caused them to be prosecuted in great numbers. Signifi­
cantly, they were not marched off to the stocks or whipping
post. Rather they received mild punishments and were often 
treated with leniency.
So too were those who compromised the moral order by 
transgressing colony statutes— the subject of Chapter 4. To 
be sure, the conduct of a handful of individuals was consid­
ered so threatening that exclusion for deviance was employed 
successfully as a strategy of social control. But most moral 
offenders, contrary to impressions made by puritan rhetoric, 
retained their membership in the community. These lawbreakers 
constituted New Haven's delinquent population. They were 
not, however, in the modern sense of the word, part of a de­
linquent sub-culture that bred career deviants. Instead, 
they were the descendants of the founding fathers whose "fall 
from grace" was brief and considered temporary. And their 
punishments reflected as much. Increasingly, the town's 
drunks, thieves, and illegal fornicators received mild sen­
tences by magistrates who were empowered to, but did not, 
subject them to corporal punishment. Even God's rulers on 
earth came to realize that morality could not be legislated.
The fifth and final chapter examines disorders caused 
by private controversies. Moreover, limiting contention in 
a "peaceful and loving" manner was just as important to 
social harmony as controlling crime. And while there is 
ample evidence of "vexatious" civil suits between New Haven 
residents, authorities utilized law and the courts to re­
solve disputes equitably. But beyond the obvious ramifica­
tions of litigation, there were others which suggest further
10
that law played an increasingly prominent role in maintaining 
order. One, is that litigation was "a useful agent" in pro­
moting social stability, because certain lawsuits called to 
attention the need to pass bylaws which in turn regulated 
conduct. Another relates to the method of conflict resolu­
tion chosen by litigants. Rather than embracing fully the 
non-binding process of arbitration, as first generation rul­
ers had hoped, disputants came to rely on formal legal insti­
tutions exclusively. This is yet further evidence that the 
policies of perfection failed to withstand the vicissitudes 
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Included in the intellectual baggage transported to New 
England in the seventeenth century was a profound reliance 
upon the concept of order. The puritans steadfast devotion 
to the righteousness of order, frequently epitomized by 
historians in the thought of John Winthrop, represented a 
long standing and continued veneration of a social vision 
which was decreed originally by God. To early modern 
Englishmen, whether a country gentleman, a rural peasant, 
or a merchant of the emerging urban middle class, order 
was conceived of as a network of hierarchical relationships 
fused together for the common good. Contemporaries were 
fond of likening the many parts of society to those of the 
human body to emphasize, as Winthrop did in his ’’Model1 of 
Christian Charity," that each part functioned to serve and 
nourish the whole. Even though Winthrop and other first 
generation New Englanders Like John Cotton and John 
Davenport believed that old England was no longer being 
nourished properly, they by no means discarded their vision 
of an ideal, highly ordered society. In fact, it may well 
have been that many of the planter's traditional beliefs 
were fortified by disorders in the mother country and their 
trans-Atlantic voyage.^ Certainly the concept of order was 
and once transplanted in New England it served as the
13
14
keystone which gave society its form and texture. This 
meant, among other things, a devotion to order that colored 
the puritan's family organization, ecclesiastical arrange­
ments, political institutions, and fundamental laws.
The belief in the efficacy of order was by no means in­
vented by the religious non-conformist leaders of the Great 
Migration. They were merely clinging to a traditional and 
seemingly instinctive sense of order which had its immediate 
origins in the medieval past. It was probably this deep 
commitment to "order" that enabled the saints to establish
viable communities which remained reasonably close to the
2
founder's initial ideals for nearly a century. But what 
perhaps makes the puritan's interpretation of the well- 
ordered society so intriguing, was the apparent strength of 
their commitment to an abstract definition of reality which 
was in many ways inconsistent with actual human behavior. 
Nevertheless, the order which the puritan perceived to be 
real, that which he revered and obeyed as best he could, 
was defined and delineated in the scriptures by an un paral­
leled authority— God. He had created what one writer has 
described as a "cosmic division of labor" within which each
of His creations was allocated a particular place and given
3
an assigned function. It amounted to nothing less than a 
majestic blueprint for human conduct intended to aid man in 
his principal function of glorifying God. It was this plan 
that John Winthrop addressed in his famous message aboard 
the Arbella in 1630. "We are commanded this day to love the
15
Lord our God, and to love one another,” the governor wrote;
"to walk in His ways and to keep His commandments and His
ordinance, and His laws.” Disobediance to His plan meant
"that we shall surely perish out of the good land whither we
4
pass over this vast sea to possess.”
Obedience to God’s injunctions and to His laws was an
integral component of the puritan's conception of the well-
ordered commonwealth. Their departure from England was
prompted by a sense of mission whi, h called for the creation
of a visible kingdom of God in the wilderness of the new
world where "a smooth, honest, civil life would prevail in
5
family, church, and state.” The puritan's insistence upon 
organizing and sustaining ordered and regulated communities 
in keeping with the Creator's grand design can be explained 
primarily by their intense religiosity. That is what dis­
tinguished them from the average Englishman also steeped in 
the tradition of order. Moreover, the pervasive and persis­
tent emphasis on order in New England towns and colonies went 
beyond a tradition common to all Englishmen. In short, the 
puritan's commitment to order was certainly grounded upon 
tradition, yet in America it was reinforced to a degree 
missing in England based upon the rudiments of their theol­
ogy, particularly the notion of the covenant.
Members of the puritan fellowship in England and America 
were all too familiar with the consequences of breaking God's 
laws. From early childhood New England puritans recalled 
the lines of their primers which reminded them that "In
16
Adam's Fall, We Sinned All." Again and again they read in 
their Bibles and heard from their ministers that man had for­
feited his opportunity for salvation by disregarding the 
terms of his original agreement or covenant with God. But 
they were also reminded that their God of love and mercy had 
given man another chance at salvation. A new covenant had 
been contracted with Abraham which promised salvation for 
faith alone rather than for any particular works or deeds.
The conditions of this new contractual obligation, the cov­
enant of grace, formed the central core of puritan theology
and it was utilized in America to a significantly greater
0'
extent than it had been in England.
In practice this meant that New England puritans had to
be extremely vigilant and concentrate assiduously to adhere
to the terms of the covenant. Even though a puritan might
be fairly certain that he had been elected, or chosen, for
salvation, he also realized that he retained some of Fallen
7
Man's degenerate characteristics. The disposition to sin 
lurked constantly within the inner reaches of one's soul 
and was capable of manifesting itself at the least instance 
of spiritual weakness. When a person did sin, it could not 
change the nature of his relationship with God because He 
had predetermined which men would savor the wonders of 
heaven and which would suffer the torments of hell. How­
ever, the act of sinning, of, for example, committing a 
crime, could very well call into question one's convic­
tions about one's status with God. Such doubts were
17
capable of illiciting psychological unrest and members of 
the puritan fellowship sought to ease this stress by leading 
lives worthy of truly visible saints.
The concept of sanctification in many ways 'explains why 
puritans insisted upon upholding order in their Christian 
Commonwealths which were, after all, based upon the laws of 
God. In a very fundamental sense, sanctification may be 
described as good social conduct that affected both regener­
ate individuals, or members of the chosen few who had been 
elected for salvation, and unregenerates, those damned in­
dividuals who constituted a majority even in seventeenth-
O
century New England. Moreover, the saints were bound to 
good behavior because they believed that sanctification 
followed justification. This meant that they kept their 
covenant with God through obedience to His injunctions. 
Outward acts of proper conduct were not the means to grace, 
but were interpreted as being an indication of the infu­
sion of saving grace into the soul by God. Sanctification 
was therefore of utmost importance to the visible saint. 
Disregard for God's laws as set down in the Scriptures 
could indicate an unsanctified way of life. Essentially,
then, the absence of sanctified behavior became a sign of 
9
damnation!
Correct moral conduct, especially when viewed in the 
context of sanctification, was an essential ingredient in 
the formula of success in the Bible Commonwealths of New 
England. As suggested, it was applicable to both regenerate
18
and unregenerate members of society. Once again, the rea­
soning behind this points to the covenant of grace. The 
stipulations of Abraham's agreement with God applied to each 
of his descendants, whether covenanted or not. Accordingly, 
visible saints felt it was their obligation to engender 
Godly conduct in all members of their society. Boston's 
John Cotton explained that obedience to God's injunctions 
was undertaken not just for the elect, "but in behalf of 
every soul that belongs to us... our wives, and children, 
and servants, and kindred, and acquaintance, and all that 
are under our reach, either by way of subordination, or 
coordination. Lack of proper conduct on the part of the 
saints, and their failure to restrain the corruptions of 
those around them, was a strong indication that they were 
destined for something other than salvation. Psychologically 
this must have had a disquieting affect on the saints, since 
it was believed that God's wrath was aimed at the entire 
puritan commonwealth, not simply towards the unregenerate 
sinner. Consequently, the restraint of sin and the firm 
correction of gross offenders was required of the saints 
according to the terms of their covenant with God.
The puritan's insistence upon maintaining order in New 
England communities thus emanated more from their religious 
convictions than it did from a medieval tradition of order 
which was shared by most early modern Englishmen. The def­
inition of order to which they adhered most rigorously orig­
inated with God, an indisputable authority in their eyes.
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The commitment to order was intensified by the puritans who 
migrated to the new world and who grounded their social in­
stitutions upon the word of God. Once settled in New England 
they erected these institutions and enacted laws which were 
designed to inculcate sanctified behavior in all the people 
participating in their unique social experiment. And for 
many New Englanders, proper order and good conduct began in 
the family, which was viewed by the saints as "the germ of 
all political and ecclesiastical authority.
Because families were regarded as the "nurseries of 
society," well-ordered households became a fundamental goal 
of New England leaders. For nearly a century, ministerial 
tracts like John Cotton's Spiritual Milk for Boston Babes 
(1656) and Benjamin Wadsworth's The Well-Ordered Family 
(1712) established guidelines considered necessary to satis­
fy these expectations. The public was reminded repeatedly 
that the well-being of the commonwealth rested upon founda­
tions laid in the family. If familial control were allowed 
to become ineffectual, if husbands and fathers neglected 
their families, if wives and mothers failed to catechise 
their young, if children disregarded the fifth commandment, 
and if apprentices and servants were not introduced to via­
ble trades by their masters, leaders were convinced that 
evil would spread like an uncontrollable cancer and infect 
the different segments of society. When, for example, New 
England was plagued by a host of problems in the 1670s,
20
ministers argued that lack of discipline in the family was a
12principal cause. Civil authorities sometimes had to make
family life their business by intervening in family disputes
and by correcting circumstances of family organization which
13they perceived to be out of order. Under ideal circum­
stances, however, well-ordered families required little mag­
isterial or ministerial intervention. Preservation of family 
harmony was the responsibility of household heads; parents 
were regarded as "governors" of their "little commonwealths," 
and as such were due the respect and authority also claimed 
by civil and ecclesiastical officials. Not surprisingly,
disrespect for family authority was viewed as an offense as
14grievous as contempt for political authority. Moreover,
an offense against a family ruler violated God's commands,
deviated from the basic values of the community, and thus
15constituted a threat to the social order. Yet if all 
family members fulfilled their roles successfully and sat­
isfied their obligations, order would inevitably result.
Proper order in the family began with the relationship 
between husbands and wives. An acknowledged feature of 
their union was the superiority of the husband over the 
wife. This meant, among other things, that the principal 
responsibility for maintaining order in the family rested 
on the shoulders of the husband. Patriarchal control was 
a traditional custom and one which fit neatly into the net­
work of hierarchical relationships which was, again, part 
of the Creator's master plan. Members of society were
21
familiar with the plan; they had been told that God created 
man superior to all other creatures and that in the realm of
*i
human relations, men were superior to women. One need not 
look far to find a reaffirmation of this attitude in seven­
teenth-century New England. When the defiant Anne Hutchinson 
clashed with Massachusetts' leaders in the 1630s a fundamen­
tal consideration in her case was that she had "gone out of
her way and calling to meddle in such things as are proper 
17to men." When the sister of Thomas Parker "published" a
book, her brother told he that it was beyond the custom of
18her sex and it "doth rankly smell." During the witchcraft
craze in Salem, the majority of witnesses who testified
against the middle aged females accused of Satanic practices 
19were men. Indeed, not only was the position in which 
women stood in relation to men understood in a general way, 
but in the case of husbands and wives, it was solemnized 
through a marriage covenant. Moreover, the only natural 
union between man and woman had been engineered by God for 
Adam and Eve, and that relationship had been tainted by the 
corrupting influences of the female partner. However, the 
basic duties implicit in their union still applied to all 
marriages. New Haven's John Davenport argued that an ac­
knowledgement of these duties was made when voluntary cov­
enants were undertaken by men and women at the time of
20their marriage. Through these important oral agreements,
21which were followed by legally prescribed "announcements," 
espoused couples were essentially making public statements
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of their commitment to the values of proper relationships 
and well-ordered families.
The commitment to order may be conceived as the fulfill­
ment of a series of related obligations governing the rela­
tionship between husbands and wives. Love was a basic in­
gredient in the recipe for a successful marriage, indeed, 
for the puritan experiment in general. Sincere affection 
was the foundation of a healthy relationship, a source of 
order in family life, and in some respects the backbone of 
the body constituting the entire community. But, because 
love is such an elusive emotion and at the same time very 
personal, historians face limitations in their attempts to 
portray accurately the intimate details of married life in 
the seventeenth century. They can reason from their own 
experiences that love and order are closely related. And 
they can make use of fragmentary evidence related to love 
found in personal documents. But for the most part they 
must be satisfied with an intuitive sense that love was a 
very real and important mutual obligation.
Hand in hand with the requirement of love was harmony. 
Because court records contain shreds of information on how 
civil authorities tried to control family disorders, his­
torians are able to get some idea of what the duty of har­
mony entailed. The principal means of maintaining a har­
monious family life was for heads of households to provide 
safe and secure environments for their dependents. When it 
became evident to New Haven officials that Ebenezer Brown
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failed to satisfy this obligation, he was directed by the
22court to secure a suitable dwelling place for his wife.
The reasons for the order are clear because the Brown's un­
settled state of affairs had led to "wicked carriages one
23towards the other in their married relation together." In 
addition to providing support for their families, husbands 
were also required to live with them. Single adults in gen­
eral were viewed as a source of disruption in the community. 
Those who were married and living apart simply compounded 
that threat. Thus in .1667, when New Haven magistrates 
learned that Richard Nicolls, a laborer &t the East Haven
ironworks, was married to a woman in New York, they "ordered
24him to attend to his duty and return to her." Harmony in
married life was also achieved when husbands and wives did
not abuse one another or force their partners to engage in
unlawful acts. This is why the New Haven Plantation Court
promptly convicted Thomas Pinion in 1666 for promising a
friend the use of his wife's body. Even though Mrs. Pinion
had previously faced the bench for her own misdeeds, in this
instance she justifiably protested that her "husband had no
25such power over her to make her sin." Quite simple, har­
mony between spouses was best secured when circumstances 
like these were avoided.
The logic of hierarchical relationships that governed 
husbands and wives also applied to the relationship between 
children and adults. Because the framework of the social 
order rested upon foundations laid in the family, it was
24
extremely important for parents to control their offspring.
Moreover, in terms of regulating human conduct, children
were viewed with trepedation, and it was essential that both
parents and their progeny uphold the guidelines which defined
their relationship, one in which youngsters occupied a posi-
26tion inferior to that enjoyed by their elders. And as in 
the case of marital relations, the observance of mutual ob­
ligations was required of both parents and children. The 
principal familial duty of young puritans was to adhere to 
the terms of the often quoted command: "Honor thy father and 
mother." Essentially, youngsters were expected to follow the 
dictates of family rulers. If not, then legal recourse was 
at the disposal of parents. It has been suggested, however,
that few parents would have enjoyed the humiliation associ-
27ated with making family discipline a public spectacle. For 
the most part the umbrella of parental authority covered a 
variety of domestic situations and applied not only to child­
ren, but to young adults as well. When parental control 
lapsed, as it was bound to on occasion, civil officials 
stepped in, as was done in the case of 21 year old Samuel
Brown who was fined 10s for participating in a drinking party
28"without leave of [his] parents."
If parents and other family members fulfilled their roles 
successfully, order would inevitably result. Indeed, certain 
obligations were actually specified in legal documents and 
thus served as reminders of familial duties. New Haven 
Colony officials compelled parents to prevent their children
25
from becoming "barborous, rude, and stubborn" by legally re­
quiring frequent catechism so that youngsters would "under­
stand the main grounds and principals of Christian religion 
necessary to salvation." And in an effort to direct child­
ren and apprentices in some honest and lawful calling, labor,
"29employment, profitable for both themselves and the colony. 
Legal obligations of this sort make perfectly sound sense 
when placed in the context of the well-ordered commonwealth 
as it was perceived by New England lawmakers. If family 
life was properly ordered, then magistrates would have lit­
tle cause to intervene in domestic affairs. And they rarely 
did. Although there must have been occurrences of parental 
neglect in Connecticut communities, these particular laws 
never had to be enforced in New Haven. For the most part it 
seems that parents were aware of both legal and moral obli­
gations required of them and of the importance of their role 
in maintaining a well-ordered community.
Parents were frequently masters as well, and their af­
filiation with servants was meant to be ordered in a fashion 
similar to their own kinship relations. Servants, like all 
children, occupied a position in life inferior to that of 
their masters and mistresses. As such, they were expected 
to adhere to the commands of household rulers. Obedience 
was exceedingly important because ordinarily servants re­
sided and interacted with families on the most intimate of 
terms. In order for their relationships to be "smooth, 
honest, and civil," masters and servants had to contend
26
successfully with the problems of youth and adolescence in 
addition to the social and psychological adjustments associ­
ated with servitude. To help make that relationship viable, 
the obligations required of both master and servant were 
spelled out in written covenants or indentures.
For their part, masters were expected to provide servants 
with security akin to that afforded their own children. A 
glance at one of the few extant indentures from New Haven 
illustrates the point. The agreement was recorded in 1659 
on behalf of John Winston, a local cooper, and 15 year old 
John Jagger of Stamford, who was being "putt" out by his 
recently widowed mother. As master, Winston agreed to in­
struct the youth in the "art of coopery, of keyne and set- 
work, to provide him with meat, drink, apparel, washing,
and lodging, meet and convenient for such a servant in all 
30civility." Beyond the terms of formal covenants, masters 
were obliged to catechise younger servants and to eschew 
maltreatment of any sort= Masters who neglected their ob­
ligations were accountable to civil authorities, as was 
Henry Bishop who, in 1653, abused his servant Samuel Andrews
because, among other things, "he would piss and foul his bed
31and breeches." More charitable behavior was expected by 
masters than that shown by Bishop, and judging from extant 
records it appears that most New Haven masters lived up to 
their expectations.
Servants were a somewhat different story when it came 
time to fulfilling obligations. Servants and apprentices,
27
like their masters, were familiar with the duties implicit
in their positions in society. John Jagger, for instance,
must have understood that for a period of six years he was
required to obey his master "as a good and faithful servant."
His indenture also stipulated that he avoid "unlawful games,
taverns, and alehouses," and at all times to do what an obe-
32dient servant ought to do." Many servants unquestionably 
observed the terms of their indentures to the satisfaction 
of their masters. Yet a simple understanding of a covenant 
did not guarantee that it would be followed to the letter, 
especially if you were male, 15, and thrust into a strange 
community. Some of New Haven's servants were disobedient, 
given to tipling, theft, and fornication. Because ado­
lescents were prone.to pride and sensuality by nature, it 
seems that a certain amount of misbehavior was tolerated by 
charitable (and perhaps realistic) masters. This in part 
explains why, in 1677, Abraham Dickerman pleaded success­
fully with the court to have his servant's punishment re­
duced from whipping to a bond for good behavior, or why,
ten years later, the master of Abraham Johnson adopted a
33similar course of action. In so doing masters exhibited 
the same compassion for their servants as was shown to their 
offspring. In each instance the ultimate aim was the pre­
servation of household harmony and order in the community.
Because family life was considered paramount to the 
well-being of society, each of its various relationships was 
grounded upon Christian love and mutual obligation. In and
28
of itself, this is not particularly unique, but when coupled 
with the religiosity of New Haven puritans, family life was 
afforded what seems to be an exaggerated position of impor­
tance. Patriarchal authority of the kind described by Philip
34Greven in his study of Andover, Massachusetts, rested upon 
concepts of order and hierarchy which governed each house­
hold relation from that of husbands toward wives, masters 
toward servants. Presumably, as long as family rulers com­
manded the obedience of their subordinates, the social order 
would remain unblemished. But New England's religious and 
secular leaders knew all too well that even patriarchs were 
subject to temptation. Consequently it was necessary to 
provide other institutions of control to counteract sinful 
urges. Perhaps the most important of these was the church.
The contractualism that delineated familial relations 
also played a primary role in ecclesiastical affairs. The 
covenant of grace, which was mentioned earlier to emphasize 
the saint's strong commitment to order, became an acknowl­
edged feature of the so-called "congregational way." The 
institutional church was likewise a significant part of the 
puritan's concept of the well-ordered society. It too, like 
all other components of the commonwealth, had been decreed 
by God in the Old, and, as some divines argued, the New Tes­
taments. Indeed, for many congregational ministers, cove­
nant theology was inseperable from the voluntary covenants 
undertaken by the saints for the "foundation work" of the
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institutional church. Together the covenant of grace and 
the church covenant became the basis for the ecq.lesiastical 
order and discipline prevalent in many New England communi­
ties .
This fusion of the two covenants was, according to 
Perry Miller, "the ultimate triumph of the New England mind." 
For most first generation ministers the union was a logical 
corollary to God's agreement with Abraham. Since God com­
manded his children to go out and form churches, the saints, 
by virtue of their covenant with Him, willingly followed His 
decree by forming their own. It may well be that the most
significant aspect associated with the formation of covenanted
35church groups was that the process was voluntary. This 
meant that individual saints agreed to follow His injunctions 
religiously, as well as conform to the decisions of the ma­
jority in fellowship with them. The church covenant as it 
was practiced in New England elevated church membership to a 
special level, so unique that it was condemned by prominent 
non-conformist ministers in England. It is quite possible 
that their criticisms were justified on technical grounds.
Yet the fact remains that in communities like New Haven, 
where the franchise was dependent upon church membership 
until 1665, political power belonged to the elect. Even 
through the saint's influence erroded over time, the first 
generation leadership enjoyed remarkable control over all 
New Englanders.
The keystone for much of this claim to power lay firmly
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embedded in the congregational polity. The actual form which 
served as a guideline for many New England churches, includ­
ing the New Haven church, was specified point by point in
the Cambridge Platform of Church Discipline, published in 
361649. The Platform summarized the work of leading minis­
ters who, in 1646, covened a synod in part to answer the 
criticisms of English theologians. The major disagreement 
between the two groups centered on church government. The 
New England ministry equated congregational polity with vol­
untary covenants and thus institutional freedom from sources 
of external control, especially in the realm of discipline.
A brief reference to some of the most conspicuous positions 
of the Platform illustrates precisely the church order prac­
ticed in New Haven.
Considering the religious zeal of the saints, and of John 
Davenport in particular, it is hardly surprising that the 
organization of the church pre-dated the establishment of New 
Haven town government. The church was gathered in the summer 
of 1639 following 14 months of reflection and humiliation. 
During this period of inward searching the settlers congre­
gated into small groups "and prayed together and conferred to 
their mutual edification,” so as to best judge "whom they 
found fittest to nominate" for the foundation work of the 
church. Eleven men were nominated and all, including Richard 
Malbon who was questioned "about taking an excessive rate for 
meal," were found suitable. Of these, seven were selected as 
"pillars" of the church and entered into covenant with one
37another.
The Cambridge synod followed the founding of the First 
Church by seven years, but the theory enunciated at the 
gathering was already practiced in New Haven. John Davenport, 
along with other ministers who met in Cambridge, believed 
that the saints "by calling must have a Visible-Political- 
Union or else they are not yet a particular church." Even 
though they had entered into covenants with God on an indi­
vidual basis, the New Haven pillars, while "squared, hewn, 
and polished," were not a house until "compacted and united," 
not a church "unless orderly knit together." When it came 
time to found churches, as in all other particulars deemed 
so important to the puritans, proper procedure was decreed 
by God and revealed in Scripture. The covenant was essen­
tial, because it was what made "the family of Abraham and 
the children of Israel to be a church." Specifically, "the 
Visible Covenant, Agreement, or Consent," was required by 
the saints so that they could "give up themselves unto the
38Lord to the observing of the ordinances of Christ together." 
Church covenants of the variety used by the saints were in­
strumental in securing ecclesiastical independence. Al­
though unusually brief, the Charlestown-Boston covenant of 
1630 is illustrative of these agreements:
We whose names are hereunder written,... promise 
and bind ourselves, to walk in all ways according 
to the'Rule of Gospel, and in all sincere Con­
formity to His holy Ordinances, and in mutual 
love, and respect each to other, so near as God 
shall give us grace.39
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Covenants like this became the basis for the properly gath­
ered church, and, because they were voluntary, tended to 
serve as instruments of control through the pledge of the 
signatories to lead sanctified lives.
More than just a signature was demanded of the saints if 
they hoped to become full fledged church members. Both the 
Boston and New Haven churches required a "personal and pulic 
confession, and declaring of God's manner of working upon 
the soul" before one was received into church fellowship. 
Professions of faith were both "lawful and expedient," and
had to be made by those "that were never in church society 
40before." Therefore, when Nathaniel Turner desired to be­
come the eighth member of the First Church, he had to make 
a public profession which suited the original pillars. A 
genuine saint had to be a "tender and broken hearted Chris­
tian," or "a tender hearted soul full of fears and tempta­
tions but truly breathing after Christ," before gaining ad-
41mission to Davenport's church. Cotton Mather wrote of 
Davenport that so strict "were the terms of his communion, 
and so much, I had well nigh said, overmuch, were the golden 
snuffers of sanctuary employed by him in his exercise of 
discipline," towards those seeking admission "that he did
all that was possible, to render the renouned church of New-
42Haven like the New-Jerusalem." More recent scholars have
concluded, along with Mather, that Davenport was perhaps the
43most "exacting" minister in New England.
Davenport's own confession, which was made publically at
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the gathering of the New Haven church, was a comprehensive 
statement touching upon some 20 points ranging from his per­
sonal relationship with God to his role within the framework
44of the institutional church. Although ordinary members' 
professions were not as detailed, Davenport's must have 
served as the standard. During his ministry at the First 
Church, New Haven's visible saints constituted a minority 
of the total population. This is partially explained by the 
assiduous screening of applicants. But it is also explained 
by space, for there was not enough to embrace the entire 
community. In 1647, for example, when the first seating 
plan was issued, the 189 available seats could not accommo­
date New Haven's 219 adult males, not to mention the town's
4 owomen and children. Evidently many New Haven residents 
were denied access to the church on the basis of physical 
restraints alone. For others, membership in the church was 
denied because of the requirement of rigorous confessions.
A major part of New Haven's population was, therefore, not 
subject to as much influence or discipline as leaders would 
have liked. But for those who had been admitted into fellow­
ship with Christ, discipline was an important and required 
obligation.
Even saints were capable of error, and on such occasions 
were in danger of polluting the entire church body with their 
transgressions. Accordingly, a viable means of ecclesiasti­
cal discipline had to be implemented in order to vindicate 
"the honor of Christ and his church," if and when delinquent
34
saints violated the terms of their covenant. The two forms 
of disciplinary action adopted by the New Haven church and 
specified in the Platform, were admonition and excommunica­
tion. They were the most effective "Censures of the church," 
and had been "appointed by Christ for the preventing, remov­
ing, and healing of offenses in the Church." The "offenses" 
were not always specified, but must have included activities 
ranging from slander to sodomy. In addition to the perceived 
seriousness of an offense, the question of which censure was 
to be brought to bear on the wayward member by the congrega­
tion was determined in part on the basis of whether it was a
• 4. . i . . 4 6private or public miscarriage.
Regardless of how serious the offense, brethren labored 
to reform the sinner and effect a public confession and sin­
cere acknowledgement of wrong doing. A good example of the 
disciplinary process at work in New Haven can be found in 
the 1644 proceedings of the church against Anne Eaton, the 
wife of Theophilus Eaton, a local magistrate and governor 
of the New Haven Colony. She was charged with 17 private 
errors which collectively stood in violation of the third, 
fifth, sixth, and ninth commandments. After lengthy exam­
ination the congregation wanted her to be "cast out" for her 
sins, but Davenport persuaded the brethren to settle on a 
public admonishment because it was not certain that she was 
afflicted by "a habitual frame of sinning." Mrs. Eaton was 
accordingly admonished and told "to attend unto the several 
rules... broken," and "to hold forth... repentance according
35
to God." Much to the sorrow of the church members and their 
officers Mrs. Eaton "did continue offensive" and "neither 
came up to the acknowledging of the particulars for which 
she was admonished, nor held forth repentance" to the satis­
faction of the congregation. When she appeared before the 
church, "she behaved herself without any show of remorse" and 
expressed herself in an ostentatious fashion. After nine 
months of waiting, during which "no fruit of reprentance ap­
peared," the members felt compelled, by virtue of their cov­
enant, to further censure Mrs. Eaton. Therefore, with "much 
grief of heart and many tears," the church cast her out,
whereupon "God showed a wonderful presence to the satifaction
47of all that were present."
The patience accorded Mrs. Eaton was characteristic of 
the charity required of members in their relations with one 
another. Indeed, on occasion, even excommunicated individ­
uals, like Henry Glover, were re-admitted as members of the
48church in good standing. Less charity was shown in in­
stances of "a more heinous and criminal nature," as in the
case of William Potter who was excommunicated for bestial-
49ity in 1662 "without gradual proceeding." Discipline 
remained an essential aspect of church government because 
it punished individuals for prophaning the seals of the 
covenant. Moreover, if disorders were permitted to go un­
checked, then the church itself faced the possiblity of 
dissolution, and its members something even more unimagin­
able: the wrath of God.
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The church covenant, the profession of faith, and the 
ability of each congregation to discipline its own members, 
were all important components of the properly ordered church. 
These were considered basic for the success of the errand in­
to the wilderness. An elect society of visible saints was 
believed to have been decreed by God and for many a first 
generation religious enthusiast God's blueprint was meant to 
be followed vigorously. Few were able to envision, in 1639, 
that the institutional church which they pondered over and 
wrote about so meticulously would, within a generation, be 
altered so dramatically. Among those alterations was the 
dropping of the church membership requirement for the elec­
tion of civil officials who were charged with overseeing the 
activities of all members of the "secular society."
The authority associated with the church was not enough
to completely preserve order in New Haven. Even the most
energetic puritans believed that civil authorities were
necessary to uphold the social order. Ecclesiastical and
secular authority were, therefore, to work in conjunction
with one another. They were, moreover, designed to exist
as "coordinate states in the same place reaching forth help
mutually each to other, for the welfare of both, according 
50to God." Although the two "states" were meant to work in 
harmony, it was the civil rulers who, from the outset of 
colonization, shouldered the primary burden of social con­
trol in New Haven. And as patriarchal prestige waned and
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as the church "declined" over time, the responsibilities of
51civil authorities multiplied. Because the function per­
formed by secular officials was considered so vital, the 
settlers of New Ha’ven and other plantations moved cautiously 
when it came time to found political institutions and to 
choose men to assume positions of leadership within them.
Unlike the settlers of Massachusetts, New Haven's plant­
ers lacked a charter to provide a legal basis for a civil 
government. Both John Davenport and Theophilus Eaton were 
members of the Massachusetts Bay Company, however, and they 
had spent enough time in Boston to be influenced by the form 
of government which had been erected in the Bay Colony.
Their Boston experiences and their familiarity with the man­
uscript of John Cotton's Discourse About Civil Government 
were both factors which helped shape the political institu­
tions they created in New Haven. But before they could be 
given life, an agreement needed to be reached amongst the 
free planters of New Haven relative to those principles of 
government which they were willing to accept.
There was little doubt in the minds of New Haven leaders 
like Davenport and Eaton that the principles underlying 
civil government were originally decreed by God. They were 
convinced that following Adam's Fall God had created civil 
governments in order to retrain the conduct of individuals 
who could not be trusted on their own to adhere to the order 
specified in His divine plan. The foremost task of the 
leaders was to convince New Haven's 200-plus adult males to
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accept this as the guiding light for the political institu­
tions they were about to create. Naturally the person best 
qualified to persuade the planters was Davenport, and it was 
he who presided over a gathering of the settlers in 1639 
which terminated with the signing of New Haven's "Fundamental 
Agreement."
The agreement was important because it became the founda­
tion of the government established at New Haven. And it was 
arrived at through a series of questions which were posed by 
Davenport and then voted on by the entire company. The first 
of the queries was particularly suggestive of the direction 
to be taken in the meeting: "Whether the Scriptures do hold
forth a perfect rule for the direction and govenment of all 
men in all duties which they are to perform to God and men
as well as in the government of families and commonwealths
52as in matters of the church." This first principle was 
agreed to by all, "no man dissenting." The second question 
was equally significant for it requested planters to reaf­
firm the "covenant solemnly made by the whole assembly... 
of this plantation the first day of extraordinary humilia­
tion which we had after we came together." This was New
53Haven's plantation covenant and it promised that "in all 
public offices which concern civil order, as choice of 
magistrates and officers, making and repealing laws, di­
viding allotments of inheritance and all things of like 
nature we would all of us be ordered by those rules which 
the Scripture holds forth to us." The planters once again
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unanimously accepted the terms of the covenant "by holding 
up their hands." By acknowledging that scriptural rule was 
the best and that it was most suited to the ordering of gov­
ernment in New Haven, the planters moved a step closer to 
accepting political institutions which would be dominated by 
the elect.
The third query was again a prelude to those which would 
follow. After the planters had renewed their covenenat, 
they were asked if they desired to be "admitted into church 
fellowship according to Christ as soon (as) God shall fit 
them thereunto." The response was once again both positive 
and unanimous. Perhaps the planters would not have been so 
accommodating had they realized that less than half their 
number would eventually join the church and that even fewer 
would become freemen. Yet they nevertheless agreed to the 
next question which bound them to establish a "civil order 
as might best conduce to the securing of purity and peace" 
for themselves and their posterity "according to God." The 
stage was set for a vote on what was perhaps the most cru­
cial question and one which was surely considered to be the 
foremost means of securing order in the community: "Whether
Free Burgesses shall be chosen out of church members," and 
whether only they should have the privilege of voting and 
holding office? "This was put to vote and agreed unto," but 
the planter’s hands had barely been lowered before "one man 
stood up," and expressed displeasure with the most critical 
condition of Davenport's query. The individual, most likely
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54the Reverend Mr. Samuel Eaton, agreed that leaders of the 
commonwealth should be God fearing men and that they were 
normally found within the body of the church. He did, how­
ever, warn those assembled not to surrender the power to 
vote "out of their hands." In other words, the dissenter 
threatened to breach the foundation of New Haven's civil 
government before it had had time to set.
This unexpected turn of events must have caused a moment 
of anxiety in the seemingly unflappable Davenport. The fact 
that he was being questioned was bad enough. But by another 
minister? By a man of prestige and influence? Fortunately, 
however, Davenport received support from those participating 
in the meeting. One planter rose and stated that "nothing 
was done but with their consent." Theophilus Eaton likened 
the circumstances to those in England where "the companies 
of London chose the liveries by whom the public magistrates 
are chosen," and where consequently "the rest are not wronged 
because they expect in time to be of the livery themselves, 
and to have the same power.” Had Davenport needed to bol­
ster his position further he was well equipped to do so.
More than likely he would have concurred with John Cotton 
who perceived a true danger in giving political power to 
non-members because they were capable of creating cults, 
subverting faith, and supporting heretics. He could have 
utilized examples from Scripture like Paul's condemnation 
of judges who were not saints as "destitute of righteous­
ness" and utterly lacking morality, in contrast to those
41
who were saints and "consecrated to God and to his ends in 
55all things." And was it not Paul who had said that the 
saints shall judge the world? But instead of belaboring the 
issue Davenport simply requested the planters to consider 
what had transpired since the initial vote and asked for 
another, if they were convinced that the foundation of gov­
ernment he proposed was truly in the mind of God. The sec­
ond time around once again proved positive; Davenport prob­
ably breathed a sigh of relief and New Haven finally had a 
"Fundamental Agreement.”
By affixing their signatures to the agreement, New Haven's 
planters accepted rule by the elect as the cardinal princi­
ple underlying their political institutions. The civil or­
der they erected fit neatly into the borader notion of order 
which characterized other puritan institutions. What this 
meant in practical terms was that a majority of New Haven 
residents "gave out of their hands" the right to participate 
in the political decision making process. And it remained 
that way until 1665 when the church membership restriction 
was dropped. Political power thus lay firmly in the grasp 
of the elect for nearly a generation. Only those adult male 
members of the church who had taken the freeman's charge 
were granted the honor of choosing magistrates, deputies, 
and selectmen, the principal office holders of the community. 
Not surprisingly, the election of these leaders was consid­
ered no mean task. The electorate, despite its special 
status, was required to be well informed about potential
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rulers. It was for this reason that Davenport devoted time 
in the 1639 meeting to discussing "what kind of person might 
be trusted with matters of government." The source of his 
exhortations was the Old Testament: "Choose wise, under­
standing, and experienced men, according to your tribes, and 
I will appoint them as your heads" (Deut. 1:13); "you may 
indeed set as king over you him whom the lord your God will 
chose" (Deut. 17:15); "moreover choose able men... such as 
fear God, men who are trustworthy and who hate a bribe, and 
place such men over the people as rulers" (Exodus 18:21). 
Thirty years later Davenport was still urging thoughtful 
consideration in the choice of rulers, men who must rule in
fear of God which is "a sanctifying gift of Grace, wrought
56by the Holy Spirit in the hearts of the elect." Clearly 
in Davenport's view, the men elevated to leadership posi­
tions by New Haven's freemen had to be chosen carefully and 
had to be of the highest caliber. They were, after all, 
God’s viceregents on earth and as such were due proper 
deference and respect. If any spoke out against their rule, 
as was done by Thomas Blacksley in 1646, punishment would
surely follow for "neglecting the image of God in magis- 
57trates." Contempt for authority, in addition to being 
disrespectful and setting a poor example for others, was 
viewed by the saints as a threat to the civil order they 
had fabricated.
Along with the family and the church, magistrates, the 
guardians of New Haven's civil society, were viewed as
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being especially important. More so in fact than the insti­
tutions entrusted to their care. This is not to suggest 
that the principal political institutions of the community 
were unimportant, rather that their effectiveness hinged on 
the quality of the individuals who were placed in positions 
of authority. This is a major reason why so much attention 
was devoted to the choice and the character of magistrates 
in New England, why the magistracy was considered ro be such 
an important office. But another line of reasoning is also 
suggestive. The actual organs of local government erected
in New England towns were, with some variation, transplanta-
58tions of English borough and shire institutions. They 
were part of a tradition common to all Englishmen, regener- 
* ^ ute -and unregenerate alike. Consequently, there was little 
need to justify the necessity of political institutions tha,t 
the majority of colonists already accepted, that were part 
of their collective heritage. Political rule by the elect, 
in contrast, was uncommon; it is what needed to be defended, 
indeed extolled. This is why it was crucial for the founda­
tion of secular government to be constructed through a pro­
cess that was voluntary. This explains the care and se­
quence inherent in the process which led to New Haven's 
"Fundamental Agreement." And it was consistent with the 
forethought given to the creation of institutions on the 
county and colony levels of government. It was a deep 
seated sense of order, intertwined with the .religiosity of 
the saints, that characterized the foundation of a civil
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government, much in the same way it defined familial obliga­
tions and influenced the gathering of a covenanted church 
group. This staunch commitment to order was reflected also 
in the fundamental laws of New Haven.
There can be little doubt that New Haven’s earliest 
laws were those that the "Scriptures held forth” as fitting 
for a society of saints. The concept of order to which they 
adhered and which played a prominent role in the organiza­
tion of other institutions also determined the character of 
their laws. This is consistent with the opinions of legal 
historians who.subscribe to the notion that at any given time 
the most powerful ingredients in law are the current values,
convictions and emotions of those responsible for making,
59repealing, and enforcing laws. In the case of New Haven 
it is clear from the preceding discussion of the family, 
the church, and the magistracy, that these attributes man­
ifested themselves in what amounts to a predictable se­
quence of reasoning and events. In each instance, the 
cardinal source of both information and inspiration was 
the Bible. And, so it was with law.
Less can be said, however, about the legal edifice 
erected at New Haven in 1639 than was the case with other 
institutions for the simple reason that very little was 
written about law at the time. This is not a problem with 
New Haven evidence exclusively, for the earliest records 
of other New England towns are equally barren of either
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legal theory or enumerations of fundamental laws. This ex­
plains the lack of consensus in legal scholarship over mat­
ters concerning the character of law during the Great Migra­
tion. A point made two decades ago by George Haskins typi­
fies the problem: "Massachusetts law in the colonial period
was a syncretization of Bibilical precedent and a complex 
English heritage which included not only the common law and 
the statutes," but also practices "of the church courts, of
justices of the peace, and of the local courts of manors
60and .towns from which the colonists came." In other words, 
a virtual grab-bag of explanations has been utilized to 
describe the foundations of law in the region. A few ref­
erences to Mosaic law or common law or local custom have 
seemed to satisfy scholars of the early colonial period.
In response to the lack of explicit descriptions of law in 
its inchoate stages of development, current assessments have 
drawn heavily from law codes which, although complex, tended 
to postdate settlement to a significant extent. In the
case of Plymouth, where the earliest code in New England
61was compiled, the lag-time was 16 years. In the Massa­
chusetts, Connecticut, and New Haven colonies, it*1 was 20.
But to describe the fundamental laws of New England communi­
ties on the basis of several years of accumulated experi­
ence is, it seems, to minimize the importance of the set­
tler's concepts about law and society before this accumu­
lation actually occurred. Moreover, the legal foundations 
that existed in New Haven and other communities at the
46
outset of settlement consisted of laws that were far more 
limited in scope and far more "fundamental" than those em­
bodied in subsequent codes.
These limitations can be traced to a pair of sources.
The first was a complete lack of experience with new world
conditions. The legislation which was ultimately required
to meet these novel circumstances, however, was incorporated
into later codes. The second, and perhaps more important
source, was the mind set of the planters, particularly the
leaders of the puritan mission. The process of immigration
provided unique opportunities for New England's rulers to
create a legal milieu based upon voluntary agreement and
62was therefore in keeping with their larger world view.
The basis for scriptural rude in New Haven was established 
when the planters consented to Davenport's first query 
which, when considering the fact that it was the foremost 
principle underlying the town's laws, church, and govern­
ment, received what appears to be extraordinary mileage. 
Despite its apparent limitations, the foundation of New 
Haven's corpus juris was the Bible, just as it had been for 
the other components of the New England Way; each was cast 
out of the mold which had been crafted by God. This does 
not mean that the saints failed to anticipate problems 
which would arise over time and for which there were no 
Biblical equivalents, but rather that the Scriptures were 
meant to serve as a guide for the conduct of individuals 
in their relations with one another— and with God as well.
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Consequently, it was with sincere conviction that New Haven 
leaders determined "that the judicial laws of God as they 
were delivered by Moses... shall be accounted of moral equi­
ty, and generally bind all offenders, and be a rule in all
the courts... in their proceeding against offenders, till
63they be branched out into particulars hereafter." This 
provision was extremely basic, but at the same time it was 
broad enough to cover a multitude of sins, each of which 
was capable of damaging the carefully constructed social 
order. Hence if a member of the community were to rise up 
and take the life of his neighbor, he could be put to death. 
If a young adult should neglect his duty and steal from a 
parent or master, he was required to make restitution. Or 
if a stranger in the town disturbed the peace, he could be 
taken to a stranger's court and be punished accordingly. 
Moreover, the framers of New Haven's fundamental laws 
adopted those which they believed would best preserve har­
mony and which, after all, were in keeping with the formu­
la for success in New England. To suggest otherwise, to 
imply that a "syncretization" existed at the time when the 
fundamental institutions were being implemented, does not 
do justice to the broad commitment to order which served 
as a foundation not just for law, but for family life, 
churches, and political bodies as well.
The character of New Haven's fundamental laws was but 
one indication of a broad vision of order transported to
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the new world in the seventeenth century. On the one hand, 
this vision was part of a tradition shared by most English­
men, one in which notions of hierarchy and the "commonwealth" 
held very prominent positions. On the other hand, it was 
strengthened substantially by a religious commitment to a 
"cosmic division of labor" that colored the institutions 
created by the vanguard of the errand into the wilderness. 
The nucleus of the overall concept of order was one's per­
sonal relationship with God; it was the covenant which bound 
saints to lead sanctified lives and to set examples for 
those around them in "subordination or coordination." The 
success of the puritan mission rested upon the ability of 
the elect to regulate the conduct of those in fellowship 
with them, and perhaps above all, of those who were not.
The surest means of achieving this goal was to fashion 
the basic components of society to the specifications of the 
master architect himself— God. And because families were 
considered the nurseries of society they became important 
sources of proper behavior. Moreover, these "little com­
monwealths" mirrored larger society to the extent that, 
from adult male heads of households down to the inferior 
servant, a network of hierarchical relationships and a 
corpus of divine commands existed which delineated the true 
and proper structure necessary to nourish the well-ordered 
society. Often written and oral covenants played a signif­
icant role in highlighting familial obligations. Indeed, 
the saints utilized voluntary covenants in a variety of
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settings to help stress the mutual love and charity they per­
ceived as permiating their society. Perhaps the most visible 
use of the covenant lay in conjunction with the gathering of 
ecclesiastical institutions which were completely autonomous, 
even though they were not synonymous with the membership of 
the entire community. Nevertheless, both the form of the 
church and the requirements of those who wished to join, were 
stipulated in Scripture. The purity of the properly ordered 
church was linked closely to its independent status and, 
nested within this, the ability of each congregation to dis­
cipline its own members. It was not, however, the elect who 
played havoc with the psychological insecurities of rulers. 
The unregenerate "civil man" posed the most formidable chal­
lenge to orthodoxy. This is why secular government performed 
such a central role in upholding the social order. And in 
New Haven and other communities, the contractualism upon 
which the church rested also formed the basis of political 
institutions. New Haven's "Fundamental Agreement" was 
reached through a process of voluntarism which placed poli­
tical power in the hands of the elect. In 1639 the town's 
free planters chose to impose extremely high qualifications 
for citizenship and agreed to follow the laws set forth in 
Scripture and enforced by a small group of God fearing mag­
istrates. Everyone knew that they were the laws of God, and 
they became the cornerstone of social control.
All of this, of course, represented an ideal, one almost 
too good to be real. But it was real, at least in the minds
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of the puritans who presided over the founding institutions
64in New England. And although the ideal would crumble in
the face of new world conditions, it did have an impact on
65subsequent generations of New Englanders. Additionally, 
the puritan notion of order became the standard by which to 
judge social change. In the past few decades a number of 
studies have been devoted to change in the areas of family 
life (Greven), religious life (Miller), and community orga­
nization (Lockridge). In each instance an ideal view of 
order has performed a basic task in explaining patriarchal 
control, religous principles embodied in documents like the 
Cambridge Platform, and the policies of perfection inherent 
in a utopian commune. The character of fundamental law in 
New Haven also reflected the ideal. It is against this that 
alterations must be measured. The wait will not be a long 
one, for in New Haven, the process of change began when the 
law "branched out into particulars" in an effort to order 
more completely a society confronted by challenges associ­
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On a December day in 1647 New Haven's Plantation Court 
devoted an entire session to the resolution of private 
controversies. Of the several suits heard, the case between 
John Meiggs, a New Haven tanner, and Henry Gregory, a 
Stratford shoemaker, proved to have a significant impact on 
the writing of law and hence the maintenance of order in the 
community. As plaintiff, Meiggs sued Gregory for damage to 
"his name and estate" stemming from a breach of contract. 
Meiggs charged that the 14 dozen shoes he bargained for were 
poorly made, thereby damaging his reputation (he claimed 
that some consumers thought that he was "worthy to be put in 
prison") and to his livelihood because other sales he had 
pending fell through once word spread that the shoes he was 
selling were inferior. Specifically, Meiggs claimed that 
the shoes fell apart almost immediately upon use, that he 
never received any with wooden heels as the contract stated, 
and that some pairs were designated as size ten when in fact 
they were a size smaller. Gregory's defense was that the 
leather he had received from Meiggs to make the shoes was of 
extremely poor quality, thus, to his way of thinking, shift­
ing the blame back to Meiggs.3'
The broad manifestations of the case emerged when
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witnesses appeared and it became clear to authorities that 
consumers were left unprotected from fraud or poor workman­
ship. Because so many shoes were involved and because many 
of them had been sold, it was easy to locate witnesses. For 
the most part, all the testimony pointed to the same thing: 
inferior shoes. John Parmely of Guilford testified, for 
example, that the pair he had bought fell apart within days. 
Jonathan Sargent reported that after wearing his recently 
purchased shoes on three occasions one of the soles fell 
off. A Mrs. Blackman claimed that after wearing her pair 
for a few days, "the leather was like flaps of a shoulder 
mutton."
It was clear from most of the testimony that the shoes 
were poorly made-. However, the question of blame was still 
at issue. Each party was able to produce witnesses who 
spoke convincingly on his behalf. One of the plaintiff's 
backed up his claim that flax rather than hemp was used to 
bind the shoes, thus tending to weaken them. By the same 
token, Gregory's son Juda testified that the original 
leather was poor and as such could not be worked properly.
As to some of the specific charges: Gregory admitted that
no shoes with wooden heels were delivered, but, echoing his 
son, he also argued that the sizes had originally been 
marked by Meiggs and that the leather marked size ten was 
so poor that it could not be stretched to specification.
As for the charge of inferior quality, witnesses for the 
defense repeatedly claimed that the leather was "tainted"
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and that it could be torn easily.
Following the testimony of witnesses for the plaintiff 
and the defendant, other tanners and shoemakers were called 
to examine the shoes from the perspective of the quality of 
the leather used and of the workmanship itself. According 
to the "experts," both parties appeared to have been at 
fault. On the one hand, they determined that the raw leather 
was in fact poor, indeed, untanned. For this Meiggs was 
liable. On the other hand, they also concluded that the 
workmanship was sub-standard because the stitches were too 
long, the flax was unwaxed, and the awl holes were too large 
for the thread. The decision of the court mirrored that of 
the experts: both parties were to blame and in the process 
the "country was much wronged." Most of the fault was 
placed on Meiggs for providing Gregory with untanned leather. 
Consequently he was fined £10 and ordered to satisfy wronged 
consumers. Yet the shoemaker had also "transgressed the 
rules of righteousness" and for this he was fined £5, court 
charges, and was told that he could not recover his lost 
labor.
Although Meigg's suit had begun as a private issue 
pending between two parties, it escalated quickly to include 
numerous New Haven residents as well as those of neighboring 
communities. From a legal perspective, what is significant 
is the speed with which authorities responded to issues 
raised in the case. Within two months of the trial legisla­
tion was passed which was intended to regulate the quality
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of leather used in the community and protect consumers from
"unrighteousness." The chosen response to the problem was
the creation of the position of public sealer to inspect and
seal all leather sold to shoemakers. And, so that the
"buyer be not deceived," cobblers were ordered to mark their
shoes "upon the lap withinside below the place where they be
tied," or face prosecution and punishment at the discretion 
2
of the court.
Meiggs v. Gregory is one of the more dramatic examples 
of the way laws were framed in early New Haven. The case 
called to attention a basic problem facing the community—  
lack of consumer protection— and it generated a direct legal 
response to a source of potential discord. In short, it 
epitomized the "branching out" that characterized lawmaking 
and legal change throughout the seventeenth century.
Because this kind of legal cause and effect relationship 
had such an important bearing on the maintenance of order in 
New Haven (and presumably other communities), it is sur­
prising that legal historians have not analyzed such connec­
tions in greater detail. Typically, their energies have 
been channelled in the direction of colony level law codes 
which, in New England, tended to postdate the settlement 
process by at least 15 years. Thus by emphasizing formal 
codes almost exclusively, legal scholars have virtually 
ignored the evolution of law on the local level and there­
fore the context of community bylaws which had a pervasive
3
impact on the lives of New Englanders. Furthermore, they
I
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have also neglected to emphasize the connection between law 
and its enforcement. So too have historians of crime in 
early America. While their studies have documented the en­
forcement of law, they have not generally analyzed the obvi-
4
ous link to the legislative process.
This is also somewhat surprising because in New Haven
and other locales both criminality and litigation were 
closely related to legislation. In England, for example,
the Clandestine Marriage Act of 1723 altered the legal def­
inition of marriage and thus had an impact on prosecutions 
for illegitimacy. Similarly, a sixteenth-century Act of 
Parliament restricting the use of benefit of clergy is 
thought to have produced a reduction in the number of thefts 
involving breaking and entering. And it has also been 
argued that the re-definition of law, which sometimes causes 
changes in normative boundaries, can have an instrumental
5
affect on the production or reduction of rates of deviance. 
Since New Haven experienced the kind of legal interplay il­
lustrated by the foregoing examples it is necessary to syn­
thesize the concerns of legal scholars and historians of 
crime in order to appreciate fully the context of social 
control.
This is perhaps best accomplished by approaching law and 
order the way the planters of New Haven did: on two dis­
tinct, but interrelated levels. First, order was promoted 
on the local level through the implementation of penalty- 
bearing town ordinances or bylaws. These originated within
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the context of local needs and were approved in the town 
meeting by freemen. Generally magistrates and other town 
officials took the initiative in pushing for the adoption of 
local ordinances, but they were doing so in response to the 
concerns of local residents who felt that their daily affairs 
could be better served through bylaws aimed at reducing 
sources of disorder within the community. This had been the 
case with the regulations formulated in the wake of Meiggs 
v. Gregory. On other occasions, the initiative can be 
linked more directly to local residents who openly clamored 
for the adoption of certain laws. This proved to be the case 
in the late forties, for example, when the control of live­
stock had become problematic. Regardless of who took the 
initiative the actual bylaws shared common characteristics: 
they tended to be "secular" responses to local problems and 
were universally punishable by small fines. Furthermore, 
the enforcement of these bylaws generally took place on the 
local level and as such was strikingly similar to the situ­
ation that existed in English communities. In essence then,
6it was a traditional strategy for maintaining order.
But because New Haven was one of six towns which, after 
1643, comprised the New Haven Colony, its residents were 
also bound by the laws of this larger jurisdiction. The 
laws of the colony were passed by magistrates and deputies 
(representatives) of the respective towns and were eventually 
incorporated into formal, written codes. The New Haven and 
Connecticut Colony codes were patchwork collections of
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procedures and laws which were designed to promote unifor­
mity and order. It was not uncommon for the codes to in­
clude some of the rules and regulations which originated on 
the local level. Indeed, the sections of the New Haven 
Colony code concerning shoes and shoemakers can be traced 
ba,ck to Meiggs v. Gregory. However, it was on the colony 
level that one encounters the ’’Judicial Laws of Moses” and 
numerous other laws ranging from gaming to drinking that 
were meant to regulate the passions of the saints and civil 
man alike.
Broadly conceived then, each level of lawmaking in early 
New Haven attempted to promote order through law by addres­
sing different sources of disorder. Local officials were 
concerned primarily with problems peculiar to their community. 
Although colony officials focused on a wider range of legal 
matters, largely in the interest of uniformity, it is never­
theless important to recognize that they had the task of 
legislating morality. Because the character of law on the 
local and colony levels was so different, it is not sur­
prising that patterns of criminal conduct as reflected 
through enforcement also varied. Moreover, by approaching 
New Haven's legal milieu from this dual perspective it is 
possible to achieve a deeper appreciation of why, when, 
and how laws were enforced. Ultimately it will promote a 
better understanding of the way order was defined and 
maintained in this early New England community.
64
In October, 1639 when the Plantation or Town Court of 
New Haven convened for the first time, the recently elected 
magistrates who presided over the session did so without the 
benefits of positive or established law. In 1639 the "Judi­
cial Laws of Moses" served as the only guide by which to 
conduct legal affairs. Biblical law was, of course, consis­
tent with the leader's perceptions of how best to preserve 
order in a society of saints. And it was a principal fea­
ture of John Cotton's "Moses His Judicials" which was pre­
sumably carried from Massachusetts to New Haven by John 
Davenport. The so-called Cotton Code was compiled by the 
Boston divine in 1636 and was meant to serve as the first 
legal code of Massachusetts. Although the compilation was
rejected by Bay Colony legislators, it is thought to have
' 7had a positive influence on the New Haven leadership. Yet 
both the Cotton Code and New Haven's reliance upon Biblical 
injunctions not included in the code had obvious limita­
tions, especially when placed within the context of control­
ling the lives of ambitious settlers in the new world envi­
ronment. To be sure, in certain instances Scriptural rule 
suited the community's judicial system quite well. For 
example, New Haven magistrates were able to rely success­
fully on the word of God when prosecuting Nepaupuck, a 
local Indian, for taking the life of an Englishman: "He
that sheds man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed." 
Accordingly, the native’s head was cut off and "pitched
Q
upon a pole in the market place." But where were the
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magistrates to turn when residents accused of cutting timber 
in a disorderly manner approached the bar? Where were they 
to turn when duty called upon them to prosecute a servant 
for missing a militia training exercise? What guide could 
they rely on to prosecute recalcitrant saints whose chimneys 
had not been swept? Ultimately New Haven rulers came to 
depend on a combination of homespun and traditional secular 
law which represented their "branching out into particulars."
When the circumstances of their environment forced New 
Haven leaders to adjust to their new milieu and create laws 
that were decidedly secular in nature, they by no means in­
tended to compromise the foundations of order upon which the 
welfare of the community rested. In all likelihood they did 
not believe that they were, for even the most enthusiastic 
saint realized that Biblical equivalents could not be found 
to govern the variety of conditions present in seventeenth- 
century America. Indeed, a part of their English heritage 
included the notion that simple regulation was a function
9of good government even if it were not divinely inspired. 
There was no way of avoiding secular regulation even if 
the saints wished to because control over the daily activ- 
ties of regenerate and unregenerate men, women, and child­
ren was a necessity if the community was to survive the 
initial years of settlement and hope to prosper in the 
future. Very quickly secular law and its enforcement, not 
spiritual exegesis and admonition, became the principal 
means of controlling disorder in New England towns like
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New Haven. No amount of catechizing could ensure against 
starvation when forests had to be cleared. Though grievous, 
sabbath breaking would be tolerated if it meant that a sec­
tion of fence would be repaired and unruly livestock kept 
from a tender crop. Properly hewn and covenanted pillars 
would come to mean very little if caught in the path of a 
raging wilderness fire. And the regulation of labor, of 
fencing, and of fire control equipment became, especially 
in the 1640s, major features of New Haven's branching out 
and were all crucial elements of what amounted to an in­
creasingly secular legal milieu.
The 1640s were, without doubt, the most important 
decade of legal growth in New Haven. Certainly more orders 
or non-penalty directives and more bylaws were passed than 
during any other period of the town's history during the 
seventeenth-century."^ Between 1639 and 1698 the town 
adopted a total of 114 bylaws aimed at regulating the conduct 
of community members. Over half of these addressed the two 
most pressing and persistent problems which faced the town 
prior to 1701— livestock control and military obedience. As 
indicated in Figure 2.1, the vast majority of bylaws (53%) 
were written in the first decade of the town's existence. 
Moreover, with the exception of a trifling increase (1%) 
for the decade beginning in 1689, the percentage of total 
laws passed by the local government declined steadily from 
the peak of activity in the 1640s.
Of all the bylaws passed in the first ten years, a
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total of 30, or 50%, were placed on the books prior to the
first attempt at codification in 1646. This initial branch­
ing out reflects the need to go beyond Biblical foundations 
in order to safeguard the welfare of the community. For 
example, one of the earliest dangers facing new world set­
tlements like New Haven was fire. Because fires in fire­
places and ovens, as well as on houselots, were commonplace 
the possibilities of kindling an uncontrollable blaze were 
numberless. It was therefore imperative that some measures 
be taken to prevent and control fire. The first effort came 
in the form of an order in 1641 specifying "that fire hooks 
shall be made for the common use of the town, at a common
c h a r g e . I t  is not known with certainty if there were any
major fires during this period, but in the same year that 
the hooks were ordered a law was passed that stipulated 
"that every house in the town shall have a ladder (in length
to suit the height of their chimney)... to stand ready by
12their houses, under penalty of 5s fine." One can reason­
ably surmise, therefore, that there had been chimney or 
roof fires that were damaging to individual dwellings and 
perhaps threatening to the town itself. Quite simply, law­
makers wanted houses to be equipped with ladders so that 
unwanted fires could be extinguished. Those who failed to 
comply with the law were brought to court and reminded 
through newly imposed penalties that they had better con­
form to fire control standards. This is exactly what hap­
pened to Samuel Hotchkiss Sr. and seven other residents
68
Figure 2.1






Sources: New Haven Records, I & II; Town Records, I-III.
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who, in 1643, stood in violation of the law and were conse-
13quently fined 5s each "for want of ladders."
This small clustering of convictions is noteworthy on 
two accounts. First, it represents roughly 20% of all the 
cases prosecuted in 1643 and is indicative of local prior­
ities. Second, it illustrates the dynamics of the rela­
tionship that existed between legislation and petty offenses. 
The following scenario recreates the association: community
members express concern over dangers inherent in the con­
stant use of fire; a few fires occur which are jarring 
enough to warrant appropriate directives (hooks) and legis­
lation (ladders); all but a few of the residents equip them­
selves with ladders; those who do not are fined and then go 
on to meet the necessary fire control and prevention regu­
lations. In this particular instance the mechanisms of 
social control (law and enforcement) ran smoothly enough to 
suit the needs of both rulers and ruled, and to a decided 
measure functioned in such a way as to help preserve phys­
ical order as well as promote peace of mind in the commu­
nity. Fire control laws comprised but a portion (3%) of 
those formulated on the local level during the seventeenth- 
century. There were, however, other needs of the evolving 
community that were equally if not more important in main­
taining order and as such were addressed through the legis­
lative process.
One of the clearest example of the relationship between
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community needs and law comes under the heading of military 
affairs. Nearly 30% of the bylaws passed during the seven­
teenth century dealt with military matters, from prohibi­
tions on selling arms to Indians (£5 fine) to arriving late 
for watch duty (Is fine). Of the 31 military bylaws passed 
before 1700, 24 or 77% were placed on the books prior to 
1666 and New Haven's absorption into Connecticut. And just 
over half of these appeared during the first decade of set­
tlement when the need for protection and military discipline 
was perhaps the greatest.
At various times during the course of the century the 
colonists had good reason to fear attacks from the Dutch, 
and, perhaps with greater cause, from coastal Indians. The 
most well known period of danger from the natives is King 
Philip's uprising in the 1670s. New Haven lawmakers did 
respond to the dangers associated with that period of anx­
iety, but by 1675 local residents had nearly 40 years of 
accumulated legislation and experience which enabled them 
to mobilize effectively against King Philip's threat. The 
1640s were a completely different story. Indeed, the ac­
tual settlement of New Haven followed the conclusion of 
the Pequot War by only a few years. It is not unreasonable 
to suggest that the decade following that conflict was 
marked by underlying paranoia. The trial and execution of 
the "savage” Nepaupuck in 1639 was symptomatic of this per­
vasive fear. To New Havenites the image of the noble and 
friendly Indian so frequently epitomized in modern
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literature by Squanto was inconsistent with many of the
realities of coexisting with a people whose behavior and
cultural heritage differed so dramatically from their own.
And, to fuel the apprehensions associated with the after-
math of the Pequot conflict, several valid threats were
posed by Indians in the 1640s which prompted community
leaders to take action and come to grips with the perceived 
14menance. Not surprisingly, legislation was considered 
the most responsible means of meeting the challenge.
Given the prevailing atmosphere it did not take author­
ities very long to lay the foundation for military prepared­
ness. As early as 1639 the first law was passed: "It is
ordered that everyone that bears arms shall be completely 
furnished with... a musket, a sword, bandoleers, a rest, a
pound of powder, twenty bullets fitted to their musket...
15under the penalty (of) 20s fine for every default." Over
the course of the next five years ten more laws and a total
of 70 orders were issued in an attempt to meet the military
requirements of the community. Among other things, those
needs included the creation of a watch, the working out of
a training schedule, and the formation of an artillary 
10company. Each of these laws, together with the sanctions 
associated with them, were part of a body of secular regu­
lation aimed at forcing community members to meet the mini-
17mum standards of readiness. Although the barrage of or­
ders issued during this half decade carried no penalties, 
they clearly lent support to the actual legislation. For
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example, an order of 1642 specified that under alarm condi­
tions "every soldier in the town is to repair to the meet­
inghouse forthwith." In 1644 the town's "Great Gunnes" were 
ordered to be put "in readiness for service." The following 
year another directive was issued that required the gun­
smiths "to lay aside all other business and get those guns
18repaired that are defective." These orders and others 
like them were important sources of support for recent leg­
islation and therefore aided in the community's social con­
trol endeavors during the initial years of settlement. 
Throughout this period leaders had directed their energy 
towards meeting a major challenge— Indians— posed by the new 
world environment. By choosing law as the best response to 
crisis local rulers broadened the town's legal edifice to 
embrace new aspects of order not provided by the "Judicial 
Laws of Moses."
The military legislation of the 1640s left the community 
with most, but not all, of the bylaws needed to check the 
dangers of an Indian attack. When new situations arose 
which called for additional laws local officials once again 
responded in a direct and meaningful manner. A good example 
of this is seen in the legal response to King Philip's War. 
Like the crisis of the 1640s, that of 1675-1676 once again 
made military preparedness a local priority. And at the 
time of the war there had not been any military legislation 
in New Haven for a decade; no laws had been passed because 
none were needed. This changed dramatically when the war
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began. Very quickly six new military regulations, or 85% of 
those passed between 1666 and 1701, were placed on the books. 
Few of the new ordinances, however, were aimed at control­
ling trainband disorders, the keeping of the watch, or re­
pairing defective arms, as had been the case earlier.
Either these provisions were covered adequately enough by 
previous legislation or the issue of enforcement had not 
become serious enough to cause revisions or amendments of 
original laws. The first priority of community leaders in 
1675-76 seemed to fall in another area of preparedness: 
fortifications. That is why the town formulated new bylaws 
specifying that a stockade be built and that any individual
failing to contribute to its construction (able body males
19over 14) be fined 5s. Much of the wood used to erect the 
"fortification line" came from a vigorous effort aimed at 
clearing underbrush from the area so that it would not be­
come a "shelter to the enemy." The process of clearing 
began under an order issued in the fall of 1675 which at 
the time carried no penalty. Authorities considered the 
clearing project important enough to issue subsequent or­
ders and warnings as a means of achieving compliance.
Within a month, however, it had become evident that these 
informal approaches to the problem were not effective.
The town therefore responded by passing a law which carried 
a Is penalty for every rod not cleared. And to make it
more meaningful several individuals were appointed to over-
20see the operation and report violators to the authorities.
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This underbrush legislation was only temporary— one of a 
handful of bylaws so designated during the seventeenth 
century. However, what is significant about the military 
bylaws of the 1670s is that they were passed in direct re­
sponse to a crisis facing the community. In fact most of 
the 31 military regulations formulated during the century, 
whether in the 1640s or 1670s, were similar in that they 
represented a response to local problems and thus a branch­
ing or broadening of the legal milieu beyond Bibilical 
foundations.
Another area of concern that generated a similar legal
response to disorder was the control of livestock. As
proved to be the case with military affairs, the control of
livestock through proper fencing and other means became a
topic of utmost concern for members of the community during
the first two decades of settlement. The first mention of
livestock control— and hint of a problem— was made at a
Town Meeting in January 1640 when it was suggested "that some
21speedy course shall be taken to keep hogs out of the neck."
In many respects this order summarizes the central purpose
of livestock control: permitting animals to roam in certain
areas and restraining them from entering others. Within a
few years of this initial directive, others were made which
were aimed at controlling the animal population of New Haven
in different ways. In 1643 the court ordered two separate
pounds to be constructed and directed the neck to be fenced
22and fitted with gates. In 1645 one of the earliest live­
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stock control bylaws was passed; it prohibited goats from
roaming off private property and Thomas Caffinch was fined
23for failing to control his. By 1646 town officials had 
issued 23 orders and passed six laws all in an attempt to 
restrain and otherwise control livestock.
Yet during this initial phase of legislation the author­
ities were unable to bring the disorders under control; in 
fact, the entire problem had been faced in a somewhat in­
formal manner. Although orders had been made and laws 
passed, there existed no meaningful agencies of control to 
carry them out. The principal burden of livestock manage­
ment before 1646 fell on the shoulders of fence viewers who 
were responsible for overseeing fences in their neighbor­
hoods or "quarters." This decentralized and informal ap­
proach to the problem was ineffectual, so much so that the
town passed a law which carried a 2s penalty for viewers
24who failed to carry out their "appointed" task. The need 
for viewers originally arose in 1644 in response to a com­
plaint made by Thomas Nash, a local gunsmith, "of damage
25done in his corn to the value of nine bushels by hogs.”
Lack of diligence on the viewers part may also explain why 
Thomas Caffinch was the only resident prosecuted for vio­
lating livestock statutes prior to 1646. More often than 
not, the problem of regulation manifested itself through 
civil litigation. Quite simply, the lack of effective en- 
forecement made the problem worse and this forced residents 
to drag their neighbors into court. John Owen, for example,
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was left with no alternative in 1642 after has corn had been 
damaged by unrestrained cattle. Two years later William 
Thompson entered a complaint against Thomas Gregson, a lead­
ing member of the community, because of damage done to his 
crop. The court ruled that several individuals were at 
fault for allowing their fences to "lay down," and each, in­
cluding Gregson, was ordered to pay Thompson six bushels of 
26corn. Had the viewers been doing their job correctly, the 
litigation may well have been avoided.
By 1648 the problem had become serious enough for magis­
trate Theophilus Eaton to lament publically "that many are
discouraged from the labor of husbandry, because their corn,
27when they had sown it, is spoiled." In response to what 
was considered to be a serious problem, the town devised an 
effective agency of control, passed a number of new laws and 
supportive orders, and, by virtue of these changes, a greater 
number of violators were prosecuted.
The pivotal step towards resolving the problem was made 
when leaders introduced to the community the position of 
public pounder or pound keeper which was considered to be
*28
the "best way" to "prevent damage done, by swine and fences.
John Cooper accepted the position, and, in addition to the
traditional duties of a pound keeper, he was entrusted with
the responsibility of viewing fences on a weekly basis and
29of notifying owners of their defects. The appointment was 
indeed a significant step in combating the problems of live­
stock control because for the first time the town had an
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effective "middleman" capable of linking private residents, 
and thus violators, to the courts.
Because the magistracy considered the position of pound 
keeper to be so important, a series of new bylaws and orders 
was undertaken in the post-1648 period. For instance, in an 
effort to aid the pounder in his duties, residents were or­
dered to mark their fences so that violators could be read-
30ily identified. Within months of his appointment Cooper 
discovered "that he finds great difficulty in viewing fences" 
because of residents who left town without making some pro­
vision for the maintenance of their fences. Consequently the
court ordered that caretakers be designated by owners before
31they left town for long periods or face prosecution. And 
in 1652, after a law had been passed that enumerated penal­
ties for missing posts and rails, another was added which
carried a 12d fine for convicted fence violators who had not
32paid their original penalty.
In addition to laws focusing exclusively on fences, 
others were passed which were aimed at restricting further 
the movement of livestock. Based on information provided by 
the pound keeper and upon a series of complaints that 
"Indian corn is spoiled, and more like[ly] to be, if some 
other course not be taken," a bylaw was passed that speci­
fied that if any "swine be found in the fields or streets
unyoaked, the owner shall pay 12d a piece for them beside 
33damage." Because the control of swine had become espe­
cially troublesome by the early fifties, authorities were
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constrained to limit the number that could be owned in di­
rect proportion to the amount of land held by local resi- 
34dents. And eventually, an order was made that "no man but
such as are admitted planters here shall keep any swine or
cattle" within the limits of New Haven without first having
35obtained the "Townes consent."
The problems associated with controlling livestock were 
not completely solved by the late 1650s. Indeed, the town 
would pass 15 more laws— as circumstances required— and go 
on to issue many more orders before the turn of the century.
Yet it was during the late forties and early fifties that 
the problem of control was recognized for what it was— a 
threat to order— and that the position of pound keeper was 
created to address the situation in a realistic and mean­
ingful fashion. And among other things, the formulation of 
new bylaws and their enforcement meant that the degree of 
contention between individuals also diminished, and so too,
the kinds of public disorders community leaders hoped to
. . 36 avoid.
Overall livestock control bylaws accounted for 41 or 35% 
of those passed during the seventeenth century. Volume 
alone should be an indication that correcting disorders re­
lated to livestock became a priority in New Haven. What should 
not go unnoticed, however, is the myriad of isolated instances 
of lawmaking which, while perhaps not related to a major cri­
sis, nevertheless reflect legal responses to potential 
sources of disruption. In 1641, for instance, before ferry
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service had been established for crossing the Quinnipiac 
River, disorders arose when settlers "borrowed" canoes with­
out owner's permission. Unwanted litigation resulted and the 
town responded by passing a law which forced individuals
found guilty of taking a "boat or canoe without leave" to pay
37a 20s fine or appropriate damages to the owner. When, in 
1650, the activities of a stranger named Elisha Weeden became 
a source of disruption, another ordinance was passed which 
required transients to receive permission from town authori­
ties to remain. While the bylaw was aimed at regulating the 
presence of "outsiders," officials were quick to note that
it was not designed to exclude "friends who in a way of love
38come to visit." And when the need arose in 1663 to regu­
late the speed at which horses could be ridden through town,
39another law was passed which corrected the disorder.
Whether town ordinances were written in the wake of
isolated events such as borrowing canoes or in the midst of
more prolonged periods of crisis concerned with military 
preparedness, one basic characteristic of attempts to pro­
mote order through law on the local level emerges: law­
making was a secular response to specific needs of the 
community. Some of the bylaws, like those regulating the 
cutting of timber, can be traced to English manorial law
and thus were traditional. Others, such as military regu­
lation, were more novel insofar as they were direct re­
sponses to new world conditions. Most of the 114 local 
statutes, 78 or 69%, were passed prior to 1659 when the
80
need to "branch out" was greatest. Additional ordinances 
were passed before 1701 as amendments or new legislation was 
required to meet new conditions. However, most of the law­
making in the post-1659 period did not occur in clusters 
which may be an indication that physically the town was bet­
ter ordered in the late going that at the outset of settle­
ment. If this was the case, then it follows that most of 
the enforcement of local statutes would have taken place 
during the initial years when disorders were more prevalent. 
Since the enforcement of bylaws generally was carried out 
on the local level, it should come as no surprise to find
that patterns of petty crime were inextricably linked to the
40priorities of the community.
The enforcement of bylaws was only one aspect of the 
overall attempt to maintain order in New Haven. As suggested 
earlier, New Havenites were also bound by a set of higher, 
more universal statutes which were incorporated into a se­
ries of law codes found on the colony level. Colony codes 
touched on an array of legal matters, but specifically those 
governing morality which were never fully addressed on the 
local level. During the century residents of the town were 
exposed to four codes, each of which was more elaborate and 
realistic than its predecessor.
The initial experiment with codification came in the mid­
forties and was made in direct response to a pair of recent 
events. The compilation was made in part because New Haven's
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public notary and secretary Thomas Fugill, had been convicted
of land fraud by tampering with the records. This was a
clear violation of public trust and it caused officials to
41loose confidence in his work. Perhaps having a greater 
bearing on the codification attempt was the formation of the 
New Haven Colony in 1643 which, in addition to New Haven 
proper, included five neighboring communities. Quite natu­
rally officials believed that a single body of laws and pro­
cedures would be less confusing than six different collec­
tions of rules and regulations. Once begun, the standardiz­
ation and revision process took nearly a year to complete.
The original directive was issued in 1645 when magistrates 
and deputies were instructed "to view all those orders which 
are cf a lasting nature, and where they are defective, to 
mend them and then let them be read in the [general] court
[so] that the court may confirm or alter them as they see 
42cause." The work was completed by early 1646 with the 
formal collection of old and new bylaws, orders, and proce­
dures.
On the surface the 1646 code was little more than a 
collection or compilation of previous legal efforts. In 
this sense the revision pre-figured the more elaborate 
codes of 1656 (New Haven) and of 1650 and 1673 (Connecticut), 
which were also compilations. Yet to describe the 1646 re­
vision and subsequent codes as simple updates is to slight 
their importance to the architects of the New England Way.
On the one hand, and in a broad sense, the codes which
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appeared during the seventeenth century reflected a desire 
for precise delineation of law which originated with puri­
tans in England who perceived themselves as victims of
43Stuart tyranny. On the other hand, and closer to home, 
the codes were considered a means of promulgating order in 
New England towns and colonies through a reaffirmation of 
fundamental values and the benefits afforded by recorded, 
positive law.
Not surprisingly, the 1646 revision began with a restate­
ment of the legal foundations devised to suit the needs of 
the well ordered community: "The judicial laws of God, as
they were delivered by Moses, and expounded in other parts
of Scripture... shall be a constant direction for all pro-
44ceedings here." Beyond this general statement, however, 
the revision did not enumerate laws and punishments re­
lating to moral conduct. Following this reaffirmation of 
values, all the other laws, orders, and policies of the first 
few years "that were of a lasting nature" were incorporated 
into the revision. Significantly, many of the bylaws and 
procedures used in the town of New Haven served as the 
basis of the code; what was good for Davenport's and Eaton's 
community was evidently good for the other five colony 
towns. This was especially true with generalized regula­
tions like voting procedures and franchise requirements, 
both of which were reiterated in the revision. Other gen­
eral policies, like those governing land were rerecorded.
The methods used for determining assessments of "all rates
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and public charges" were also explained and placed on the
books. In addition to policies, orders that were considered
to be of special value to the communities were embraced in
the revision. These included provisions for the "better
training up of youth in this town" and the allocation of a
45salary for the town's first schoolmaster Ezekial Cheever. 
Because "of the trouble and hindrance which sundry, both of 
this town and other plantations find and undergo in getting 
over the East River," an order was incorporated into the 
code that called for the development of a ferry system which 
could alleviate the problem. Moreover, these are but two 
examples of codified orders ranging from the keeping of a 
book of warrants to providing bounties for wolves and foxes.
In addition to policies and orders, the revision also 
included a restatement of old bylaws and the inclusion of a 
few new ones where necessary. A total of 12 new statutes, 
mostly concerning military affairs, were added during the 
compilation process. For the most part, the new military 
legislation was designed to lend support to the bylaws 
passed prior to 1646. For example, in 1640 an ordinance 
stipulated that individuals who arrived late at training 
exercises were to be penalized. Yet no legal provision had 
been made to keep militiamen there once they had arrived.
It was in the wake of a series of inconvenient and disrup­
tive early departures that a bylaw was added to the 1646
code that penalized residents 5s if they were convicted of
46leaving the exercises prematurely. Similarly, because
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there had been disputes growing out of the recording of names
of those who attended the exercises, a new statute specified
that anyone who arrived late must notify the company clerk.
If they failed to comply, they faced possible conviction and 
47a 5s fine. And no earlier bylaws had sought to govern the 
behavior of soldiers at the exercises. This oversight was 
corrected through the addition of a law which empowered mag­
istrates and their deputies to punish disorderly militiamen
48at their discretion. Essentially, each one of the new mil­
itary bylaws was designed to promote order in the communities 
of the colony through effective regulation and enforcement of 
military affairs.
Although the revision of 1646 attempted to bring a measure 
of order through legal uniformity, it was by no means a full 
fledged code of law. It was important because it provided 
the basics needed to tie the towns of the colony together, 
but it was also vastly inadequate as an overall handbook of 
positive law. Indeed so many aspects of regulating the con­
duct of individuals were left untouched in the revision, 
that officials eventually decided to "publish" a more com­
plete code of laws. This occurred in 1656 and was also 
prompted by the fact that each of the "puritan" New England 
colonies had already compiled formal codes that transcended 
the peculiarities of "local communities. Thus moved by a 
desire for further uniformity and by the need to codify or 
otherwise define crimes of a capital nature, the New Haven 
Colony General Court requested Governor Theophilus Eaton to
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view the laws thought "most necessary to continue here," and
49then have them "sent to England to be printed." By the 
fall of 1656 500 copies of the so-called Eaton Code had ar­
rived in New Haven and they were ordered to be distributed
50to the colony's towns.
Known formally as New-Haven's Settling in New England, 
the code of 1656 resembled the earlier revision insofar as 
it was a compilation of procedures, orders, and laws. But 
Eaton's code departed from the collection made in 1646 in 
two important ways. First, it was less original because 
Eaton was authorized to borrow from the Massachusetts 
Colony's Laws and Liberties of 1648. Secondly, the Eaton 
Code finally specified penalties for moral offenses (such 
as fornication and drunkenness) which had always been un­
defined and discretionary.
The code consisted of 69 different categories of laws 
and procedures ranging from "actions” to "wolves” which 
were collectively designed to generate a uniform body of 
practices for conducting legal affairs in the colony. Of 
these, 37 (54%) were procedural in nature. For instance, 
if a New Haven housewife wished to sue her neighbor for 
slander, she could consult the portion of the code dealing 
with "actions" and find information concerning legal fees 
and, depending upon the value of her suit, the proper 
court in which to file her cause. By the same token, if a 
Branford farmer killed one of the colony's most dangerous 
predators, he could turn to the section on "wolves" and
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discover that in return for the animal's head he was enti-
51tied to a 20s bounty. Standard procedures such as these 
were clearly important in promoting uniformity and safe­
guarding the liberties of Englishmen in the new world, but 
they represent merely a portion of the code. Another 32 
(46%) of the principal headings were a combination of both 
procedure and law. Falling under these were a total of 64 
laws to which specific penalties were attached. For ex­
ample, under the heading "Ecclesiastical" there were two 
laws, each of which carried a different penalty: a fixed
fine of 5s for church absence and punishment by magisterial
52discretion for anyone convicted of reproaching religion.
In order to trace and identify probable sources of the laws 
in Eaton's compilation, the various headings must be dis­
sected in a manner that will isolate individual statutes. 
Once this is done it becomes evident that even the rather 
generalized laws of the colony were formulated in response 
to specific circumstances encountered in the new world.
The one exception to this was the block of 20 laws (31%) 
for which the Bible was the primary source. Not surprising­
ly, most of these were "universal" laws punishable by death. 
Seventeen were capital offenses which were taken directly 
from the Old Testament. In many respects these "Judicial 
laws of Moses" represent the Biblical foundations or "con­
stant direction" upon which both the town and colony rested. 
The well-ordered Bible Commonwealth was originally perceived 
as one free of those sinful deeds committed by miscreants
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who specifically violated the commands of God. Thus, con­
victed murderers could be executed (Lev. 24:17), as could 
adulterers (Lev. 20:10), and rebellious children who rose 
up against their parents (Deut. 21:18-21). Yet each of the 
seventeen capital laws found in the code were highly gener­
alized and most were never violated and therefore enforced
53with any regularity. The actual role they played in main­
taining order in the colony's towns was limited. More ap­
plicable to New England communities were the Biblical laws 
covering theft (restitution) and fornication (marriage), but 
in practice the punishment for these offenses rested on 
broad magisterial discretion and thus departed literally 
from Scriptural injunction. In terms of both application and 
quantity the laws of God were overshadowed by those which 
were secular responses to specific problems facing the col­
ony and its towns.
A little over two-thirds of the laws in Eaton's code were 
either traditional or original secular pieces of legislation. 
Nine (15%) can be traced directly to lawmaking that began in 
the town of New Haven. For instance, the law regulating
54leather for shoes evolved out of Meiggs v. Gregory in 1648.
Four military laws in the code date back to the rash of leg-
55islation undertaken during the 1640s in New Haven. And
the principal law governing the conduct of strangers can be
traced back to the circumstances surrounding Elisha Weeden 
56in 1650. Moreover, when local legislation (which Eaton 
had originally had a hand in creating) was considered general
88
enough to fit the needs of the colony, it was freely incor­
porated into the code.
So too were similar secular laws from Massachusetts. An 
additional 15 (24%) were borrowed directly from the Laws and 
Liberties, something that was in keeping with Eaton's in­
structions from the General Court. The reliance upon the 
Bay Colony for some legal advise was not altogether new in 
1656. During the late forties Eaton had written to John
Winthrop and requested information on taxation and how best
57to define the obligations of transient seamen. Because
the ties with the Bay were especially close it seemed only
natural for Eaton "to send for one of the new book of laws...
58and to add to what is already done as he shall think fit." 
Most of the borrowed laws fell under the general heading of 
entertainment— something that had never received full at­
tention by New Haven authorities. These laws were quite 
similar to those passed on the local level in New Haven, 
insofar as they were responses to problems that Massachu­
setts leaders encountered prior to 1648. For example, 
the laws against tippling which were adopted by Eaton had 
been passed by the Massachusetts General Court in May of 
1645; the penalty for lying was established in the same
year, and those for gaming were written shortly there­
to
after. The Bay Colony laws that were incorporated into 
the Eaton Code provided an additional element of positive 
legislation and strengthened those that had already been 
formulated by New Haven Colony officials.
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The sources for twenty (31%) of the remaining laws in 
the New Haven compilation are difficult to identify with 
certainty. For the most part they appear to have been a 
collection of customs and precedents practiced in the colony 
since its inception, but never specifically recorded. This 
was similar to the situation involving Biblical law, which 
was practiced in New Haven prior to the code, but which re­
mained nevertheless unrecorded. It seems clear, however, 
that generalized laws like that requiring colony residents 
to provide strong enclosures for cattle were original to 
the Eaton Code. The same can be said of laws governing
Indian affairs, like the sale of land, and of new legislation
60bearing on the education of children in the jurisdiction. 
Still the Eaton Code was, first and foremost, a compilation 
of laws and procedures that were, by 1656, in need of formal 
recording and clarification. As such, Governor Eaton turned 
to the Bible, to appropriate legislation from his own com­
munity, to the Laws and Liberties, and to the customs prac­
ticed within the colony as a means of putting together 'che 
colony's first formal body of laws.
The Eaton Code was but one of two major legal changes 
which affected residents of the town of New Haven during 
the late fifties and sixties. The code added another layer 
of rules and regulations that community members were bound 
to follow. It provided leaders with a set of uniform laws 
which they could use to hold residents accountable. By the 
same token, however, it provided the colonists with a
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clearer understanding of what was expected of them and, im­
portantly, with a guide which they could use to protect
61their own rights and interests. Although lawmaking on the 
colony level did not end with the publication of the code, 
Eaton's compilation, which was more secular that Biblical 
in nature, remained the principal body of laws governing 
behavior for the last decade of the colony's existence.
A second major change to occur during this period can 
be traced to the dissolution of the colony in 1665. The 
formal absorption into the Connecticut Colony brought an 
end to nearly a quarter century of "puritan" rule by men 
like John Davenport and Theophilus Eaton. Although the 
latter's code had had an impact on the lives of all colony 
residents, it ceased to exist legally after 1665. So too 
did the discretionary Court of Magistrates on the colony 
level and the Plantation Court on the local level, both of 
which had heard cases without the use of juries. From a 
legal perspective, absorption by Connecticut meant that 
New Haven residents were exposed to a new body of laws
62(the "Ludlow Code" of 1650) and to a new court structure.
In practical terms the transfer of power from New 
Haven to Hartford was accomplished with little difficulty. 
There was some resistance in the years immediately follow­
ing 1662 when leaders like John Davenport first learned of 
the impending change. But for the most part New Havenites 
seemed, if anything, indifferent to the jurisdictional al­
teration. There was, consequently, also little difficulty
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involved in erecting the new court system which remained in 
force for the balance of the seventeenth century. The new 
structuring provided the town with a local or monthly court 
as before, with jurisdiction over misdemeanors and over 
civil suits under £20. The principal distinction between 
the new inferior or Commissioners’ Court and the old Plan­
tation Court was the use of juries in actions amounting to 
40s or more. Also new to New Haven residents, indeed to all 
inhabitants of the colony, was a network of county courts 
which heard appeals from the inferior courts, administered
estates, and acted on grand jury presentments in all cases
Q 3
"excepting life, limb, and banishment." The jurisdiction
for these more serious punishments rested with the new
Court of Assistants which also handled appeals from the 
64County Courts. The creation of both courts was signifi­
cant because together they shared a case load which had 
been previously the responsibility of a single quarterly 
court in Hartford. This fact, when coupled with the in­
creased accessibility afforded by the County Courts, meant 
that the entire network became more responsive and more 
efficient. Finally, the court of last resort remained, as 
it had during the New Haven Colony years, the General 
Assembly.
In addition to a new court system, New Haven residents 
were also exposed to an entirely new code of laws. The 
collection of procedures and statutes in force in 1665 was 
the one compiled by magistrate Roger Ludlow some 15 years
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65earlier. Although it was new to New Havenites, the code 
was not radically different from Eaton's either in format or 
content. Because of this, the Ludlow Code more than likely 
had less of an impact- than did Eaton's when it was original­
ly distributed.
Although the Ludlow Code, along with post 1650 legisla­
tion, provided legal guidelines for New Haven residents im­
mediately following absorption, this changed in 1673 when
Connecticut officials ordered a new code to be written. The
66revision process was put into motion in 1671, when colony 
authorities requested John Allyn to "prepare a draft of laws 
of this jurisdiction now in use with such amendments and ad­
ditions as he shall find necessary." The code was compiled 
inside of a year, whereupon the governor and his assistants
wrote a preface and ordered the new body of laws to be
, . 67printed.
Connecticut's new code, "published" in the colony's 
68towns in 1673 and distributed in book form a year later, 
was more extensive than either the Eaton or Ludlow compila­
tions. All of the codes were similar in format, yet the 
1673 lawbook contained a substantially greater number of 
headings (141) than either of its predecessors. Within 
these were nested 87 different laws, about a third more 
than found in the Eaton Code. As far as sources of law 
are concerned, both the Eaton and Connecticut Codes were 
similar. Both borrowed freely from the Laws and Liberties 
of Massachusetts; 31% of Connecticut's statutes can be
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traced to that document, compared with 24% for New Haven. 
Both codes relied extensively on a combination of local law 
and colony precedent— 49% for Connecticut and 40% for New 
Haven. And each code utilized the Bible as a source for 
their "universal" laws. In the case of the Eaton Code 31%, 
whereas 20% of Connecticut's laws were drawn from Scripture.
That fewer of the laws in the Connecticut compilation 
are traced to the Bible is, in part, indicative of amend­
ments which reflect both changing social conditions and 
values. For instance, in the Eaton and Ludlow codes, adul­
tery was considered a capital offense (Lev. 20:10). By 
1673, when the new code appeared, the punishment for that 
crime had been reduced to whipping and stigmatization— a
subtle redefinition which was perhaps necessitated by
69changing patterns of adulterous behavior. Indeed, the 
inclusion of a number of new provisions in the code that 
had no equivalents in earlier compilations suggests a re­
sponse to recent social developments in the colony. Nei­
ther of the earlier codes contained bastardy laws, prob­
ably because the birth of "natural" children was uncommon.
By 1673 the activities of a promiscuous second generation
70had necessitated new legislation. The offense of "night- 
walking" by young adults had become so prevalent by the 
1670s that it too became a new addition to the code. More­
over, the practice of enacting new laws to counteract 
changing circumstances was by no means original to- the code 
of 1673; it had taken place before and would continue to in
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the last decades of the century as Connecticut authorities 
responded to social disorders through new, appropriate 
legislation.
Finally, it should be noted that while some of the laws 
included in the new code regulated individual conduct in 
new ways, there were others that remained unchanged. Pun-
71ishment for theft was as severe in 1701 as it was in 1639. 
The same was true with penalities for fornication— a major 
moral offense. Importantly, in the case of both of these 
crimes, magistrates continued to possess discretionary 
powers in sentencing offenders. Many of the capital laws 
like bestiality and rape also retained their original form. 
And, so too, did a multitude of laws which defined petty 
crimes and minor procedures ranging from the gauging of 
"casks and cooper" to bounties for wolves and foxes. In­
deed, on both the local and colony levels laws of a con­
stant nature together with those that were written in re­
sponse to change not only defined, but more frequently re­
defined notions of order in seventeenth-century Connecticut.
If there is one prominent theme of the many introduced 
in this assessment of promoting order through law, it re­
lates to legal change; it reinforces the concept that law, 
unlike puritan rhetoric, was far from being cast in con­
crete . Some of the legal changes, like the reorganization 
of the court system in 1666, were made in response to ex­
ternal or jurisdictional changes. But most of the altera-
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tions that occurred came from an internal source, from the 
needs of the people and the circumstances of life peculiar 
to the new world which necessitated legal adjustments on 
two levels.
First, there was change on the local level. The con­
text of lawmaking illustrated by Meiggs v. Gregory (1647) 
is central to the notion of legal change and the way social 
order was defined in early New Haven. The case emphasized 
the need to "branch out" beyond Biblical foundations and 
pass laws which protected consumers from unscrupulous arti­
sans. Those laws enacted in the aftermath of the case 
(1648) also came at a crucial juncture in the town's legal 
evolution— the first decade of settlement when 60 or 53% of 
the 114 bylaws were written. Nearly all of the town ordi­
nances passed during the century were similar insofar as 
they were secular responses to particular problems facing 
the community. The most serious of these— livestock con­
trol and military preparedness— produced 72 (62%) pieces of 
new legislation. The remaining bylaws, although not passed 
in clusters during periods of crisis, were nevertheless 
practical responses to conditions in New Haven. Thus wheth­
er new legislation took the form of a series of livestock 
control ordinances or were more isolated responses to the 
presence of strangers in town, fires, or the "borrowing" of 
canoes, law seemed to function best "as a response to the 
concrete needs of society."^
Second, there was notable legal change on the colony
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level. Here too, change was a pervasive theme. The codes 
which affected New Havenites during the century were more 
than updates of older statutes; they are dynamic examples 
of the flexibility of colonial law. The Revision of 1646, 
for example, closed loopholes in earlier legislation in an 
effort to better order the affairs of the colony. The 
Eaton Code did not merely copy the Laws and Liberties, but 
included statutes and procedures original to conditions in 
the New Haven Colony. And the Connecticut Code pragmati­
cally discarded antiquated laws and penalties in favor of 
those which more accurately reflected the needs of Connecti­
cut society in the 1670s. One of the most striking aspects 
of these compilations is the extent to which they departed 
from Biblical foundations. With the exception of universal 
or capital laws delineated in the codes and traced to the 
Bible, the statutes were clearly secular. If one is willing 
to accept the argument that colonial codes were the "regis­
ters of social values most sensitive to the needs of society,"
then the legal guidelines of the New Haven and Connecticut
73colonies were overwhelmingly secular.
Although the bylaws of the local community and the va­
riety of statutes embodied in the colony codes illustrate 
the degree to which definitions of order branched out be­
yond the Bible and the rhetorical concerns of the founding 
fathers, they alone do not provide us with a satisfactory 
understanding of which laws were most instrumental in de­
fining social order in early New Haven. More analysis of
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the context of colonial law, specifically the enforcement 
of local bylaws, colony statutes, and civil litigation, is 
needed to provide additional insights into those disorders 
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CHAPTER III
CHALLENGES TO PHYSICAL 
ORDER: PETTY CRIME
In February 1649, eighteen individuals were convicted 
at a session of the New Haven Plantation Court "for not 
bringing their weights and measures to be tried upon the 
appointed day." The reasons for not observing the court's 
instructions undoubtedly varied. Perhaps the lawabiding but 
litigious merchant John Evance was away on business. Shop­
keeper William Peck might have found the "appointed" time 
of eight a.m. on a mid-November day downright inconvenient. 
Or the recently widowed Jane Gregson may well have found it 
emotionally difficult to gather her late husband's measures 
and cart them across the street to the meetinghouse for 
inspection. Whether intended or not, the oversight cost 
each of the offenders 12d.^
There was nothing unusual about a court ordered viewing 
of weights and measures. By the late 1640s it had become a 
custom in New Haven. Indeed, well before New England had 
been settled, similar accountings had come to play a tradi­
tional role in English commercial life. What is novel 
about this snippet of New Haven history is that a group of 
well-kenned residents had failed to comply with the court's 
request. It was unusual because the 17 men and one woman 
fined in 1649 were the only inhabitants of the town known
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to have violated this practice during the seventeenth 
century. Although it was uncommon in its particulars, the 
scene and its players are nevertheless illustrative of the 
more general drama of social control acted out by New Haven 
residents between 1639 and 1701.
The "legislative" segment of the chronicle of order and 
social control in this Connecticut community has already 
been told. Residents of New Haven promoted order by relying 
upon the traditional practice of formulating bylaws designed 
to meet the needs of the community. For the most part laws 
were written when crises or other problems posed discernable 
threats to social stability. The series of 35 livestock 
control laws is but one example. These and other bylaws 
governed daily activities in early New Haven and when they 
were violated authorities moved swiftly to enforce them.
Enforcement of local statutes is thus an important por­
tion of the overall story of order and social control. The 
prosecution of residents who violated community bylaws is 
as central to an appreciation of order as the writing of 
the ordinances themselves. While lawmaking sheds light on 
the process of promoting and defining order, the enforce­
ment of law reveals much about how it was maintained. One 
aspect of an analysis of enforcement is that it provides a 
realistic view of the sorts of disorders prevalent in the 
community. These in turn help explain how order was per­
ceived, perhaps more convincingly than the lofty sermons of 
New Haven's celebrated divines John Davenport and James
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Pierpont. Indeed, the famous writings of New England's 
"articulate few" might, provide insights into the ideals of
2
the well-ordered commonwealth, but not always its realities. 
Analysis of law and its enforcement is the equalizer; it 
contributes to the balance needed to depict accurately the 
nuances of order and social control on the local level. 
Patterns of "criminal" conduct reflect realities, not ideals; 
the rhetoric of magistrates and ministers, just the opposite. 
Yet when both are considered simultaneously, one finds that 
most of the disorders requiring control bore little resem­
blance to the "corruptions" that the articulate few expected 
to undermine order in the community.
This does not mean that the town was free of the disrup­
tions associated with the behavior of alcohol abusers, for­
nicators, and thieves— those who violated the’codified law
of the colony and about whom the spokesmen of the New England 
3
Way warned. Yet the lion's share of the enforcement effort 
seems to have been directed towards the control of petty 
offenders who violated local bylaws. It may well have been 
that the true sources of disharmony in the community were 
not the servant or transient who stole some lace or drank 
excessively, but rather the widely known and generally 
respected resident whose fence lay in disrepair or who in­
advertently fell asleep during his watch duty. This is why 
it was suggested earlier that the weights and measures vio­
lations enforced in 1649 were "illustrative" of social con­
trol in New Haven. The majority of the offenses known to
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have been prosecuted during the seventeenth century were
similar; they were violations of local ordinances and were
generally punishable by small fines. Indeed, it may well
have been that offenses like these played a more prominent
role in shaping the well-ordered community than hitherto 
4
imagined. It is therefore necessary to reconstruct as best
as possible the patterns of local enforcement recoverable
from extant records in light of questions pertinent to the
5
maintenance of order. Which laws were violated and with 
what frequency? When were the violations? What was the 
connection between new legislation and enforcement? Once 
the violations occurred, how were they resolved?
It is also necessary to go beyond offenses. If the 
majority of the violations in New Haven were similar to those 
for which the 18 planters of 1649 were punished, what of 
the offenders themselves? How typical were they? Were 
most petty offenders recidivists, as was each of this group 
save John Evance? How typical was the career of carpenter 
and selectman William Andrews, whose three court appearances 
spanned a twelve year period: in 1648 he was accused of
missing a military training exercise and his case was dropped; 
in 1649 he was convicted of the weights and measures vio­
lation; and, in 1662 he was acquitted of missing a session 
of the town meeting. Indeed, what was it about these law­
breakers, aside from the types of bylaws they violated, 
that enabled them to retain their membership in the com­
munity? What does this suggest about the maintenance of
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order? Answers to these and other questions about petty 
offenders and the different disorders they had a hand in 
promoting are requisite for a clear understanding of social 
control in early New Haven.
In the period from 1639 through 1698 New Haven residents 
appeared before authorities on 897 known occasions for in­
fractions of community bylaws or variations thereof. Usu­
ally an appearance was made before the Plantation Court, a 
local tribunal which sat without a jury, was essentially
6discretionary, and which at times could be quite informal. 
Occasionally, for reasons not altogether clear, petty of­
fenses were heard before sessions of a superior court. For 
the most part, however, violations of local laws were han­
dled by local authorities; social control was principally a 
local endeavor. Roughly 88% of the appearances were pro­
cessed through the Plantation Court (before 1665) or (after 
1665) the Commissioners' Court, both of which had original 
jurisdiction over petty offenses. Furthermore, most of the 
known prosecutions by local authorities occurred prior to 
1666, the year in which the County Courts were established. 
Because New Haven was a county seat it seems as if many of 
the minor transgressions of law which took place in the 
town after 1666 were tried in the County Court as a matter 
of convenience. Perhaps sessions of the local courts were 
postponed when the County Court sat.
Regardless of which group of authorities local resi­
dents faced, their appearances had two fundamental meanings
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and a variety of possible resolutions. Either an individ­
ual stood accused of violating a bylaw and appeared invol­
untarily, or an appearance was made voluntarily to conclude 
some unfinished business. In the case of the latter, this 
meant filing an appeal from an inferior court decision or 
applying for remission of an earlier penalty, most likely a 
fine. In both instances the possible outcome was limited
O
to either a "yes" or a "no." There was somewhat more
variation involved when appearances were made involuntarily.
Generally one of four things happened. Offenders could be
haled before the court and convicted (which was usually the
case with petty offenders) or they could be acquitted. It
was also possible to have a case dropped or even postponed
(often, as it turns out, indefinitely). There were other
conceivable resolutions, such as being told to post a
recognizance, but as in the case of remissions and appeals,
9
deviations from the four just described were infrequent. 
Although there were a number of possibilities associated 
with making an appearance before the bench, a little over 
three-quarters of those who did so involuntarily ended up 
being convicted of their minor violations.^  The majority 
of these decisions were determined by local authorities 
and this suggests, in part, that the control of petty of­
fenders was indeed the responsibility of the town, not the 
colony.
When viewed over time, the distribution of court ap­
pearances for petty offenses points towards the same
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conclusion. They were unevenly distributed, with an over­
whelming number occurring during the initial years of set­
tlement and thus acclimation to new world conditions. This 
particular distribution is strikingly similar to that of 
community bylaws, most of which were passed at an early 
stage in the town's legal development.'*'^ As illustrated in 
Figure 3.1, fully 43% of the appearances for petty viola­
tions in seventeenth-century New Haven took place before 
1649. An additional 36% were heard before the town cele­
brated the twenty-first anniversary of its planting. More­
over, by the end of 1658, 713 or 80% of the total number of 
known bylaw infractions had been tried by local authorities. 
The peak in appearances was reached in 1644 when members of 
the Plantation Court handed down 118 decisions. And 1649 
was also a busy year for local officials, who prosecuted 
another 101 cases. The 219 appearances made during these 
two years alone represent a quarter of the total number 
made for violations of local laws over the course of the 
entire century. As was so with the formulation of bylaws, 
the 1640s were clearly a crucial decade for their enforce­
ment. Although it is difficult to determine what consti­
tuted a "heavy" or "light" caseload, certainly the number 
of cases handled by town and county officials declined 
steadily after the late 1640s. Whereas enforcement efforts 
in all courts uncovered 385 violations in the first decade, 
similar attempts at control yielded only 17 in the last.
Although the distribution of petty offenses reflects a
Ill
great deal of activity in the early decades, it would be a 
mistake to conclude that it all but ceased during the second 
half of the century. The reason is twofold. While it is 
correct that the vast majority of known appearances for 
petty violations after.1666 were made before the County 
Court, it does not mean that local rulers relinquished their 
claim to social control; they still passed bylaws and they 
continued to prosecute petty offenders. Yet the important 
and regrettably unanswerable question remains: precisely
how much law enforcement took place on the local level after 
the County Courts were established? The last known prose­
cution of a petty offense by the town court was in 1670 when 
Jonathan Lampson was reproved for violating a 1658 law gov­
erning the "pressing" of residents for work at the town 
12mill. Although local court proceedings disappear from
town records after 1670, it is paramount to recognize that
Commissioners' Courts continued to be held in the town.
Frequent references to "inferior courts" and occasional
appeals from them dot the County Court records and signify
that social control was indeed taking place on the local
13level in New Haven and its surrounding communities.
The second reason for not concluding that local en­
forcement ceased in the post-1666 period involves subtle 
changes in the apparatus of control utilized by the New 
Haven town government. Even if there were complete and 
accurate records of all the Commissioners' Courts, the 
story of enforcement would still be incomplete because
Figure 3.1 





Sources: New Haven Records, I & II; Town Records, I-III
and County Court Records, I.
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some cases were heard by yet less formal agencies of con­
trol. For as the workload of the town meeting and Planta­
tion Court increased in the 1650s, portions of their com­
bined authority were delegated to other bodies, the most
14important of which were the selectmen.
This group was given a variety of tasks which the other 
local institutions considered time consuming and perhaps 
unpopular. During the mid-fifties, for example, a great 
deal of time was spent addressing problems associated with 
livestock control. Rulers responded to the disorders by 
passing local ordinances, devising a new agency of control 
(the public pounder), and prosecuting individuals who con­
travened the new legislation. Most of these violations 
occurred when the lack of order seemed to be worst. For 
instance, in a five year span from 1649 to 1654, 80% of the 
total number of livestock control prosecutions took place. 
And, perhaps not so coincidently, it was at the end of the 
period, in 1654, that a small but significant change af­
fecting social control and modern perceptions of it occur­
red: selectmen were given "power to hear complaints con­
cerning fences which are defective and make orders... and
15levy fines for the same... as if the court did it." It 
is not certain that the selectmen or townsmen, who became 
a part of the system of New Haven governance in 1652 were 
given this responsibility because the court was overbur­
dened; the records do not explicitly indicate as much.
That, however, is what they imply. Indeed, the office of
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selectmen had been formulated to absorb some of the business 
transacted at town meetings; it was borrowed from neighbor­
ing communities so "that these meetings which spends the
X 6town much time may not be so often." In fact, in 1652 the 
selectmen were given certain powers to "order" matters about 
fencing and swine. The action taken in 1654 was, it seems, a 
logical corollary.
For modern observers of life in premodern New England
communities subtle changes in enforcement procedures are
problematic. On the one hand, it is evident that violations
of lifestock control ordinances continued after 1654 because
they are recorded irregularly in published and manuscript
records (the last case was heard in 1693 by the County
Court). On the other hand, the records of the New Haven
selectmen, which begin in 1665, do not include mention of
violations by petty offenders. Yet, at a town meeting held
in 1665, direct reference is made to active participation
by the selectmen in the control of livestock and the main-
17tenance of fences. Moreover, the townsmen were enforcing 
livestock control laws, but unfortunately they were not re­
cording the violations. Thus, while it appears that social 
control was continuing to take place on the local level, 
the extent to which it was undertaken remains a mystery.
For this reason the distribution of known petty offenses 
illustrated in Figure 3.1 must be assessed with caution.
Is, for example, the precipitous drop in court appearances 
that began in the early fifties to be explained by changes
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in approaches to enforcement, like the delegating of auth-
X 8ority to selectmen? Or, is it simply a question of real 
decline in the number of bylaw violations by New Havenites?
The answer to both of these questions is the same: to 
a certain degree, yes. Chances are quite good that avail­
able records underreport the total number of court appear­
ances in seventeenth-century New Haven. If, indeed, select­
men or military officials were given a hand in controlling 
certain aspects of conduct in the community, then it is 
reasonable to assume that there were more than 897 appear­
ances for violations of local laws. In other words, there 
was more enforcement taking place within the confines of 
the community than surviving records indicate. If anything, 
this adds credence to the notion that social control was 
fundamentally a local affair. To an extent, however, it is 
quite probable that the downward trend suggested in Figure
3.1 is correct, that changes in the apparatus of control 
which contributed to the underreporting problem were only 
partially responsible for the overall decline in appear­
ances after 1649. As will be seen through analysis of the 
distribution of different kinds of violations, the post-1649 
plunge seems bonafide. But first, a more precise under­
standing of the types and quantity of lav/s violated is 
necessary.
Local authorities enforced a veritable potpourri of 
laws during the seventeenth century. The offenses they 
handled ranged from numerous and varied military infractions
to a solitary violation of the 1663 bylaw regulating the 
speed at which horses could be ridden through town. Some 
of these violations, such as those relating to fire preven­
tion, seemed to pose a more serious threat to the community • 
than did others. A great number of the petty offenses were 
prosecuted within a short period of time, while others were 
distributed in a more random fashion over the course of the 
century. This is an important distinction because ordi­
nances which were enforced in clusters signify the gravest 
disorders facing the town and say something of how they 
were corrected.
One of the highest priorities given to the enforcement 
of local law fell under the heading of military affiars.
As indicated in Table- 3.1, military offenses were prosecuted 
most frequently. They tended to occur in the initial years 
of settlement when New Haven was susceptible to attacks 
from the Indians and the Dutch. As many as 394 (85%) of 
the known military violations occurred prior to 1657. Of 
these, 157 were infractions of the 1639 law requiring mili­
tiamen to be properly armed. Faulty equipment, it appears, 
was not tolerated which is why Edward Parker was fined Is 
in 1646 for carrying a ’’defective gun and touchhole," and
why Benjamin Wilmot was assessed the same penalty for a
19"defective socket and bullets." Complete or partial ab­
sence from training exercises accounted for an additional 
113 violations. Jointly, breaches of bylaws within these 
two categories amounted to 270 or 58% of the military
117
violations known to have been prosecuted. It is noteworthy 
that most of the militia cases were heard between 1645 and 
1660, when 64% of the military bylaws were passed. Not 
only were ordinances being written at a healthy pace, but 
apparently they were being enforced assiduously.
Because of the insights regarding social control afforded 
by evidence associated with this rash of military violations, 
it will be examined in more detail below. So too will other 
types of violations which were known to have occurred either 
in great quantities or in isolated clusters. Livestock con­
trol laws, for instance, received more than casual attention 
during the first decades of the town's existence. Most of 
the violations, 91 or 93% of the total, were prosecuted 
prior to 1660. This was also the period marked by the heav­
iest livestock control legislation; indeed, 51% of these 
agriculturally-oriented bylaws, mainly governing swine and 
fences, were passed in the first two decades. During this 
period residents like magistrate Matthew Gilbert, who was 
fined 8s for "defects" in his fence in 1650, were nearly
always convicted once their cases found their way into the
20formal court system. Individuals like Gilbert, Parker, 
and Wilmot were, however, only three of many local resi­
dents whose "criminal” activity constituted 68% of the to­
tal number of appearances made for violating local regula­
tions .
Although violations of military and livestock laws 
were the most frequently enforced in early New Haven, by
118
Table 3.1
New Haven Petty Offenses, 1639-1698











Sources: New Haven Records I & II; Town Records,
I—III; and County Court Records, I.
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no means did they hold a monopoly on the time local offi­
cials spent controlling disorders in the community. Not 
only did magistrates have to contend with inhabitants who 
violated the colony's laws, such as those prescribing gam­
ing or fornication, but with a myriad of other violations 
(334) of local bylaws. Contempt of court, which repre­
sented five percent of the total, is one example. Despite 
the fact that no laws were designated as such, individuals 
were charged with contempt for transgressing one of the 
town1s other ordinances. James Stewart, for instance, "was 
complained of for several disorderly expressions and con­
tempt of the magistracy" in New Haven by refusing "to help
21mend some of the town highways" when pressed by authorities. 
Over the course of the century, 44 other appearances were 
made for either questioning or ignoring the judgements of 
local officials. Because the magistracy was considered to 
be such an important component of the well-ordered common­
wealth, at least to New Haven's "pillars,” contempt for 
authority in any form was an offense which rarely went un­
punished. When combined,, crimes like contempt of court and 
the related court absence comprise a significant portion of 
all known petty infractions. Yet while they might not have 
occurred with a much frequency, other minor offenses, like 
fire prevention violations, are perhaps more illustrative 
of social control because of their timing. Indeed, further 
analysis will demonstrate that the circumstances surround­
ing the prosecution of specific offenses reveal much about
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the way order was maintained in this Connecticut town.
Thusfar something has been said of the kinds of offenses 
that were tried in early New Haven and how, as a group, they 
were distributed over time. Most of the prosecutions were 
handled by local authorities in the Plantation Court. Most 
of the cases (76%) resulted in convictions. And an over­
whelming majority of these appearances occurred prior to the 
publication of the Eaton Code. Among other things, this 
suggests that the enforcement of law was a local matter and 
that most of it took place during the important years of 
acclimation to new world conditions. This process of ad­
justment figured prominently in how and when bylaws were 
enforced. As it turns out, local ordinances were enforced 
selectively in New Haven. Evidently vigorous enforcement 
took place only when a grave problem jeopardized the com­
munity. Nowhere is this seen more clearly than in the at­
tempts to control military disorders during the forties and 
early fifties.
Correct ordering of military affairs proved to be one 
of the most challenging and time-consuming obligations 
facing local officials in the 1640s. Military preparedness 
was elemental to the physical welfare of this wilderness 
hamlet and its still untested inhabitants. Within a year 
of settlement two principal strategies had been adopted for 
safeguarding the community. The first was proper training 
and arming of the local militia. The second, the establishment
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of a military watch capable of alerting unsuspecting resi­
dents, whether asleep in their beds or deep in prayer on 
the "Lord's Day," of dangers posed by Indians or fire.
There were also a variety of tangential’military matters 
with which local officials grappled and which, as a result, 
led to the prosecution of parties offending military disci­
ple. For the most part, however, military business and
associated violations related either to the watch or 
22training.
The first "order” governing military affairs in New 
Haven also became one of the first bylaws passed in the 
community. In December 1639, everyone who possessed arms 
(males between 16 and 60) was ordered to report to the 
market place for an inspection by Nathaniel Turner and 
Robert Seely "under the penalty of 20s fine for every de­
fault or absence." This group of New Haven males formed 
the nucleus of the town's trainband which had its second 
review the following spring. By the fall of 1640 a regu­
lar training schedule had been instituted and the original
penalty was reduced to a more modest Is for defective arms
23and 5s for missing an exercise. In addition to formula­
ting bylaws, a number of ancillary matters had come to the 
attention of local officials before the end of the decade. 
Pikes, for example, had to be made at the town's expense 
for use in training exercises. In return for "giving out 
and laying up the pikes from time to time," rulers excused 
Mark Pierce from further training. Other requests for
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exemptions, like those granted to Robert Abbott and Richard 
Hull in 1643 "by reason of their bodily infirmities," also 
required consideration by town fathers. And on occasion 
civil rulers, in conjunction with military officers, served 
on a council of war to coordinate trainband activities with 
those of other regions. Efforts like these, while they may 
not have been exactly routine, illustrate the type of in­
volvement local authorities had in matters pertaining to 
military training. When considering, too, the amount of 
time that was also expended prosecuting military violators, 
it is little wonder that a certain amount of authority was 
eventually delegated to the militia company.
Involvement by town officials in business concerning 
the watch during the early decades was similar. Moreover, 
they had the initial responsibility of formalizing the 
watch, which ran from an hour after sunset to thirty min­
utes past sunrise. As in the case of the trainband, this 
was accomplished through legislation; early in 1640 laws 
were passed and penalties were fixed so that backsliders
like Daniel Fuller could be fined for "neglect of his 
25watch." Because the watch was unpopular, officials were 
burdened with the task of granting exemptions, requests 
for which were made regularly as was true with training. 
Other details relative to the watch, ranging from deter­
mining the number of men required to stand duty to pro­
viding wood for the watch house in cold weather, became 
additional responsibilities of New Haven town officials.
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Many of these tasks appear mundane and unimportant. They 
should not be underrated, however, because experience in 
ordering military affairs proved helpful in times of crisis 
and it allowed authorities in New Haven to control disorders 
when they arose.
An understanding of how the mechanisms of social control 
functioned is perhaps best attained by first gaining an ap­
preciation of the context of events which set them in motion 
As suggested in Chapter 2, New Haven experienced a series 
of military crises beginning in 1643. Unrest among the 
Indians in the Connecticut-New Amsterdam region had led to 
the spilling of "much Christian blood." New Haven offi­
cials were initially informed of the situation when the 
Dutch requested military support for an expedition against 
the Indians. Although they refused to become actively in­
volved, on the grounds that it would undermine the effec­
tiveness of the newly formed New England Confederation,
New Haven authorities nevertheless began taking precautions 
on a regional basis. The election of Theophilus Eaton and 
Thomas Gregson as United Colony Commissioners took place 
months before it was scheduled so that if an invasion oc­
curred, representatives from New Haven could attend the 
Confederation meeting without first having to wait for 
normal balloting. Officials were not out of sympathy with 
the Dutch, but it is clear that lawful cooperation with 
Confederation members was preferable to independent action. 
When the commissioners convened in September, they did
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address the crisis and their recommendations were adopted
by the General Court of the New Haven Colony the following 
26spring.
Meanwhile, the Court had been busy apprising local 
residents of the dangers and they in turn took their own 
precautions. After receiving news that Stamford planters 
had suffered "many injuries from the Indians," town offi­
cials ordered the militia squadrons to "come to the meeting 
every Sabbath completely armed" and instructed that those
who "walk the rounds shall have their matches lighted" dur-
27ing public worship. The conviction of Richard Lovell in
January of 1644 "for want of match" may well reflect the
enforcement of this order. More disconcerting information
about the unruly natives was passed along to New Haven
residents the following spring. They were told of an
Englishman who "had been cruelly murdered of late by the
Indians," enroute from Stamford to Fairfield. And in June,
they heard of a Stamford goodwife who was attacked by an
28Indian wielding a lathing hammer. This information must 
have had an unsettling affect on New Havenites; in July a 
local artillary company was formed and in August another 
general muster was ordered. When this review was called, 
local leaders were still uncertain about the future. Would 
they be asked by colony officials to provide men "to go 
against the Indians?" Were the heathens going to set upon 
they first? As it turned out, autumn came and went with­
out any further incidents; the town's first crisis was
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over by December.
Although nothing came of this military alert, law en­
forcement officials were doing their part just in case some­
thing had developed. Their fundamental task was to enforce 
military bylaws. Only by controlling or regulating indi­
viduals who shirked their responsibilities could the town 
hope to become proficient in "military art." Moreover, 
while the town meeting was busy ordering musters and iron­
ing out details concerning the watch, members of the Plan­
tation Court were energetically prosecuting anyone who was 
presented to them by militia officers. Over the course of 
the two year alert (1643-1644) more residents were tried 
for military violations than in any comparable period for 
the entire century. In 1644 alone, 124 inhabitants ap­
peared before authorities; 122 were convicted, while two
appeared voluntarily to request moderation of previous 
29penalties. Significantly, there were no acquittals.
Not only does the large number of prosecutions reflect con­
centrated efforts at controlling military disorders during 
an alert in a general sense, but the fact that most of the 
violations (86%) took place in a seven month period (Sep­
tember 1643 to April 1644) suggests both the need to achieve 
preparedness quickly and the pervasive unpopularity asso­
ciated with participating in military exercises during the 
winter. Most of the court appearances made during this 
period were for training infractions or watch disorders. 
Typical were Thomas Yale's "late coming to trayne" and
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and Matthew Hitchcock's "willful neglect to walk the round
30when officers called him." Both men violated bylaws which 
were, in a time of crisis, considered to be especially im­
portant to the physical welfare of the community.
Military readiness was indeed a high priority of leaders 
during the first decade and a half of the town's existence. 
Between 1640 and 1658, a year did not pass without someone 
being punished for military laxity. As might be expected, 
the degree of enforcement differed from year to year. Yet, 
it is necessary to recognize not just the existence of a 
great disparity in the number of appearances made in a given 
period, but also why it existed. The violations of 1643- 
1644 reflect both assiduous enforcement during a crisis 
situation as well-as the fact that the alert was the first 
(and perhaps most frightening) of many sounded in the early 
years of settlement. But, by the same token, the 19 appear­
ances made in 1650 occurred in the absence of a military 
crisis. And the outcome of these appearances is revealing. 
Only 12 (63%) resulted in convictions— a far cry from the 
100% of the early forties. It appears as if the mechanisms 
of control— issuing orders, lawmaking, and enforcement—  
were thrust into high gear when circumstances necessitated 
an uncompromising ordering of conduct. It also seems, how­
ever, that once conditions changed and a given situation 
became less critical, the social control apparatus wound 
down and underwent a correction of sorts. To be sure, by­
laws continued to be enforced, but apparently with less
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enthusiasm than had been the case during periods of crisis.
There is ample evidence to support the notion that 
social control in early New Haven was, as suggested in 
Chapter 2, responsive to the needs of the community. It 
has already been illustrated, for example, how much of the 
lawmaking that took place on the local level resulted from 
authorities responding to particular situations. The mili­
tary ordinances of the forties, the livestock control leg­
islation of the fifties, and the Meiggs case are the most 
graphic examples. The enforcement of military bylaws during 
the first alert is yet another indication. Moreover, the 
sudden jump in the number of appearances from three in 1642, 
to 124 in 1644, back down to 21 in 1645 was not accidental. 
Indeed, similar increases and decreases in the number of 
appearances took place when the town experienced subsequent 
threats from either the Indians or the Dutch.
The period from mid-1645 to late 1646 is a case in 
point. Once it became obvious in late 1644 that the first 
crisis had run its course, authorities adopted a more le­
nient posture in their treatment of offenders. In January 
several individuals who had been fined "for not bringing 
their arms to public worship" had their fines remitted—  
the first for military violations in the town's six year 
history. In February additional remissions were granted, 
as in the case of Matthew Crowder who was able to prove
that he "was sick at the training from which he was ab- 
31sent." Over the course of the next few months a few
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isolated appearances were made for missing training or the 
watch, or, in the instance of Robert Johnson, for having a 
"defective gunstock." First and last the spring months were 
not characterized by the frenzied prosecution of the pre­
ceding year. Yet, this changed abruptly in June when it 
became evident that there was a need to send "some soldiers 
to strengthen Uncas against the Narragansett Indians" and a 
council of war was formed. Thus New Haven and her neighbors 
sounded another, albeit less serious, alert. At the August 
town meeting several steps were taken to provide for the 
"common safety." Gunsmiths were urged to postpone their 
normal business and "get those guns replaced that are de­
fective." Henry Peck and William Basset were asked to set 
the "great gunnes" upon good strong carriages. And all
farmers in the possession of butter and cheese were informed
32that both might be needed for "public service."
In the renewed crisis special attention was again given
to military discipline. Residents like Anthoney Stevens
and John Thomas, presented for violating watch and training
bylaws respectively, became the focus of law enforcement 
33efforts. Most of the violations associated with this
second alert showed up in the records in the spring of
1646 following what may well have been the first training
34exercise since winter. Beginning in April and running 
to a session of the court in early October, some 69 mili­
tiamen were presented for their disorders. In all, more 
than three times the number of appearances were made in
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1646 than in the first eight months of 1645. And as was so 
with the first alert, there were no acquittals during the 
second. People like Richard Marden, found asleep on watch 
duty, were presented and fined unceremoniously. Although 
some violators offered excuses for their misconduct, they 
tended to fall on deaf ears. Throughout the century, peri­
ods of military alert were characterized by the lack of 
leniency displayed toward offenders.
A good example is found in the serious but short lived
alert beginning in 1649. As was the case in other periods
of perceived danger, the authorities moved swiftly to
achieve preparedness. Many different people were involved
in the process. Because of the "pride and insolence" of
the Indians, more members of the community were required to
stand watch than was usually the case. Governor Eaton had
to levy a special tax, payable in goods ranging from wheat
to pork, in order to provide for the colony's "defense
against the Indians." The town drummer was charged with
extraordinary responsibilities during the emergency.
Farmers were instructed to keep their weapons out of sight
"least the Indians break in and steal them." Workmen were
"desired to mend the ladder" to the platform atop the
meetinghouse so that a sentinel could stand watch during
35"days of public meeting." The alert was real and it 
fostered a mobilization effort that embraced people from 
a variety of callings. And among those agencies of social 
control which swung into action was the Plantation Court.
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Although the Court normally met once a month, its mem­
bers had an increased workload in October and November be­
cause of a rise in the number of presentments for violating 
military bylaws. Of the 37 appearances made for military 
infractions in 1649, well over four-fifths occurred in the 
fall— after the alert had been sounded. Everyone who ap­
peared before the bench after September was convicted. One 
case, which was postponed at a November session, was con­
tinued the following year when Isaac Beecher was finally
Q  O
convicted of his offense. Two other postponements (from
May) were also resolved in the fall. "For going into the
watch-house and lying down by the fire and sleeping, when
he should have stood sentinel," Samuel Hotchkiss Sr., was
37convicted, as was John Bishop, for a similar crime. All 
of the military offenders, with the exception of John 
Brockett whose case was postponed before the alert began 
and never continued, were punished by the court for their 
lack of diligence. The normal punishments for training and 
watch violations were fines. But two watchmen were 
whipped— an indication of the seriousness with which the 
local authorities took the alert. James Clements and 
Nicholas Slooper, two transients of dubious character, de­
cided that it was in their best interest to seek shelter 
in Thomas Mix's barn rather than walk the rounds exposed 
to the brisk autumn night air. Perhaps under normal con­
ditions, if convicted, they might have only received a fine. 
Indeed, it is possible that they might not even have been
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reported by the master of the watch. Yet, during a "time
of danger" Richard Hull had little choice; they were pre-
38sented, tried, and punished.
What was true of 1649 was true during other periods of 
alert. Quite simply, military and law enforcement offi­
cials appear to have been unwilling to tolerate violations 
of defense-oriented bylaws. Although the number of appear­
ances decreased with each alert— 124 in 1644, 69 in 1646, 
and 37 in 1649— there was one thing that remained unchanged; 
during each of the alerts, between 98% and 100% of the of­
fenders were convicted. Military emergencies turned into 
periods of genuine concern for members of the town. As 
such, leaders fulfilled their obligations to the best of 
their ability through the restraint of military disorders. 
They led the town meeting in issuing orders designed to 
confront the "common danger" and they promoted order through 
the adoption of bylaws (68% of which were passed before 
1650) which were then used to prosecute individuals who 
were ill-prepared during alarms.
But what happened in years when no alerts were sounded? 
What do the years of calm reveal, if anything, about con­
trolling disorders in early New Haven? In many respects, 
evidence culled from court records pertaining to law en­
forcement during times of peace, is as helpful in under­
standing control as is that found in the years of danger 
when disorders were widespread. Laws were still enforced 
in years marked by normality in military affairs, but the
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resolution of many of the cases was notably different than 
in periods of crisis. Disorders still surfaced; they were 
merely resolved differently by authorities. Among other 
things, convictions declined and acquittals increased, thus 
indicating further, that the mechanisms of social control 
were flexible.
Thusfar it has been suggested that occasions of military 
alert signalled prompt and efficient prosecution of offenders. 
Recall, for instance, the period from late 1644 to early 
1646. The late winter months of 1644--1645 were characterized 
by a certain amount of leniency on the part of local offi­
cials. Individuals who violated bylaws during the crisis of
1644 were granted remissions the following spring, once con-
39ditions had returned to normal. The spirit of charity 
vanished, however, in late 1645 and early 1646 when another 
crisis arose. And a rise in the number of convictions 
followed. When the alert had run its course, authorities, 
so it seems, consciously resumed the practice of showing 
leniency. And when the need to tighten the net of enforce­
ment arose again, it was done. Yet by the same token, when 
circumstances changed, the enforcement net was loosened 
accordingly.
This is seen most explicitly after the danger of 1645- 
1646. It would be two years before another alert was 
sounded and the patterns of enforcement during the inter­
regnum are most interesting. As expected, there was an 
immediate drop in the number of appearances— from 69 in
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1646 to 20 a year later. Whereas during the alert each of­
fender was convicted, in 1647 less than half of those pre­
sented were punished. Three individuals made requests for 
remission of earlier penalties. Those made by Richard 
Marden and John Walker were granted; the one made by Samuel
Hotchkiss Sr., "for going away from training in the after-
40noon without leave," was denied. Four other cases were 
postponed and two of them were never continued. Perhaps 
the most significant turn of events was the acquittal of 
three violators. Although his case was originally post­
poned because he was absent from court, Roger Knapp was 
eventually acquitted of the charge of "not bringing his 
arms one Lord's Day." When Knapp's case was continued, he 
explained to the court that "his wife had been sick the 
Lord's Day before, and she desiring now to go to meeting, 
he stayed home." Knapp was clearly guilty as charged, yet
because the court found his excuse satisfying, his offense
41was "passed by.” So too was that committed by an uniden­
tified servant of Mrs. Nathaniel Turner. The man neglected
his watch duty because his mistress asked him to help care
for two oxen that were injured and "in danger to die." And
at the session of the August Plantation Court, Michael
Palmer was acquitted of charges that he failed to observe 
42his watch. Importantly, these three were the first ac­
quittals for military infractions and it is significant 
that they were granted immediately after a period of danger. 
The apparent leniency practiced in 1647 carried over
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into the following year— another marked by peace with the 
Indians. Indeed, in 1648, 61% of the appearances were re­
solved by acquittal, dismissal, or postponement. Only 20 
of the 51 military offenders presented were actually con­
victed. Sixteen had their cases dropped because of incom­
plete evidence or procedual violations. Thomas Hogg, for 
example, "was warned to the court for not coming to watch...,
but it appeared he had not sufficient warning," and the case 
43was dismissed. Eight other residents had their cases 
postponed, but only one was taken up again. In 1648 mili­
tiamen like Martin Tichnor, presented for insufficient 
arms but whose case was "respited until next court," gen­
erally never had their cases continued beyond the initial 
session. The one exception in that year was the case of
Joseph Guernsey whose hearing was resumed and who finally
44was fined 5s "for want of arms." The cases of John 
Thomas Sr. and six other individuals had a happier ending. 
Although Thomas was late to the meeting with his arms one 
day, he was acquitted ("the court judging it a work of 
mercy and necessary to be done") because he had a sick 
child who required his attention. Earlier, at the same 
session of the July court John Whitehead, a servant to 
Jasper Crane, was acquitted of charges that a piece of 
pine was missing from the lock of his gun. Crane, who 
argued on behalf of his servant, maintained that "it was 
no other defect than hath passed these eight years," and 
explained that "the gunsmith said it was sufficient."
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Later in the year, John Benham Sr. was complained of for
being "absent at two general training days." Benham said
that on the first occasion he had to leave after the names
were called because "news came that there was many oxen in
his corn," and as a result he was excused by the court. On
the second occasion he neglected his training because his
harvested corn "lay in danger of being eaten." This time,
45however, he was ordered to pay half of the 5s fine.
Whether one's case was dropped, ended with an acquittal, 
or was postponed and never continued, it is clear that the 
court did show "mercy" and lenience towards most of the of­
fenders who appeared during the years of peace. It is im­
portant to recognize, however, that in 1649, when the town 
experienced another alert, everyone who appeared before the 
bench for military violations was convicted. Quite simply, 
authorities were willing to bend in times of peace, but re­
mained inflexible in the face of a crisis. Indeed, beyond 
the raw data on crime there is further qualitative evidence 
to support this conclusion, such as a resumption in the 
granting of military exemptions or the relaxation of the
watch in 1648— a reflection of the change in attitude re-
46garding military affairs.
Despite the apparent leniency of authorities in those 
years free from the uncertainties associated with alerts, 
it nevertheless seems evident that offenders had to earn 
the acquittals they received. Indeed, of the 38 acquittals 
handed down between 1639 and 1665 all but one had to be
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earned; offenders had to offer some explanation or excuse 
for their misconduct. They essentially had to persuade of­
ficials not to punish them. That is precisely what Benjamin 
Ling and eight others did in the fall of 1648 after they had 
been charged with arriving late at a training exercise.
More than likely it was Ling who, on behalf of the group, 
argued that "they was there before the body moved." The 
court in turn acquitted each of them "because it hath been
the usual course to count no man late until the body has 
47been removed." Had the men said nothing in their own de­
fense it is probably, based on the militia captain's pre­
sentment, that they would have been convicted and fined.
Most cases which ended in acquittals included similar verbal 
defenses by the accused.
There is one other factor which needs to be considered 
in conjunction with acquittals— timing. Figure 3.2 illus­
trates the percent distribution of military convictions,
defenses, and acquittals. It was not until 1647, following
48an alert, that the first acquittals were handed down.
And as suggested earlier they had to be earned. Moreover, 
as the number of explanations offered by violators increased, 
so too did acquittals. Conversely, when defenses declined, 
there was a corresponding drop in acquittals. What Figure
3.2 does not show is year by year distributions of a spe­
cific nature. It should be recalled that during periods of 
crisis, almost all military offenders were convicted re­
gardless of whether or not a courtroom defense was offered.
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In 1646, for example, Thomas Munson, a militia company of­
ficer, was presented for impressing three men to help him 
"fetch hay" during the course of a training exercise. Al­
though he clearly violated the law, Munson attempted to 
convince authorities that it was more important to bring in
his hay than it was to train. His plea fell on unsympa-
49thetic ears and he was fined. Similarly, during a short
lived alert in 1656 Samuel Hotchkiss Sr. tried to explain
his way out of not having adequate amounts of powder. As
in other instances where excuses were offered during the
course of an alarm, Hotchkiss was unsuccessful in his en-
50deavor to sway the judgement of the court. What is 
notable is the apparent lack of difference between the 
kinds of explanations offered in times of danger or in 
periods of peace. From a legal standpoint, John Benham's 
neglect of training because of his desire to tend to his 
crop was no different than Thomas Munson's. Both men 
clearly violated an established bylaw. The difference 
lies in the timing of the infraction; Munson's was during 
an alert and Benham's was not. The latter, however, was 
acquitted, while the former was convicted. New Haven 
authorities simply refused to allow military order and 
discipline to be compromised during times of crisis, yet 
were willing to back-off and act with compassion and flex­
ibility when conditions warranted such action.
When viewed on an individual basis military infractions 
appear innocuous at best; they are far less dramatic than
Figure 3.2
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cases of "deviant" misconduct, which is perhaps one reason 
why crime on the local level had failed to capture the at­
tention of historians. Although not very sensational, vio­
lations of military bylaws in early New Haven appear to 
have posed a greater threat to the maintenance of order 
than hitherto imagined. This is especially true when placed 
in the context of problems encountered by authorities in 
the first decade of settlement: More than half of all pro­
secutions of petty offenses in the seventeenth century were 
in some manner linked to military affairs. This reinforces 
the notion that social control on the local level was a 
time-consuming but evidently flexible enterprise. When the 
enforcement pattern of military bylaws in New Haven is con­
sidered in conjunction with other elements in the social 
control equation, like the formulation of bylaws, the role 
accorded the regulation of military disorders looms even 
larger.
Because military violations accounted for as much as 
51% of all petty crime in New Haven between 1639 and 1701, 
their management has served as a good example of how the 
mechanisms of control functioned in the community. The 
same kind of flexibility can be discerned in the efforts 
made by rulers to control livestock disorders. Some of 
the difficulties inherent in controlling livestock have 
been addressed in Chapter 2. As in the case of military 
affairs, the problems local officials encountered while 
attempting to control livestock were'formidable. That 31%
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of the town's bylaws--more than any other category— were 
directed expressly at this problem illustrates the deep 
concern shared by authorities and their constituents alike. 
Not surprisingly, when it came time to enforce these ordi­
nances officials were kept extremely busy.
The preoccupation with livestock control violations was 
short lived, however. As was the case with military mis­
conduct, the overwhelming majority of known livestock in­
fractions occurred in a relatively concentrated period of 
time— principally during the late forties and early fifties 
when, not so coincidentally, most of the livestock bylaws 
were written. Of the 102 violations (11% of all petty 
crime) recorded in the century, 93 or 91% were prosecuted 
in the decade beginning in 1649. Perhaps more dramatic and 
indicative of the problems of control is the fact that 79 
or 77% of the violations occurred in a five year span be­
tween 1649 and 1654. In order to understand why this hap­
pened an investigation of the particular setting within 
which enforcement was carried out in necessary.
The typicality of "crisis management" in New Haven is 
caught in the circumstances surrounding the acquittal of 
John Benham. After being charged with missing a training 
exercise, Benham explained that the "many oxen in his corn" 
forced him to miss the muster. The justices of the Planta­
tion Court were receptive to Benham's plea and the local 
brickmaker was acquitted even though he had patently vio­
lated established law. The leniency displayed by officials
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reflected the fact that the town had recently returned to 
normal conditions following a military crisis. The oxen in 
Benham's cornfield, however, is indicative of a different 
threat which was, in the early fifties, gripping the town: 
control of livestock. The general characteristics of this 
new threat to order in the community can be gleaned from the 
particulars of Benham's case: either he or his neighbors
had insufficient fencing. What this meant in realistic 
terms was that crops were threatened. So too was harmony, 
for crop damage was the source of many civil actions. While 
it remains uncertain as to who was at fault in this instance, 
it is known that Benham was convicted in 1650 "for seven
lengths of fence being down or defective" and was ordered to
^ -p- 51pay a 7s fine.
Benham was not the only resident to be presented in 1650 
by pounder John Cooper and subsequently punished. In all 
there were 41 presentments, each of which ended with a con­
viction. In two respects this renders 1650 analogous to 
1644 and as such points again to the way problems were re­
solved by local law enforcement officials. First, both 
years were similar insofar as each offender prosecuted for 
violations of certain laws was convicted; in 1644 it hap­
pened to be residents who ignored military regulations; in 
1650 it was those who disregarded livestock control bylaws. 
Second, both years were similar because they were charac­
terized by the perception of a crisis. When local problems 
appeared to reach levels of danger, as was true in both
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years, authorities moved swiftly and uncompromisingly to 
restore order in the community.
Even though livestock disorders lacked the hair-raising 
peril associated with an Indian attack, the fact remains 
that they were problematic and consumed the energy of offi­
cials on a variety of levels ranging from fence viewer to 
52magistrate. The problem in its embryonic stage can be 
traced back to 1640 when leaders noted "that some speedy 
course" was needed to exclude hogs from the neck. For the 
next eight years numerous orders were issued and 13 bylaws 
were written in an effort to bring a measure of order to 
what must have been, in the early years of settlement, a 
spatially disorganized community. Orders like those in 
1643 requiring the construction of two pounds and in 1647 
requesting that fences be viewed after storms illustrate 
the range of concerns over time. Bylaws such as those 
passed in 1648 which set penalties for damage done by cat­
tle and hogs suggest that land had not been enclosed to
53the satisfaction of town authorities. That the disor­
ders were permitted to persist for a decade or more is in 
part due to human nature and the lack of enthusiasm people 
shared when asked unofficially to perform a certain task. 
But it also reflects the lack of a meaningful agency of 
control. The decentralized neighborhood fence-viewing 
committees of the early forties were merely charged with 
notifying owners of defects, who then became liable for 
damages. It was not until 1648 that damages were fixed by
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law and that John Cooper was chosen as pounder. And it was 
only then that enforcement of livestock bylaws was begun in 
earnest.
It is fair to say that the problems associated with 
fencing and livestock which had plagued the town during the 
1640s came to a head in 1649 and 1650 when two-thirds of the 
10.2 violations were prosecuted. The climax of the problem 
is illustrated graphically in the events of March 1649 and 
the spring of 1650. At the March session of the town meet­
ing magistrate Eaton reported that "he hears there is great 
remisses and neglect in setting up fences according to the 
order made in November last." He went on to remark that 
"some stricter order" would have to be made if residents 
failed to act on Cooper's warnings. Ultimately it was 
stressed that any individual who was fined and did not pay
immediately would be subject to seizure of "part of his 
54estate." Before the year was out, 30 New Havenites were 
convicted for violating recent livestock legislation.
The following year still more presentments were made. 
Indeed, in 1650 John Benham and forty of his fellow resi­
dents were convicted of similar violations. In April,
Eaton once again presided at a gathering of the town's 
planters and reiterated a familiar theme: "Fences lye
down so much about the corn fields, that some men are dis­
couraged from planting, or sowing, and therefore some 
speedy course must be taken...." Several individuals 
present at the meeting openly voiced their support for more
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meaningful control because they feared any corn planted un-
55der existing conditions "would be eaten up." The discus­
sion led to several new orders, one of which allocated 
pounder Cooper a salary derived from fines and specified the 
precise methods to follow in presenting violators to the 
secretary.
And he did just that. In May, 26 residents were fined
56for failing to maintain strong fences. The list of of­
fenders reads like a "who's who" of the First Church of 
Christ: Deputy-Governor Stephen Goodyear was fined 3s "for
3 lengthes of fence being down," Matthew Gilbert, one of 
the original "pillars" of the church and community, was 
ordered to pay 2s 12d for his neglect, and Mrs. Isaac 
Allerton, wife of the Mayflower pilgrim, was fined 12d for 
her lack of diligence. And there were many other permanent, 
albeit less illustrious, members of the community who were 
convicted by the court. There was John Meiggs (of Meiggs 
v. Gregory fame), fined 5s for five defective lengths; 
William Basset who, between 1644 and 1650, appeared before 
the court every year for a total of ten infractions; and 
John Benham who in the same period made six appearances 
before the Plantation Court. Whether celebrated or not 
each of the violators presented by Cooper was convicted.
The complete lack of favorable decisions for the accused 
replicated the posture of the bench during the military 
alerts of the 1640s. Once again, when it became impera­
tive to gear-up the mechanisms of social control, to take
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"some speedy course" in the face of a crisis, authorities 
did so with little hesitation and they achieved what appears 
to be a reasonable degree of success.
One indication of the successful .resolution of the live­
stock problem is the sharp decline in the- number of viola­
tions recorded after 1650. It may well have been that the 
energetic enforcement of livestock control bylaws served 
its purpose. Between 1650 and 1664 there were an additional 
22 violations, but only half of these resulted in convic­
tions. This too bears a similarity to the way military 
cases were handled in the aftermath of a crisis. Matthew 
Moulthrop, for example, was accused of keeping more swine 
than permitted by law. His case was postponed because he 
was absent from court. It was never continued. At the same 
session of the August court John Jones was charged with the 
same infraction. Although he was subsequently convicted
(in 1655) the court was willing "to be favorable to him"
57and he received a reduced fine. Additional cases after 
1654 were postponed but never continued, and finally, in 
1656, the first acquittal was handed down. After having 
his case postponed in November of 1655 William Davis was 
acquitted the following February of charges that his fence 
was defective. As depicted in Figure 3.3, it was well 
after the cathartic period from 1649 to 1651 that author­
ities were willing to either let cases slip into the limbo 
associated with postponements or grant acquittals. All 
available evidence relating to both livestock and military
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violations points in one direction: rigid policies of en­
forcement during crises, followed by leniency once the most
58serious problems had been overcome.
Over the course of the century violators within these 
two categories accounted for 62% of all petty crime recorded 
in New Haven. There were other kinds of offenses which, 
when viewed from the perspective of the context within which 
they were committed, were similar in theory if not in quan­
tity. The 25 timber violations, for example, also occurred 
in clusters and reflected a current concern amongst offi­
cials. "Disorderly cutting," a charge leveled against each 
of the violators, became a problem because residents failed 
to properly "clear away tops and bodies," thus cluttering 
fields and pastures. The case of William Judson is typical. 
In 1654 Judson was "complained of for falling eight trees in 
the ox-pasture contrary to order," and was fined 16s.
Judson pleaded ignorance of the order which authorities said 
he "had no ground to do seeing it was made publically." 
Judson was merely one of a group of 21 prosecuted between 
1654 and 1659.59
Local officials expressed their concern about fire 
through periodic enforcement of fire prevention bylaws 
which led to a similar concentration of violations. There 
were two clusters of infractions, one in 1643, the other in 
1649, encompassing all but one of the fire control offenses 
in the century. Both occasions for enforcement can be tied 
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the community. The eight individuals tried and convicted 
in 1643 because they did not own ladders is a manifestation 
of the concern which had produced fire prevention legisla­
tion a month earlier. Then there was no action or enforce­
ment until 1649, when the impending resignation of the 
chimney sweep rekindled interest in adherence to fire pre­
vention bylaws. At that point eight more residents were 
presented to authorities; three were convicted, three were 
given postponements which were never continued, and two 
were granted acquittals, including Edward Camp whose ladder 
"was not in sight when the marshal" made his inspection. 
Finally, the conviction of Thomas Johnson in 1654 for burn­
ing rubbish on his houselot owes itself to complaints made
by neighbors who felt that open fires were dangerous as
60well as illegal. Johnson and each of his fellow residents 
were haled before the Plantation Court because of legitimate 
fears about the spread of fire.
It was just a few months prior to Edward Camp's acquit­
tal that Mrs. Gregson and company were convicted of the 
measures violations which introduced this analysis of petty 
crime in New Haven. Unlike cases reflecting disorders re­
lated to haphazard cutting or dangers associated with fire, 
the enforcement of the weights and measures bylaw cannot be 
linked with as much certainty to a major problem in the 
community. One suspects from its timing that the prosecu­
tions in 1649 were tied to an uproar over proper measures 
stemming from Meiggs v. Gregory some 13 months earlier.
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Following the conclusion of that spectacle, officials ex­
pressed an increased interest in diminishing the possibility 
of fraudulent practices by local merchants. A new bylaw 
covering the marking of shoes was written in 1648; later in 
the same year every cooper was ordered to "make his ware 
tight and good" and in so doing create a "just gauge." And 
a bylaw of April 1649 directed "that all men that use mea­
sures with strikes, shall get strikes well made... under
61the same penalty that the measures are." Based upon ex­
tant evidence, there is no way of knowing why Mrs. Gregson 
and her neighbors failed to comply with the court ordered 
viewing of their measures. Nevertheless, the context with­
in which the convictions took place is suggestive of most 
of the enforcement which occurred in early New Haven: the
maintenance of order in the community on a priority basis.
Whether it was the prosecution of 18 people who viola­
ted a weights and measures ordinance or several hundred who 
failed to follow military bylaws, three basic characteris­
tics stand out about how and why law enforcement functioned 
on the local level.
First, most infractions of local bylaws occurred in 
separate and concentrated periods of time which were re­
lated to specific disorders plaguing the community. Some­
times these periods ranged over several years, as witnessed 
by the military violations of the 1640s. In other instances, 
the enforcement of particular laws was restricted to shorter
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periods as exemplified by the weights and measures viola­
tions of January 1649. These isolated periods of enforce­
ment accounted for as much as 70% of the petty offenses 
prosecuted in New Haven during the seventeenth century and 
they can be attributed directly to particular problems 
facing the community. Clusters of violations appeared and 
disappeared, signalling both the existence and resolution 
of specific threats to the social order.
Secondly, although unquantifiable in a statistical 
sense, it appears that there was a relationship between the 
formulation of bylaws and their enforcement. Rather fre­
quently, periods of vigorous enforcement followed the 
"branching out into particulars by just a few years. A 
clear example can be seen in the fire prevention legisla­
tion and the prosecution of residents who lacked ladders. 
Essentially, most of the community bylaws were written in 
response to a specific set of circumstances. When the 
majesty of the law itself was not enough to nudge res­
idents in the direction of conformity, uncompromising en­
forcement was the solution. It seems more by design than 
coincidence that 58% of New Haven's bylaws concerned mil­
itary and livestock affairs, as did 62% of the petty of­
fenses prosecuted during the century.
Third, the flexibility of social control on the local 
level should be recognized. It has already been demon­
strated that bylaws could be adapted to meet the needs of 
the community. Enforcement, too, was related to need.
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Roughly a quarter of all petty crimes, like absence from
the town meeting or land use violations, were prosecuted on
6 2a random basis. Yet the overwhelming majority of infrac­
tions (70%) were linked to identifiable problems. The 
mechanisms of control could, when necessary, be unflinch­
ingly rigid. This can be seen most readily in years like 
1644 and 1650 when 100% of the offenders were convicted.
But by the same token, the mechanisms were capable of 
winding down and becoming rather loose once the foremost
aim of enforcement (resolution of the problem) had been 
6 3achieved. Military and livestock violations which ended 
favorably for violators— whether guilty or not— reflect 
this flexibility. Moreover, the disorders which surfaced 
and consumed the time of local officials really bore little 
resemblance to the kinds of dangers that the architects of 
the New England Way warned about and endeavored to prevent.
Finally, it should be added that petty offenders were 
not criminals in the traditional sense of the word. The 
typical petty offender was what could be described as a 
social insider; he was a person who tended to share common 
values and who had strong ties to the community. Most of 
the militia consisted of permanent residents and they were 
the ones prosecuted for missing watch duty or a training 
exercise. Those who appeared before the bar for fence vi­
olations were land owners. And individuals who were warned 
to court for fire prevention violations were residents who 
owned homes which by law were required to be equipped with
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fire buckets and ladders. Indeed, it is fair to say that 
being a permanent member of the community was nearly a pre­
requisite for violating local bylaws.
John Allen, a saddler, is typical of New Haven's petty 
offenders. He is one of a group of 100 whose age at first 
appearance as a violator, along with other attributes, is 
known. Allen was 31 when he was convicted by the Plantation 
Court for missing a training exercise. He was born in 1629, 
the same year that Davenport and Eaton signed the famous 
Cambridge Agreement, and travelled to New England a decade 
later with his older brother Roger. In 1652 he married 
Ellen Bradley, fathered nine children, and lived the remain­
der of his life in New Haven, dying in 1691. Allen was one 
of 63 individuals in the sample to appear before the court 
only once. Although he was admitted to the First Church in 
1658, he was but one of 27 who became members. Most nonre­
cidivists in this group were similar to Allen; they were 
slightly over 30 years of age, they had what might be con­
sidered middle-class professions, and they were married. 
Church members and freemen were in the minority. Signif­
icantly, recidivists, 37 in number, were not al all dis­
similar. Members of this group averaged three appearances 
before the court. They were also in their early thirties 
and married. For example, the first of John Holt's three 
appearances came in 1675 when he was called to answer for 
a trade violation committed by his wife Elizabeth. Holt 
was thirty and had been married for two years. In 1677 he
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again appeared before authorities on a voluntary basis; he 
requested a remission of his original penalty and he was 
successful in getting it reduced from 20s to 10s. Holt's 
final trip to court was in 1687 when he was fined for an­
other trade violation. Like Allen, Holt spent the rest of 
his life in New Haven, dying in 1733.
Residents like Allen and Holt were permanent fixtures 
in the community. They were like countless others who ap­
peared before law enforcement officials because they had 
violated one or more of a host of bylaws which were designed 
to maintain physical order in New Haven. They were, like 
magistrate Stephen Goodyear or selectman William Andrews, 
part of a large group of well known planters who subscribed 
to the principles of the Fundamental Agreement. Although 
plentiful, their offenses did not undermine the basic moral 
values of the community. This challenge came in the form 




1. New Haven Records, I, 429-430 for the violations; 313 
for the context of the law.
2. A point argued by Darrett B. Rutman, "Mirror of Puritan 
Authority," in George A. Billias ed., Law and Authority 
in Colonial America (Barre, Mass., 1965), 149-167, 
passim.
3. Prosecutions of colony level law and consideration of 
social deviance and exclusion as a strategy of control 
follow in Chapter 4. To avoid misunderstanding, viola­
tions of local laws which found their way into the col­
ony codes are included in the present examination.
4. A major reason for this is that most significant studies 
of social control have focused on the colony or county 
levels, and therefore have never really addressed the 
issues vitally important to the individual community. 
This includes Erikson, Wayward Puritans; Faber, "Puritan 
Criminals;" Greenberg, Crime and Law Enforcement; Konig, 
Law and Society; and Powers, Crime and Punishment. Some 
of the more recent English social history has examined 
crime and disorder within the context of the local com­
munity. See, for example, J.A. Sharpe, "Crime and De­
linquency in an Essex Parish, 1600-1640," in Cockburn 
ed., Crime in England, 90-109.
5. Even though the present analysis concentrates on viola­
tions of local laws, the 903 infractions between 1639 
and 1701 were distributed in five different courts: New 
Haven Plantation Court (N=787 or 87%); New Haven County 
Court (N=106 or 12%); and in the Magistrates', General, 
or Special Courts of the New Haven Colony (N=1Q or 
roughly 1%).
6 . Informal enough to be held in the home of magistrate
Theophilus Eaton. And the practice was not unique to
New Haven. In 1639, for example, John Winthrop fined 
three individuals 3s each for "loytering and sleeping" 
during a militia exercise. Rutman, Winthrop's Boston, 
233.
7. Apparently, however, the local courts were more re­
sponsive to individual needs and as such were more 
likely to hand down acquittals than were the formal 
sessions of the county courts.
8. Individual initiative was, as best as can be deter­
mined, rather infrequent. There were few remission
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requests, about 53 or 6% of the total appearances, and 
a minuscule number of appeals (2). The lack of appeals 
is not unusual given the nature of petty offenses.
9. The outcome of the appearances was as follows:
Resolution No. Pet.





Other 3 . 5
Totals 897 100
10. Based on the population of involuntary appearances 
(N=841), 76% resulted in conviction.
11. Unfortunately, direct statistical comparison of the 
two is impossible. Residents were occasionally pun­
ished for violations of laws that either do not appear 
in local records, or, more likely, never existed. In­
formalities like this were bound to have occurred in 
New England towns and are thus frustrating, but not 
surprising, to researchers.
12. Town Records, II, 273. For the bylaw see Ibid., I,
355. Lampson was no stranger to either the local or 
county courts. Between 1661 and 1683 he appeared be­
fore the latter on five occasions; before the former, 
on seven. Jonathan seems to have followed in his 
father's footsteps who appeared on 10 occasions. Both 
were well above the average three appearances made by 
New Haven recidivists.
13. An example would be the case of Joseph Baldwin who ap­
pealed "the judgement of an inferior court held at New 
Haven." County Court Records, I, 213.
14. Workload should not be confused with "caseload" of 
criminal offenses. The Plantation Court also had ju­
risdiction over civil suits and in matters of probate.
















David Allen has illustrated the accumulation of power 
by Watertown, Mass., selectmen who, among other duties, 
fined individuals for "infractions of bylaws and rates." 
See, In. English Ways, 155-159, esp., 158. In New Haven, 
selectmen were granted authority to prosecute in areas 
other than just livestock control. Examples would in­
clude fire prevention and regulation of timber cutting. 
Cf., Town Records, I, 380 and 337. It also appears that 
the militia company was given the responsibility of pun­
ishing recalcitrant soldiers sometime in the 1650s. See 
suggestive references in Ibid., I, 317; II, 200.
New Haven Records, I, 260-261.
Town Records, I, 52.
New Haven Records, I, 262-263. For his indiscretion 
Steward was ordered to pay a £5 fine and be "imprisoned 
[at] the court's pleasure;" an unusually stiff sentence, 
but one which is perhaps explained by the fact that he 
had appeared before the bench on eight previous occa­
sions for offenses ranging from theft to partial absence 
from a trainband exercise.
Violations of watch and training regulations, or varia­
tions thereof, amounted to 361 or 78% of the total num­
ber of military infractions. "Variations" include 
sleeping while on watch duty which technically is "ne­
glect" of watch, but for which no specific legislation 
existed, as was the case with many military offenses.
New Haven Records, I, 25, 32, and 45-46 respectively.
Ibid., 76, 86, and 167.
Ibid., 38 for the violation, 35 for the bylaw.
Ibid., 133-134.
Ibid., 122 for the violation, 119 for the order.
Ibid., 135. Winthrop, who recorded the incident in his 
chronicle, noted that "the woman recoverd, but lost her 
senses." Busheage, the Indian, was subsequently tried 
and executed. According to the governor of Massachu­
setts, it took the executioner (armed with a falchion) 
eight blows to strike-off the condemned man's head who, 
in the process, remained "upright and stirred not all 
the time." John Winthrop, History of New England from 




29. Nine of the offenders are unidentified because, for ex­
ample, they were listed in the records as "3 men" or
something equally as vague. Richard Perry and Roger 
Knapp, whose arms "was burnt in Delaware Bay," were the 
two men whose original fines were moderated.
30. New Haven Records, I, 122 and 125 respectively.
31. For the rash of remissions see Ibid., I, 152. Crowder
was one of those convicted during the crisis. See Ibid.,
123 for the violation and 153 for the remission.
32* Ibid., 167-168.
33. Ibid., 170.
34. For New Haven's training schedule see Ibid.,'202.
35. Ibid., 481-485.
36. Ibid., 498 for the continuation and Town Records, I, 1, 
for the conviction. Isaac was Lyman Beecher's Great 
Great Grandfather.
37. For their postponements see New Haven Records, I, 456; 
convictions, 487-488.
38. Ibid., 488-489. The watch misconduct was compounded 
by lying— thought to be the "working of Satan." Mag­
isterial discretion in the punishment of gross military 
misbehavior was provided for in the Revision of 1646 in 
Ibid., 205.
39. Jules Zanger has addressed the role of remissions in 
his "Crime and Punishment in Early Massachusetts,"
William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd. Ser., XXII (1965), 
471-477, although he did not analyze the context of 
events and the attitudes prevalent in the Bay Colony 
which promoted leniency. For more on remissions con­
sult Lee, "Discretionary Justice,” 129-130.
40. For Marden and Walker, New Haven Records, I, 281. For 
Hot.chkiss, 378 for the offense, 428 for the refusal.
The remission denial is perhaps explained by his pro­
clivity for violating military laws, which was the 
cause of seven of his eight appearances in the courts 
between 1643 and 1646.
41- Ibid., 310 and 317. Knapp was also fined for missing 




44. For Tichnor see Ibid., 400. It is perhaps noteworthy 
that the one person in the group with a prior record of 
severe punishment was Geurnsie, a one-time servant who 
evidently left town in the fifties. See 239 for the
original offense and punishment; 380 and 384 for the
postponement and conviction for his military infraction.
45. Ibid., 392, 391, and 412-413 respectively for the 
acquittals.
46. Ibid., 374, 381. Later, when the 1649 alarm was sounded,
the watch was again increased because it was "not safe"
to continue according to the provisions of the 1648 or­
der, 481.
47. Ibid., 411.
48. In the period from 1639 to 1665, 343 or 97% of all mil­
itary convictions occurred, 133 or 96% of all military 
related defenses were made, and 41 or 91% of all the 
military acquittals were granted. The breakdown for 
Figure 3.2 is as follows:
Three Year Mid-Point Convictions Defenses Acquittals
No. Pet. No. Pet. No. Pet. '
1640 8 2.3 0 0 0 0
1643 135 39.3 0 0 0 0
1646 84 24.4 19 14.2 3 7.3
1649 65 19 58 47.7 10 24.4
1652 31 9 30 22.6 14 34.2
1655 6 1.7 6 4.5 3 7.3
1658 8 2.3 14 10.6 8 19. 5
1661 1 .5 3 2.2 oo 7.3
1664 5 1.5 oO 2.2 0 0
Totals 343 100 133 100 41 100
49. New Haven Records, I, 230.
50. Town Records, I, 264.
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51. Ibid., 27.
52. In Rowley, Massachusetts, during the same period, live­
stock control was also problematic. Special overseers 
had to be assigned to enforce livestock and fencing by­
laws. Allen, In. English Ways, 53.
53. For the orders see New Haven Records, I, 82 and 305; 
for the bylaws, 407.
54. Ibid., 445-446. In January Eaton threatened residents 
with a "more severe fine” if disorders continued, 427.
55. Town Records, I, 18-19.
56. Ibid., 26-27.
57. For the Moulthrop and Jones postponements see Ibid., 
219; for Jones' reduced penalty, 244, and for the by­
law, 101.
58. For the Davis postponement and acquittal see Ibid., 259 
and 266 respectively. The breakdown for Figure 3.3 is 
as follows:
Three Year Mid-Point Convictions Non-Convictions
No. Pet. No. Pet.
1641 0 0 0 0
1644 1 1.2 0 0
1647 0 0 0 0
1650 64 83.4 0 0
1653 11 14.2 3 42.8
1656 1 1.2 4 57.2
1659 0 0 0 0
1662 0 0 0 0
Totals 77 100 7 100
59. Judson's fine was partially remitted in 1655 because of 
a counting mistake by officials. Town Records, I, 219 
and 254 for the remission. For the orders see 154 and 
223. For the other violations, 237. David Allen has 
addressed cutting infractions from the perspective of 
the value placed on different kinds of timber. In 
English Ways, 76-77.
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60. New Haven Records, I, 121 and 453 for the 1640 and 1649
clusters; 121 and 447 for the bylaws and expressions of
concern over chimnies. Town Records, I, 223-224 for 
the Johnson violation. New Haven Records, I, 157 for 
the law restricting fires in house lots.
61. «New Haven Records, I, 357, 397, and 447-448.
62. Absence from the town meeting could have just as easily
been linked to an enforcement priority of officials.
In 1670, for instance, a strong warning was issued be­
cause "there was a great neglect in not attending the 
time of these meetings." Planters were told that they 
"must expect the penalty will be required if there not 
be better attendance in the future." See Town Records, 
II, 257.
63. Similar isolated periods of enforcement are, on occasion, 
alluded to elsewhere. Joseph Smith noted that crisis 
management revealed through supplemental laws could 
produce sudden jumps in the enforcement of particular 
crimes. "Criminal Law," 23. In England, "variations
in the incidence of theft followed very closely fluc­
tuations in the price of food." Cockburn, The Nature 
and Incidence of Crime," in Idem., ed., Crime in 
England," 67. And M.G. Davies reported that English 
justices enforced apprenticeship laws "only when it met 
an urgent need of the local community or was in' harmony 
with strong public sentiment." See his The Enforcement 
of English Apprenticeship (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), 162
CHAPTER IV
CHALLENGES TO MORAL ORDER:
DEVIANTS AND DELINQUENTS
More than likely New Haven's meetinghouse was filled to 
capacity in May of 1655 as a session of the Magistrate's 
Court was being called to order. The attraction was not the 
reading of the last will and testament of Anthony Tompson 
"late of New Haven deceased." Nor was it the civil suit 
pending between Edward Higby and Jonas Wood. A criminal 
case involving William Ellit and Hannah Spencer for "filthy 
carriages between them in William Benfield's boat" probably 
generated more interest than either the probate matter or 
the civil dispute. However, what surely must have been con­
sidered the "main event" on that morning in May was a case 
centering on John Knight, charged with "filthiness in a 
sodomittical way with Peter Vincent, his master Judson's 
boy, of the age of fourteen years or somewhat more."
John Knight, a person of ill-repute had been to the bar 
before. In 1651 he was fined 5s because his "rest was bro­
ken and his gun rusty," rendering them both useless. Ear­
lier the same year he was identified as one of several 
"young men" who participated in drinking parties with an 
unsavory fellow named Thomas Langden. On at least one oc­
casion Knight's absence from a training exercise caused his 
master, William Judson, to be fined. And he had faced
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colony authorities at a prior session of the court for 
"loathesome filthiness" with the children of Francis Hall, 
"for which he was then near death and therefore sentenced 
(beside other punishment) to wear a halter about his neck.!'
If his general demeanor had not already set him apart from 
other residents of this community of saints, then certainly 
the halter served that purpose. Knight was different from 
other residents of the town anyway insofar as he was an out­
sider, a servant with no known ties to the community other 
than his physical presence. Whether he was hated, feared, 
or viewed with pity is, at this juncture, only speculation. 
And if John Knight had not yet been labelled as a deviant by 
local residents, he was now. Convicted, he was characterized 
by the court as a "lewd, profane, filthy, corrupting, incor­
rigible person... tending to the very destruction of man­
kind." Because there seemed "to be no end to his filthiness 
nor means to reclaim him, whether public punishment or pri­
vate warning" the court determined that he was unfit to 
"live among men" and agreed that a rope, not a halter better 
suited John Knight's neck.'*'
Three years prior to the Knight case an "extraordinary" 
session of the court was held to examine three youths also 
charged with gross sexual misconduct. Samuel Miles, Esborne 
Wakeman, and John Frost were charged with certain unspeci­
fied homosexual acts (perhaps sodomy) as well as with some 
of a more explicit nature. These included the accusation 
that they whipped each other and "handled on[e] anothers
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members." The court records suggest that under ordinary 
circumstances deviations like these would be taken up pri­
vately. Yet because this behavior "was spread abroad among 
several youthes" the court felt the community would be bet­
ter served if the boys were all "publically witnessed 
against." A trial was held, they were found guilty, and
they were ordered to be whipped severely "according as their
o
age and strength will bear."
One wonders exactly how much punishment the youths 
"years" would in fact bear: Miles and Frost were twelve and
ten respectively, while Wakeman, the son of a deceased Hart­
ford planter, was roughly the same age. Not surprisingly it 
was their first appearance before local authorities, but, 
importantly, it did not mark the beginning of three deviant 
careers. Young Wakeman never appeared before New Haven mag­
istrates again; he fulfilled the terms of his indenture to 
William Davis and removed to Stratford where he was listed 
as a freeman in 1669. The son of Richard Miles, a well re­
garded New Haven resident, remained in town where he married 
and pursued his trade. Samuel's only other appearance be­
fore the court was in 1672 when he was charged with making 
public speeches on the Lord's Day and ordered to post a bond 
for good behavior (from which he was released six months 
later). Although the career of John Frost was somewhat more 
delinquent, he too seems to have remained a member of the 
community in good standing until his death in 1700. During 
adolescence, however, he came dangerously close to being
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excluded permanently. When he was 14 he burned his master's 
house to the ground. During his trial, which ended in con­
viction and severe punishment, Frost claimed that he had 
been "knocked" and "whipped" by his master and that the fire 
was his means of revenge. Frost appeared before the bench 
for the last time in 1662 when he was again accused of sex­
ual misconduct, this time with John and Mercy Paine. De­
spite his uneasy passage through adolescence, John Frost, 
like Miles and Wakeman, seems to have been treated with
3
charity and understanding by members of the community.
These dramatic but different examples of misconduct 
raise two major questions about the maintenance of order in 
early New Haven. The first concerns flexibility. In Chap­
ter 3 it was suggested that a proper ordering of the prag­
matic aspects of community life was achieved through flex­
ible and responsive enforcement of bylaws. In most in­
stances, local ordinances were actually formulated in 
response to particular problems facing the community. That 
enforcement on the local level should be equally responsive 
is hardly surprising. However, does this also hold true 
when addressing the more universal statutes embodied in 
colony law codes? Unlike local laws, which were ever 
changing, those governing morality tended to be more rigid; 
they were "fixed" in codes at specific points in time (1650, 
1656, and 1673) and for the most part were all similar. For 
example, laws governing sodomy in each of the codes required 
the same penalty: death.4 How then was it possible, given
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the rigidity of the law, for Knight to receive one punish­
ment while his younger counterparts received another? It 
is this kind of flexibility which must be addressed when 
analyzing violations of colony law.
Clearly related to the issue of flexibility is a second 
element of enforcement touched upon in the two cases of 
sexual misbehavior: exclusion for deviance. Indeed, was
exclusion utilized as a means of maintaining the moral 
order? Judging from the Knight case one is tempted to con­
clude that it was; he was stigmatized as an individual "un­
fit to live among men" and promptly executed— an extreme 
form of exclusion. But where does this leave the three 
youths who, despite their sordid crimes, retained membership 
in the community? Although the trio must have been viewed 
with displeasure by their parents and masters, as well as by
other residents, it is highly probable, considering their
5
age and kinship ties, that their "fall from grace" was 
temporary. Unlike Knight, it seems that these youths were 
considered to be capable of being reclaimed. They were de­
linquent; Knight was a deviant.
In many respects, it was New Haven's delinquents, not 
its deviants, who made it difficult for leaders to maintain 
moral order. Generally, exclusion for deviance affected 
individuals with few ties to the community, of low social 
standing, or those of different racial backgrounds. It was 
easier for all involved to make difficult decisions about 
these "outsiders." Where notorious conduct became a problem
166
was with the off-spring of the saints. Local residents 
could not exclude their own flesh and blood, hence in the 
end there was little that could be done to control the pil­
fering, drinking habits, or sexual appetites of New Haven's 
rising generations.
Most of the appearances made before authorities for vio­
lations of colony laws were related to sex, drinking, or 
theft. In the period from 1639 to 1698 offenses within these
categories totalled 330 or 61% of the 541 known appearances
6made for transgressing colony statutes. Most of the trials 
were heard before local rulers at sessions of the Plantation 
Court. Officials of New Haven punished fornicators and 
thieves, just as they did negligent planters whose fences 
were defective. Yet while 88% of the petty offenses were 
tried on the local level, only a slim majority (52%) of the 
colony offenses were. Many more of these colony infractions 
were heard at the county level (39% to 12% for petty crimes) 
and still more (93% as opposed to 7%) were handled in other 
sessions ranging from the Court of Assistants to "Extraor­
dinary" Courts. On the surface it may seem unusual that so 
many colony violations were heard by the local tribunal. 
However, until 1665 when New Haven was absorbed by Connect­
icut, the Plantation Court had jurisdiction over cases in­
volving punishment that did not exceed whipping or fines of 
£5. Thus, prior to 1666 nearly every kind of crime was 
handled at the local level by justices who knew, and at
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times co-habited with, offenders. Thereafter, petty crime 
became the nearly exclusive province of the Commissioners' 
Courts, while more serious offenses were tried in the County 
Courts.^
As was the case with petty offenders, deviants and de- • 
linquents appeared before court sessions either on a volun­
tary basis to request, for example, remission of a previous 
penalty, or involuntarily, in which case violators were con­
victed, acquitted, or had their cases dropped and postponed. 
Of those who appeared involuntarily, 92% were convicted com­
pared with 76% for petty offenders. And whereas authorities 
displayed frequent leniency with the latter, the opposite 
was true with deviants and delinquents. While 85 or 9% of 
the cases of petty crime ended in acquittals, only 10 or 2% 
of those accused of violating colony statutes did. And 
evidently, persons charged with colony misdemeanors were 
acquitted as a result of insufficient evidence rather than 
because officials were acting charitably.
The distribution of colony law violations also differed 
from that of petty crime. It should be recalled that 
roughly 80% of all prosecutions of the latter occurred dur­
ing the first two decades of settlement. To a large degree 
this is explained by the crises of the forties and fifties, 
but it also reflects the loss of mid-century inferior court 
records. Colony infractions, in contrast, were distributed 
much more evenly (Figure 4.1). During the first decade of 
settlement, 16% of all violations were recorded; during the
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last decade of the century, some 15%. Following a flurry 
of enforcement during the 1640s, when the commitment to or­
der was perhaps most pronounced and when deviants and de­
linquents received their harshest punishments, prosecutions 
dropped. But they rose again, to a century high in the de­
cade between 1659 and 1668 (29%) when New Haven's second 
generation was coming of age. In the 1670s and 1680s, pros­
ecutions again declined, then began to increase in the 1690s 
when another generation began to experience the trials of 
adolescence. Not only were offenders of colony law fewer in 
number than petty offenders, but it appears, judging from 
the general distribution, that there was not the distinctive 
clustering of enforcement that was associated with what has 
been termed a "crisis management" approach in prosecuting 
those who violated local ordinances.
As was the case with the distribution of petty offenses, 
the question of the authenticity of the distribution of col­
ony infractions must be addressed. It is quite probable 
that the distribution depicted in Figure 4.1 is an accurate 
representation— certainly moreso than the one for petty 
crimes. Underrecording was a problem with petty offenses 
because the records of the Commissioners' Courts, the 
selectmen, and other informal tribunals, like the militia 
company, are non-existent or contain little information .on 
the prosecution of offenders after the mid-fifties. By 
comparison, the superior court records— General Courts, 
Magistrates' Courts, Courts of Assistants, and County
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Figure 4.1 




Sources: New Haven Records, I & II; Town Records, I-III;
and County Court Records, I.
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Courts— are for the most part complete. The one exception 
is for the ten year period 1643 to 1653 when only partial
Q
records remain for the New Haven Colony. A second reason 
for greater accuracy in recording colony infractions is that 
they were considered more serious and consequently were un­
recorded on only the rearest of occasions. Based on the 
surviving records and on the nature of the offenses, it is 
reasonable to assume that the distribution of colony viola­
tions is indeed representative of actual enforcement.
What remains unanswered is whether recorded violations 
accurately depict deviance and delinquency in early New 
Haven. Again, as was true with petty offenses, there must 
have been an undetermined number of colony infractions that 
escaped the attention of law enforcement officials (and even 
nosey neighbors). Moreover, there had to have been young 
men who drank themselves silly unbeknownst to authorities. 
There must have been adolescents whose pre-marital sexual 
encounters went undetected. And there were surely instances 
of pilfering that were, for a variety of reasons, never 
reported. Although these unreported offenses clearly ex­
isted their omission from surviving records is probably not 
significant enough to alter either the general distribution 
or distributions within particular categories.
As suggested earlier, the most frequent offenses were 
those related to sex, theft, or alcohol abuse. Together, 
fornication and drunkenness accounted for 191 or 35% of the 
total number of colony infractions (Table 4.1). These two
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crimes will be assessed in more detail below. So too will 
the 76 prosecutions for theft which constituted an additional 
14%. Beyond these, there was an assortment of other colony 
law violations (274 or 50%) that also caught the eye of law 
enforcement officials. These ranged from isolated instances 
of "unnatural" sexual behavior, like bestiality, to profaning 
the sabbath "by sinful servile work or by unlawful sport," 
with six recorded cases. Both crimes carried a maximum pen-
9
alty of death. There were a few cases of arson or attempted 
arson that resulted in whipping and fines for the "said 
criminals" like John Watson, Hannah Little, and Sarah 
Chatterton, each of whom was convicted by the County Court 
in 1695.^ For the most part, however, profound sexual of­
fenses or gross crimes against property were infrequent.
Other colony infractions related to maintaining a sem­
blance of order amongst local residents. Offenses which 
seemed to threaten this the most were miscarriages of the 
peace (60 or 11%) and "nightwalking" (43 or 8%). From a 
legal standpoint, disturbing the public peace, in addition 
to violating the sixth commandment, covered a wide range 
of activities. Both the New Haven and Connecticut Colony 
codes stated that whosoever disturbed the peace "by his own 
tumultuous and offensive carriage, traducing, reproaching, 
quarelling, challenging, assaulting," behavior would be 
subject to a wide range of penalties from a simple fine to 
banishment."^ Practically any kind of conduct that the 
rulers found objectionable could fall under this heading.
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Typically, misbehavior between two or more people seems to
have been the rule. For example, in 1678, Henry Brooks was
convicted of disturbing the peace and imprisoned at the
pleasure of the court. A complaint made by his step-son
Peter Blakesley led to a hearing which revealed that Brooks
had been very "offensive to his neighbors" (probably by
cursing). Following his conviction the court noted that
such behavior was "not to be endured among any sober and
12Christian people."
Ordinarily peace-breakers received lighter sentences 
than the one handed out to Brooks. More typical of punish­
ment was the 10s fine levied on John and William Collins in
131693 when they broke the peace. Among other things, this 
points to the legal fact that authorities had a variety of 
punishments at their disposal and were thus able to assess 
each case individually. Although both Brooks and the Collins 
brothers committed the same offense, the former received the 
stiffer sentence. Other options besides fine and imprison­
ment were available to justices. When extensive quarelling 
between John Morris and Eleazer Peck fell into slander and 
defamation, their punishment was the drafting and signing of 
a covenant which acknowledged that they had been "uncomfort­
able to themselves and troublesome to their neighbors."
They had to confess that they had been a "hazard to public 
peace" and agree "voluntarily" to desist. Officials could 
also order bonds of good behavior to be posted, as was done 
with the Hall brothers in 1673 after they caused a disturbance
173
Table 4.1 
Colony Infractions by New Haven 
Residents, 1639-1698








*Includes "unauthorized" night meetings.
Sources: New Haven Records, I & II; Town Records, I—III;
and County Court Records, I & II.
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with Eleazer Morris. Finally, if the breach of peace was
not too problematic the court could act with compassion and
hand down no sentence whatsoever. That is what happened in
June of 1690 after a 36 year old male delinquent made "hum-
14ble expositions' acknowledging his evil" and was acquitted.
Although not as disruptive, nightwalking also posed a 
threat to order and as such was prosecuted frequently. Spe­
cifically, the threat lay in what could happen if youths 
were permitted to travel about unsupervised by their parents. 
Drunkenness, theft, and fornication were high on the list of 
temptations capable of corrupting the offspring of the 
saints. That is exactly what happened when Isaac Moline 
carried off John Davenport's maid, Hester Clark, "on horse­
back to a farm... in the_night after her master's family was 
in bed." During their trial the couple was told that such
15behavior was "directly contrary to the law of God and man." 
From a legal standpoint nightwalkers were individuals who 
convened "after the shutting in of the evening" in either 
"streets or fields," or in houses where no authorized adult 
supervision existed. In addition to "persons young or old... 
that are under parents or masters government," the law also 
applied to "sojourners and boaders" capable of exercising 
an evil influence over adolescents. Although provisions 
were made in earlier codes to prevent such "roaming about,” 
nightwalking was only established as a separate legal cate­
gory in the Connecticut Code of 1673— perhaps a reflection 
of growing concern over the independence youths were
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1 C
seeking in the late seventeenth century.
Nevertheless, the offense was prosecuted regularly in 
New Haven beginning in the early sixties. In February of 
1663 several youths were presented for holding "unseason­
able night meetings" at the home of John and Mary Brown 
"contrary to their parents and masters consent or knowl­
edge." Specifically, they were condemned for "playing at 
cards, singing, and dancing." After offering their excuses 
to authorities, the young men were told that they committed 
an offense against which "they had so often been warned in 
the public ministry" and one which was "contrary to the law 
here established and often published." To serve as a final
reminder, the law was read to them and they were each fined 
175s. The same reasoning lay behind the decision to uphold 
an inferior court conviction of Jonathan Tuttle for "unsea­
sonable travelling" on the sabbath eve "contrary to the good
18example [set] for him by his parents." On occasion par­
ents ended up paying the fines for offenses committed by 
their children. When Samuel and Martha Munson were fined 
10s each for unauthorized night meetings in 1687, they were 
told that inability to pay meant sitting "in the stocks one 
hour as the law directs." Faced by the possibility of hav­
ing his children publically humiliated, Mr. Munson paid the 
19fines.
Whether or not the Munson children, 19 and 17 respec­
tively, received further correction at home is unknown. 
Perhaps their father delivered a lecture on the evils of
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nightwalking and told them that they had to work-off their 
fines. It is also possible that nothing was done; that the 
Munsons returned home and carried on as usual. After all, 
Munson’s children were only doing what other New Haven teen­
agers were doing with increasing regularity. Nightwalking 
may have been considered a threat to order, but if punish­
ment is an indication of how society viewed an offense, en­
gaging in unsupervised activity did not evoke excessively 
strong feelings of displea ;ure by the community or the
courts; fines were not much larger than those laid on recal-
20citrant militiamen. Nightwalking was, it seems, less 
troublesome than disturbing the peace and certainly less 
dangerous than theft or fornication. And even these tradi­
tionally grievous offenses were punished with less severity 
over time, yet another indication of changing values. More­
over, it was only on occasions when individuals appeared to 
have the potential for genuinely eroding the social order 
that extreme sanctions— like exclusion for deviance— were 
employed uniformly.
One does not have to look very hard to find evidence of 
exclusion in New England during the colonial period. Most 
readers of history possess at least a vague familiarity with 
the region's reputation for warning-out and banishing per­
sons of ill-repute. The one name that comes to mind more 
than any other is Anne Hutchinson who was banished from the 
Bay Colony in 1637. But there were others who were excluded
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because they offended authorities, committed crimes, or 
otherwise seemed to threaten the social order. John and 
Samuel Brown were banished from Salem for holding separate 
church services which utilized the Book of Common Prayer. 
There was Alexander Partridge who, after being cast out by 
Massachusetts authorities, travelled to Rhode Island where 
he suffered ultimate exclusion (trial and execution) by an 
angry mob. And there was, of course, John Knight who was
21deemed "unfit to live among men" and executed at New Haven.
Exclusion through banishment, excommunication, and other 
means, like execution and branding, was not invented by the 
founders of the New England Way; it was part of an English 
tradition that was used with regularity as a means of social 
control in the mother country. It was transported to the 
new world in an exaggerated form because of the religious 
convictions of the saints. Indeed, it was apprehension over 
the behavior of "civil man" that prompted New England offi­
cials to formulate bylaws aimed at screening out undesir­
ables before they had a chance to corrupt God-fearing mem-
22bers of the community. Because of severe labor shortages 
and other circumstances of life in America, persons of sus­
picious character and even with criminal records found their 
way into the covenanted communities of New England. Once 
there, continued criminal conduct or the simple suggestion 
of malfeasance could lead to exclusion very quickly.
Given this familiarity, it is surprising that more 
scholars have not focused on it as a mechanism of social
178
control. The most extensive analysis is Kai Erikson's Way­
ward Puritans. Unfortunately, Erikson miscalculated the 
extent of deviance in the Bay Colony by assuming that the 
Essex County Court was the "main agency for dealing with 
deviant behavior" in northeastern Massachusetts, that its
records "provide a complete coverage of all deviant activ-
23
ities in the county." This has fostered the notion that 
most colonial law-breakers were truly deviant. Moreover, 
if one accepts Erikson's assumption, then it also holds 
true that petty offenders, like Joseph Swett's wife who was 
fined 10s for wearing a silk hood, were singled out and 
labelled as deviants. This simply was not the case. More 
recently an analysis of Middlesex County, Massachusetts 
Court Records led Eli Faber to suggest that individuals 
were offered several avenues of reabsorption into the com­
munity after a crime had been committed. Faber concluded 
that even though offenders were punished, puritan society
"did not condemn them to exclusion and isolation for long
24years to come." Erikson and Faber are the only scholars 
to address exclusion directly. The sociologist takes one 
position, the historian another. With certain caveats ap­
plied, they are probably both correct, suggesting that 
actual practice fell somewhere in between.
Despite Erikson's liberal assessment of the size of 
Essex County's deviant population, his work is eminently 
suited for a discussion of what actually constituted 
deviance. As with other studies on the subject, Erikson
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utilized the generally accepted definition that deviance 
refers to "conduct which the people of a group consider so 
dangerous or embarrassing or irritating tha,t they bring 
special santions to bear against the persons who exhibit 
it." Importantly, he added that deviance is not a property 
inherent in any particular kind of behavior; "it is a proper­
ty conferred upon that behavior by those who come into con­
tact with it." "Those" is a significant qualifier because 
it suggests that every social group has its own methods for 
labelling deviants. Thus it is necessary to recognize that 
deviance encompasses a broad range of possibilities, so 
broad in fact, that "there are no objective properties which
all deviant acts can be said to have in common— even within
25the confines of a given group."' Rape is a case in point. 
Today, most people consider it to be an act of deviance com­
mitted by individuals who are severely maladjusted. Both 
legal and societal responses indicate that rapists are 
labelled as deviants. But this has not always been the 
case. In fourteenth-century Venice, for example, rape was
viewed as a minor offense against both the victim and 
26society. These kinds of exceptions to the rule help re­
inforce the notion that identifying or "cataloguing" de­
viants in any society is no easy task.
This is especially germane in the light of the fact 
that exclusion for deviance is not always determined simply 
on the basis of the given act. Other factors enter into 
the process. The social ranking of an individual is one.
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His record as an offender is another. And so, too, is the
27shifting mood of the community over time. The presence
or absence of additional variables tend to influence ones
prospects for exclusion. For instance, there is a strong
tendency to exclude individuals who lack close social ties
28to the community. Yet this does not entirely preclude 
exclusion of those with strong ties. There is a greater 
propensity to exclude for deviance persons who are per­
ceived to reject commonly held values than there is for
29those who do not. But this does not mean that those who
embrace those values are exempted from acquiring a deviant
status. There is also a greater probability of exclusion
for offenders who are uncooperative with authorities than
30there is for those who do cooperate. However, an "un­
cooperative" suspect may be trying to convince others of 
his innocence and in so doing successfully avoid exclusion. 
The list of propositions like these is endless. They con­
tribute to our understanding of the labelling process, but 
are not definitive criteria that can be used to pinpoint 
the size of a deviant population three hundred years ago.
Seventeenth-century descriptions can help, but they 
too have noteworthy limitations. The puritans had a pen­
chant for using the word "sin" to cover a wide variety of 
offenses from illegal trade to fornication. However, in 
keeping with the definition of deviance, it would be inap­
propriate to assume that all "sinners" were deviants. 
Catchall terms like this must be approached with caution.
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Utilizing the law as a basis for assessing deviance can
help, but here too problems arise. One might conclude, for
example, that capital crimes can serve as a jumping off
point for identifying deviant offenses. Yet in the Eaton
31Code the punishment for smiting one's parents was death.
Does this mean that rebellious children were considered 
deviants? By the same token, does it mean that Aaron Stark, 
a Connecticut man whipped for bestiality before that of­
fense became a capital crime was not? He probably was, es­
pecially when considering that he had previously been
branded on the cheek with the letter "R" for sexually
32abusing Mary Holt. Although Connecticut's laws are use­
ful in establishing norms, provisions did change over time 
and the strict letter of the law was not always followed. 
Given these inconsistencies, laws themselves cannot be 
used as the principal basis for defining deviance. Finally, 
there are comments by contemporaries, like the one made by 
a prominent Londoner who described sodomites as deviants 
who "ought to be excluded from all civil society and human
conversation," but these surface too infrequently in sur-
33viving records. Moreover, as with modern propositions 
regarding deviance, contemporary evidence can help identi­
fy the existence of deviations, but they offer no ironclad 
rules for erecting models that can be used to single out 
individual deviants.
With so many variables inherent in the process of 
labelling deviants it is virtually impossible to inventory
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New Haven's deviant population. But that is really not the 
issue at hand. What is important is to recognize that de­
viance existed and that seventeenth-century New Englanders 
viewed deviants as a particular class of people who were 
unlikely to reform. Moreover, the puritan tendency to view 
things in bi-polar terms— saved or damned, ruler or ruled, 
insider or outsider— strongly suggests that once a person
was excluded for deviance it was "extremely difficult for
34him to resume a normal social role in the community."
Thus it is more appropriate to ask: is there evidence that
exclusion was used as a strategy for social control and to 
what extent was it effective?
The answer to the first part of the question is yes; ex­
clusion was utilized as a means of preserving the social 
order. The most thoroughly documented example is found in 
the legal proceedings against George Spencer, a servant who 
was executed in 1642 after being convicted of bestiality. 
Importantly his trial marked the end of what may be des­
cribed as a deviant career that began prior to his arrival 
in New Haven.
Shortly after he landed in the new world, Spencer was 
convicted by a Quarter Court held in Boston in 1637. He 
was charged with receiving stolen property from another un­
distinguished servant named William Broomfield. For his
involvement, Spencer was censured, whipped, and, in keeping
35with Scripture, was ordered to make twofold restitution. 
Following his encounter with Massachusetts authorities he
183
removed to New Haven where, in early 1640, he was appre­
hended for conspiring to "carry away" the Cock to Virginia. 
Very quickly he had acquired a reputation for being "pro­
fane and disorderly in his whole conversation and an abetter
of others to sin." On this occasion he was whipped and
36banished— in and of itself evidence of exclusion. Al­
though he was "cast out," Spencer returned to New Haven 
within a year and hired on as a servant to Henry Browning.
At roughly the same time, Browning sold a pregnant sow 
to John Wakenman and it was he who "acquainted the magis­
trate that a sow of his" had delivered a "prodigious 
37monster." The pig was described as having "no hair on 
the whole body [and] the skin was very tender... like a 
childs; the head was most strange, it had but one eye in 
the middle of the face..., over the eye... a thing of flesh 
grew forth and hung down... like a man's instrument of gen­
eration." Evidently the deformed creature came as no sur­
prise to Goody Wakeman because the "hand of God appeared in 
an impression" which prefigured the event. Curious and 
concerned citizens flocked to view the results of an 
autopsy that revealed "there was an apparent difference in 
all the inwards" from another pig of the same litter. After 
this public viewing "a strange impression" fell upon many 
others that one "George Spencer... had been [an] actor in 
unnatural and abominable filthiness with the sow." Indeed, 
so strong were these impressions that "divers upon first 
sight, expressed their apprehensions without any knowledge
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what conjecture others had made." Why? Because Spencer 
"had but one eye for use, the other has a pearl in it,
[which] is whitish and deformed, and his deformed eye being 
beheld and compared together with the eye of the monster, 
seemed to be as like as the eye in the glass to the eye in 
the face." Spencer, in otherwords, was being accused of 
grave sexual deviation on the basis of the pig's appearance.
An initial investigation into the event met with a de­
nial by Spencer who was nevertheless incarcerated. While 
in the jailhouse he was questioned by magistrate Stephen 
Goodyear, who asked him what he thought of the creature and 
"whether he did not take notice of something in it like him?" 
Spencer then asked whose sow it was and the magistrate, 
"apprehending in the prisoner some relenting, as a prepara­
tion for confession, remembered him of that place in Scrip­
ture, he that hides his sin shall not prosper, but he that 
confesses and foresakes his sins shall find mercy." With 
that the confused and scared Spencer "answered he was sorry 
and confessed that he had done it." Subsequent examinations 
by Eaton and Davenport brought forth additional details.
That the temptation had "been upon his spirit two or three 
days before." That the transgression took place in Browning's 
stable "about six o'clock in the evening, when the sun was 
set and the daylight almost shut in." That he was with the 
sow for two hours and that the act itself lasted 30 minutes, 
to which Spencer added that "it was the most terrible half 
hour that he had ever had." When asked how he could "do it
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if he had no pleasure in it," Spencer remarked that "he was 
driven by the power of the Devil and the strength of his 
[corr] uption to do the thing."
During his imprisonment Spencer had many conversations 
with officials who endeavored to discover the reasons for 
his sin. Specifically, they were concerned about his 
"atheisticall carriage" and his failure to turn to the Lord 
in the face of temptation. Hadn't he prayed? Spencer re­
plied that he had not since he left England. Didn't he 
read the Scriptures? He answered that his "master put it 
upon him else not." And when asked "whether he found not 
some working [upon him] in the public ministry," the pris­
oner admitted that it "did not abide with him." From 
these examinations it became clear that Spencer, in addi­
tion to the crime itself, appeared to reject the values 
upon which the community rested. As was the case with John 
Knight, Spencer could not be reclaimed and was ordered to 
be "hanged upon a gallows until he be dead."
Saturday, April 8 , 1642 was chosen as the day of execu­
tion, of the final act of exclusion from society. It must 
have been a day of both excitment and fear for local resi­
dents, most of whom were viewing their first hanging in 
New England. As Spencer was being drawn to the gallows in 
a cart he spoke to the youths about him, "exhorting them 
all to take warning by his example how they neglect and 
dispise the means to grace." Just prior to. his execution 
he again confessed the bestiality "in all its circumstances"
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38and "justified the sentence to be righteous." But his 
parting words were for William Harding, a sawyer, whose 
"pernicious counsel" had been a "means to hinder his repen­
tance." On hand to view the hanging, Harding denied the 
accusation. Among Spencer's last words was his retort that 
"he was the cause of his soul's damnation." The sow was 
then run through with a sword and Spencer was hung, thus
"leaving him a terrible example of divine justice and
,, ,,39wrath."
Spencer and Knight were not the only individuals in the
vicinity to pay the supreme price for pronounced sexual
deviance. In 1654 a 15 year old Milford servant, Walter
Robinson, was also executed "for committing the horrible
sin of bestiality, with a bitch, and therein abasing the
40nature of man in a most filthy way." Unlike Spencer's 
deed, an eye witness observed Robinson commit the crime. 
Edward Wilson testified that the youth "took up her hinder 
legs and pulled down his breeches and took his member in 
his hand and according to his purpose of unnatural copula­
tion, put it in a little way into the bitch's body." The 
unwilling partner resisted so vigorously that Robinson was 
prevented from penetrating "so far as he might have done." 
Wilson warned Walter that he would be hanged. Robinson 
then released the dog, "pulled up his breeches, and ran 
away, but first feeling some grumbling pain in his member,
he looked upon it, [and] he further said that he had heard
41that such filthiness with such creatures was death.”
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Indeed it was. Both the dog and Robinson were executed.
So too was William Potter, a seemingly upstanding citi­
zen of New Haven who was charged in 1662 with the "sin of 
bestiality with sundry creatures." The disturbing thing 
about Potter was that he appeared to embrace the commitment 
to order shared by most members of the community. He was a 
church member (excommunicated for his bestiality) and a man 
of good estate. Yet as the proceedings of his trial sug­
gest, he had intermittently copulated with animals since 
1619 when he was an 11 year old apprentice in England. 
Potter reported to the court that his "temptations followed 
him" to the new world. Once in New Haven he engaged in a 
series of perversions with cows, a bitch (which he then 
hanged to free him of further sin), two sows, a yearling 
heifer, and three sheep. He even attempted it with "his 
old mare." Potter admitted that on each occasion he was 
"filled with shame and confusion for the dishonor he had 
done to God," and added that little could be done to re­
form him. Even after he saw "others put to death for the 
same acts" (presumably Spencer and Robinson), his heart 
remained hardened. Eollowing his confession and testimony 
by his wife and son, the law was read to Potter and he was 
asked "why the court should not proceed to judge him ac­
cording to the law," and he said no. Realizing that "they
could do not otherwise," the magistrates ordered his exe- 
42cut ion.
Each of these individuals was excluded for what was
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considered to be a grave sexual deviation. Comments in the 
proceedings against Spencer, Robinson, and for that matter, 
John Knight, indicate that their character or so-called de­
viant disposition made their acts more believable. William 
Potter was different. Unlike the others, Potter was ac­
corded charity and understanding during his trial. Indeed, 
the phrase, "they could do not otherwise" reveals a hint of 
reluctance on the part of colony officials to exclude one of 
their own. They did so because they had to, but members of 
the fellowship of saints were excluded only on the rarest of 
occasions.
Most of those who were excluded were cut from a differ­
ent bolt of fabric; Potter was the exception, not the rule. 
Execution was also the exception. Moreover, most individ­
uals excluded in New Haven were not put to death. The very 
point of exclusion was to screen-out perceived deviants be­
fore they had an opportunity to undermine the social order. 
The process of exclusion was meant to call attention to 
conduct or personal traits deemed undesirable. In fact 
there may have been individuals of worse frame than Spencer 
or Knight who never had a chance to disrupt the moral order 
because they were warned out before they had a chance to 
commit a crime. That, however, may have been wishful 
thinking, which is why individuals like Humphrey Norton 
were apprehended, brought to trial, and excluded.
Norton was a Quaker whose reputation pre-dated his ar­
rival in New Haven. Local and colony officials knew about
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the "Quaker Invasion" of Massachusetts and on occasion had
had run-ins with Quakers within the confines of the juris- 
43diction. Controlling the sect had become difficult in 
the outer reaches of the colony, especially in regions bor­
dering Southold. It was not surprising that this sleepy 
town on the eastern end of Long Island became a target for 
the disciples of George Fox. Evidently it was to this part
of the New Haven Colony tha.t Norton travelled after being
44
banished from the Plymouth Colony in the fall of 1657.
Once in Southold, Norton viciously attacked the local minis­
ter, John Youngs, as well as the magistracy of the colony. 
For this, he was transported to New Haven where, understand­
ably, he was not received warmly. Indeed, if we accept 
Norton's account of his treatment, it was downright inhu­
mane: he was confined to an open prison in foul weather
where, for a three week period prior to his appearance be­
fore the Plantation Court, he wore irons linked to 'a great 
45lump of wood.'
At his well attended trial Norton was accused of slan­
der, of seducing the people "from their due attendance upon 
the ministry and sound doctrines of... religion," of
spreading heretical opinions, of villifying the magistracy,
46and of disturbing the peace. Particularly grievous were 
his attacks on the magistracy and the ministry because they 
threatened to undermine the principles embodied in the Fun­
damental Agreement. Norton claimed, for example, that mag­
istrates were "devil’s servants" who had no true power to
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punish offenders. Although Norton's political views were 
probably not taken seriously, they tended to call into 
question powers held by magistrates. Ministers, specifi­
cally Youngs and Davenport, got an equally bad press from 
Norton in several tracts that he had composed. Basically, 
he condemned infant baptism, a central tenant of the New 
England Way, on the grounds that it lacked Scriptural 
support. In addition, he wrote that "men may be brought to 
perfection in this life, and those ministers which tell 
people they cannot,... tell an untruth." Another of 
Norton's writings was "full of errors and reproach to Mr. 
Davenport," who endeavored to address Norton's accusations 
"before a great concourse of people." When Davenport rose 
to answer the Quaker's charges "the said Humphrey was so 
unruly with his tongue" that the New Haven divine simply 
could not be heard.
After his examination, Norton was pronounced guilty and 
ordered to be "severely whipped and branded on the hand with 
the letter H, for spreading his heretical opinions,... and 
be excluded out of this plantation." Isabel Calder has pro­
vided a dramatic description of the scene:
He was immediately led forth to the stocks, and in 
the presence of a great crowd summoned by the beat of 
a drum, stripped to the waist and given thirty-six 
stripes. Next a pan containing burning coals and an 
iron was brought, and the letter 'H' for heretic was 
burned into the hand of the prisoner still held fast 
in the stocks, 'in malice... his right hand to hinder 
him from Writing.'47
Following his ordeal in New Haven, Norton returned to
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Plymouth where, once again, he was prosecuted by authorities.
Judging from Norton's New Haven experiences it appears 
that he was excluded for deviance by being publically hu­
miliated, branded (or what law codes describe as "stigma­
tized"), and banished. His trial, which must have been 
something of a spectacle, had served to reinforce the 
policies of perfection upon which the town and the colony 
were founded. By banishing the truculent Quaker, authori­
ties controlled what they considered to be a dangerous 
situation. It seems that Norton was punished more for his 
heretical opinions than for any eccentricities (like un­
ruliness during his trial) which figured in the exclusion 
of Quakers in the Bay. There, where the Quaker infestation 
was much more widespread, people were labelled as deviants 
for external behavior like wearing hats in the presence of 
magistrates, using unconventional language, holding private 
church services, and running naked through the streets.
Persons displaying such behavior were routinely classified
48as Quakers and labelled as deviants. But while Humphrey 
Norton did not display any of these unusual characteristics, 
there were others in New Haven whose "ill-report" contri­
buted to their exclusion for deviance.
This was perhaps the case with a Mr. and Mrs. Hunt who 
were warned out of town in 1643, even though they had not 
broken any law. In fact, their only crime may have been 
guilt by association. Specifically, the Hunts were asked 
to leave for keeping company with William Harding, for whom
192
they baked a "past[r]y and plumb cakes." They probably 
were regarded with suspicion anyway, because they had been 
"admitted to sojourn" in the plantation "upon their good 
behavior." Once they began associating with Harding (the 
same man George Spencer berated from the gallows), authori­
ties may well have felt that it was time to weed them out
49before they could work their corruptions on others. Al­
though there was no public exhibition, as would later be 
the case with Norton, the exclusion of the Hunts served a 
similar purpose: safeguarding the moral order.
The Hunts were not the only couple in New Haven who 
appear to have been excluded for deviance. In the mid­
forties, for example, William Fancy and his wife had some 
major encounters with local officials. .In 1643 the woman 
was charged with "stealing divers things from sundry 
persons." In the course of her hearing, authorities al­
luded to previous misconduct in Connecticut where she had 
been whipped twice. Moreover, she was labelled as a 
"notorious thief and Iyer" insofar as stealing "appears to 
have been her trade." In addition to making restitution 
to the victim of her crime (who was "at prayer" when the
theft occurred) Mrs. Fancy was ordered to be whipped
severely. This punishment did little to reform her. Three
years later both she and her husband were examined for 
their "lewd and unclean passages." The case centered upon 
the attempts of several men to seduce Mrs. Fancy. Typical 
was the action of Mark Meiggs (brother of litigant John)
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who on one occasion, being alone with the woman, "caught 
hold of her, put his hands under her coats... and told her 
he would give her" a string of wampum and 5s "if she would 
teach him to get a boy." When William Fancy was asked why 
he did not report the several attempts to seduce his wife, 
he claimed "that his wife having been publically punished 
for thievery, should not be believed." In other words, he 
was afraid that her prior acts and reputation would confirm 
that she enticed these men to seduce her. More than likely 
this was the conclusion reached by the court: she was sen­
tenced to be severely whipped, and "for his being as it were
50a pander [e.g. pimp] to his wife," so was William Fancy.
The Fancys were not banished as the Hunts were, but the 
pair evidently left town within a few years of their trial. 
They had clearly neglected che duties required of husbands 
and wives and as such set a poor example for the rest of 
the community. Although we cannot be completely certain 
that the Fancys were labelled as deviants, it may well have 
been that their conduct led to ridicule and even ostracism 
by local residents.
Beyond those accused of gross sexual misconduct, like 
Spencer or Knight, and others whose behavior was especially 
troublesome, like Norton, the Hunts, or the Fancys, there 
is little evidence of overt exclusion for deviance in early 
New Haven. In this regard Eli Faber's assessment of exclu­
sion is perhaps more accurate than Erikson's. To be sure, 
some other instances of exclusion appear in court records
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as, for example, when Edward Woodcliff, a servant, was
51whipped and "sent out of the plantation." For the most 
part deviants were members of a highly visible but reason­
ably small group of undesirables. During the course of 
the seventeenth century probably fewer than 50 people (or 
7% of the total offender population of 669) were excluded 
for deviance. Moreover, individuals excluded for deviance 
tended to be true outsiders who lacked strong ties with the 
community. Nearly all lacked relatives in town. Few owned 
land, subscribed to the Fundamental Agreement, could vote, 
or were admitted members of the church. For the most part 
they were unskilled laborers or servants who had low occupa­
tional prestige. We can assume that because their commit­
ment to the widely held values of the community were per­
ceived to be so slight and because their behavior tended to 
jeopardize those values, such individuals were excluded.
Thus the answer to the first part of the question raised 
earlier is yes: exclusion for deviance was used as a means
of promoting and preserving the moral order. The answer to 
the second half of the question is also yes: exclusion for
deviance was effective on at least two levels. First ex- c. 
elusion removed from the community individuals whose con­
duct was "so dangerous or embarrassing or irritating" that 
special sanctions were brought to bear against them. People 
like George Spencer could no longer commit acts inspired by 
the Devil. Wayward youths like John Knight could no longer 
sexually abuse children. And fanatics like Humphrey Norton
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were prevented from spreading the seeds of apostasy and 
rebellion. Moreover, exclusion protected members of the 
community from danger. Second, exclusion was effective be­
cause it called to attention the limits of acceptable be­
havior and as such provided clear examples of how not to
behave, while at the same time reinforced the fundamental
52values upon which the community rested. New Haven was 
similar to other New England towns in that it had its share 
of social deviants who were condemned for their behavior 
and excluded. Yet recall that members of this "criminal" 
minority were responsible for but a handful of the 541 
colony violations prosecuted during the century. The over- 
shelming majority of colony offenses were committed by in­
dividuals who may have been censured and frowned upon momen­
tarily, but who by no means were labelled as deviants and 
excluded. In addition to peacebreakers and nightwalkers, 
one finds within the ranks of this group tipplers, thieves, 
and fornicators. It was they who constituted‘what may be 
loosely described as New Haven's delinquent population.
At the May 11, 1767 session of the Connecticut General 
Court special attention was devoted to the "sins" of the 
rising generation. In language that could have been lifted 
from the agreements, orders, and sermons of the 1640s, of­
ficials drew a bead on adults and youths who, with increas­
ing frequency, failed to follow the path of righteousness. 
They claimed that the sabbath was being profaned; its
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"ordinances rendered unprofitable, which threatens the
rooting out of the power of Godliness and the procurring of
the wrath and judgement of God...." To try and prevent
further disorders, the penalty for profaning the sabbath
was increased by 5s. Authorities were also disturbed about
the "increase of drunkenness" in the colony and accordingly
placed new restrictions on quantities of liquor retailers
could sell. And because it was observed "that the sin of
uncleaness" was proliferating in the jurisdiction, county
officials were urged to prosecure offenders in hopes of
stemming the tide of illegal fornication. Finally, because
youths were "getting from under the government of parents
and masters," a new law regulating that status of "boarders
53and sojourners" was implemented by the court. Nested 
within this series of warnings, which so much resemble the 
messages delivered by New England's jeremiads, Connecticut 
rulers were zeroing in on two of the colony's laws violated 
most frequently by New Haven residents and apparently those 
of surrounding colonies as well: drunkenness and fornica­
tion.
These offenses, along with theft, accounted for nearly 
50% of the violations of colony statutes in New Haven between 
1639 and 1698 (Table 4.1). Alcohol abuse topped the list 
with some 105 violations or 19% of the total. Fornication 
followed with 86 prosecutions (16%) and cases of theft ac­
counted for an additional 76 appearances (14%). As will be 
seen shortly, these three offenses had something in common—
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they were crimes committed by young adults who also happened 
to be the sons and daughters of the saints. For the most 
part, individuals presented for excessive drinking, for the 
theft of some lace, or for premarital sex, received mild 
punishments and tended to remain members of the community 
in good standing. Youths who committed these offenses 
(along with breaking the peace and nightwalking) have been 
referred to as being delinquent and indeed the term "delin­
quency" means little more than the fact that an offender 
had been negligent, that he or she had failed to meet cer­
tain obligations. New Haven residents violated laws gov­
erning morality regularly throughout the century and little 
could be done to prevent so-called delinquent conduct. Of­
ficials complained bitterly of "sundry evils," but their 
lamantations and warnings fell on deaf ears. Nearly a 
decade later authorities noted that the special laws passed
in 1676 "have little prevailed to the suppressing of the
54growth of said evils" in the colony.
But the hands of officials were not tied. If they 
wanted to severely punish tipplers, thieves, and fornica­
tors, they were so empowered. Laws bearing on the latter, 
for example, were explicit enough: convicted offenders
would be punished "either by enjoyning to marriage, or 
fine, or corporal punishment, or all, or any of these, as 
the court or magistrates shall judge most agreeable to 
the word of God." The options for punishment were spelled- 
out in no uncertain terms, but it was left with law
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enforcement officials to determine which of the penalties 
to impose. The same was true regarding sentencing for 
theft. Penalties included fines, branding, restitution, 
whipping, and, for those who were "incorrigibly unrigh­
teous, and presumptuously profane," even death. Laws 
governing drunkenness and tippling were also similar inso­
far as a variety of penalties existed which could be meted 
out according to the discretion of the court.
Magisterial discretion was an important element in the 
social control equation. In his "Discourse on Arbitrary 
Government," John Winthrop made a persuasive argument on 
behalf of discretionary justice. Moreover, Winthrop claimed 
that it was unjust to punish a "youth of honest conversa­
tion" the same as an "old notorious Iyer" even though the 
crimes they committed were identical. Essentially Winthrop 
was emphasizing that the character of an offender had to be 
taken into consideration when sentences were handed down.
Without a certain amount of flexibility and discretion,
56justice would not be served. This kind of flexibility 
in sentencing was highlighted at the outset of the present 
investigation of deviants and delinquents. Although most 
of the penalties embodied in the Eaton and Connecticut 
codes were fixed, officials were granted ample discretion 
in cases governing morality. As much as 27% of New Haven's 
laws and 14% of Connecticut's statutes left the door open 
for discretionary sentencing. Furthermore, prior to the 
publication of the Eaton Code in 1656, New Haven officials
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utilized wide discretion in all sentencing excepting cases
involving violations of bylaws with fixed penalties: It is this
kind of magisterial discretion which explains why Samuel
Hotchkiss Jr. and Elizabeth Cleverly were whipped in 1642 for
committing fornication, while 60 years later Gydian and Lydia
57Andrews were fined for the same offense. The law governing 
fornication in both cases was the same. The difference lies 
in the fact that officials simply opted for different punish­
ments— an indication that notions or morality had changed 
58over time. Thus while rulers complained of "sundry evils,"
they failed to use the resources at their disposal to punish
offenders in such a way as to deter crime. Nowhere is this
seen more clearly than in the treatment of delinquents who
violated moral statutes.
When colony officials were complaining in 1676 about the
"increase in drunkenness," alcohol related offense had al-
59ready begun to decline in New Haven (Figure 4.2). And 
that trend would continue until the turn of the century. 
Actually, the period of greatest known alcohol abuse was 
the first decade of settlement, when 27% of the cases were 
prosecuted. This was probably due to the unsettled state 
of the community in the early 1640s when the concentration 
of transients seeking land or other economic opportunities 
was highest. Once the town became better organized— land 
divided, houses completed, and positive laws formulated—  
the number of prosecutions dropped off dramatically. In­
deed, between 1649 and 1658 only three individuals were
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presented for intemperance. But prosecutions rose with the 
second generation. In the two decades from 1659 to 1678 
nearly 50% of all alcohol misuse cases were heard. Only 
when the offspring of the orginal saints began to settle 
down and have families of their own did prosecutions begin 
to decline once again.
Although drunkenness and tippling were frowned upon, 
extant evidence suggest that occasional misuse of alcohol 
did not cause excessive alarm. Drinking was a part of the 
settler's English heritage and the fact that New Haven's 
rulers were puritans did not mean that the enjoyment of 
moderate amounts of beer, wine, and occasionally "strong 
waters" was considered imprudent. In the early years of 
settlement attempts were made to find a proprietor for the 
local ordinary and individuals were granted licenses to 
retail liquor. The principal concern of leaders was that 
alcohol use be regulated. That is why the published laws 
of both the New Haven and Connecticut colonies specified 
where drinking could take place, how much liquor could be 
sold, and how much time patrons could spend in drinking 
establishments. Authorities also made special provisions 
for Indians because it was believed they were "addicted" 
to alcohol. The consumption of liquor became a cause for 
law enforcement only when individuals were delinquent by 
disregarding the "rules of sobriety."
Most people prosecuted for drunkenness or tippling 
were convicted because they drank (or were caught) outside
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the regulated confines of the tavern. Such conduct posed a 
variety of possible dangers to the well-ordered community.
It meant that the chances of idleness increased. It served 
to undermine parental authority by luring youths out into 
the night. And it threatened to disturb the peace because 
very often drunkenness led to quarelling. Henry Brooks was 
probably the town drunk, but most of his 11 appearances be­
fore authorities were made for disturbing the peace. Above 
all, rulers saw a danger in alcohol abuse because it deprived 
people of their senses. This is made clear from the trial 
of one of the few members of the church to be presented for 
the "sin of drunkenness." In 1647 James Haywood was accused 
of getting drunk on a "Dutchman's vessel." There he drank 
so much that "he had not the use of his reason, nor of his 
tongue, hands, or feet." When asked about his offense, 
Haywood confessed that he had broken the law and had "dis­
honored" God. Among other things, authorities endeavored 
to discover whether or not Haywood "had been given to 
drunkenness." Because they determined that his was "an 
act only," magistrates used their discretionary powers to
go
punish him with a fine rather than by whipping.
Most residents presented for drunkenness were similar 
to Haywood. Their offenses were "acts only." They did 
not display patterns of persistent intemperance. Of the 
80 offenders who stood before the bar for alcohol abuse, 
only 14 (17%) returned to court to face similar charges.
Eight of these made a second appearance and six appeared
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61on three occasions. Thus most of New Haven's delinquent 
drinkers were non-recidivists. As a group they were white 
males who were unmarried at the time of their initial ap­
pearance. Demographic data, available for slightly over a 
third of the group, indicate that the typical tippler was 
between 22 and 23 years of age. Tour of the offenders were
females ranging from 19 to 22 and they, too, tended to be 
62unmarried. The remaining delinquents (11) included two 
negroes (one of whom was Theophilus Eaton's "neager" ser­
vant) and nine were Indians who, as a group, appeared more 
for alcohol misuse than for any other offense. Only one 
of the population of 14 recidivists was a native American.
The punishment delinquent drinkers received was, on the 
whole, rather mild. This applied to recidivists and non­
recidivists alike. For both, fines were the penalties im­
posed most often. This is largely explained by the system 
of fixed sanctions that existed in the law codes. Further­
more, the fines were geared to increase with each subsequent 
offense. That is why Edward Bunce was fined 3s 4d for his 
excessive drinking in 1666, while his friend, John Thomas 
Jr., a second offender, was fined 6s 8d.®^ Fully 80 (83%)
of the 96 sentences handed down were fines, usually of less 
64than 20s. Four less fortunate offenders were placed in 
the stocks or whipped, and 12 received other punishments 
ranging from imprisonment to an admonition. These lawbreakers 
were punished more severely because their cases merited 
special attention. Even in certain instances where fines
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were called for, authorities used discretion to punish in­
dividuals for drunkenness based on the extent of their mis­
behavior. In 1644, for example, several residents were 
convicted for holding a "drunken disorderly" ’gathering.
Two delinquents were fined 20s each for "being the authors 
principally." One, Edmund Tooly, who was John Davenport's 
servant, was fined 10s "for fetching the wine." Another
pair were fined 3s 4d each "because they were but occa-
65sionally present with the rest." Because so many cases 
of alcohol abuse were compounded by other degrees of delin­
quent behavior, discretion had to be used in the sentencing 
process. And it remained an important feature of the social 
control apparatus throughout the century.
Thus when colony officials railed against the "sin of
drunkenness," they had within their grasp the power to ini­
tiate legal change and to punish delinquents in a manner 
which would discourage others from drinking excessively.
But leaders did not use this power as forcefully as they 
might have. In retrospect, it appears that the most rulers 
did was complain loudly— and little else. Although disap­
proved of, occasional intoxication was recognized for what 
it was: a less than serious offense that was to be pun­
ished by a fine. Most alcohol abusers in New Haven were
young, unmarried, and prosecuted only once. As a group the 
vast majority of delinquent drinkers were sentenced to pay
fines. Some received stiffer penalties, but the use of
66
stocking and whipping was rare and declined over time.
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This is partly explained by what must have been a softening 
of the official opinion relat ive to per iodic alcohol misuse.
But it was not an indication that justices let their guard 
down. They were ever wary of liquor consumption by Indians, 
of unsupervised "husking parties," and of the activities of 
Henry Brooks. Serious alcohol abuse was visualized as being 
capable of thoroughly corrupting and depriving individuals 
of their reason. In New Haven this never became a serious 
problem which is why drunks and tipplers were punished as 
mildly as petty criminals.
The situation with theft was somewhat different. If 
there was a single non-capital crime which predisposed God­
fearing New Englanders to consider an individual deviant, it 
was theft. Indeed, some of New Haven's deviants had robbed 
at some point in their infamous careers; Mrs. Fancy, William 
Broomfield, and George Spencer are examples. Children read 
in their primers that "a dog will bite a thief at night."
And the legal provisions for punishing convicted thieves in­
cluded branding with the letter "B" for their first offense-- 
an indication that thieves could easily be cast into deviant 
roles. Moreover, while cases of theft were prosecuted less 
frequently than drunkenness, thieves were punished more 
severely than drunks or tipplers.
Over the course of the century theft was an offense which 
was subject to a steady, if not slight, decline. As sug­
gested in Figure 4.3, the crime was distributed rather 
evenly; it was not enforced with great variation which
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proved to be the case with petty crime, alcohol abuse, or
67even fornication. The highest percentage of thefts oc­
curred in the first and third decades of settlement and ac­
counted for 42% of the cases prosecuted. There were never 
years or extended periods of time when the community was 
plagued by stealing. In fact, the most thefts recorded for 
a single year were six in 1665 and 1682.
Although thieves frequently received harsh punishments, 
most were not career criminals (like Mrs. Fancy) who were 
excluded for their unrighteousness. Between 1639 and 1698,
59 individuals were responsible for 76 thefts. These ranged 
from the theft of £5 17s in 1639 by Roger Duhurst and James 
Stewart, two servants who were whipped for taking the money 
out of their master's "chest on the Lord's Day in the meet­
ing time," to a case of pilfering watermelons in 1682 by
four yourths, each of whom was fined and reminded by author-
68ities that "the law gives liberty for capital punishment." 
Most offenders were similar to this group of six because 
they stole on only one occasion; ^6 (45%) never committed 
another crime, 21 (35%) violated other local or colony 
statutes during their residence in New Haven but stole 
only once, and 12 (20%) appeared for theft more than once.
Of these, ten appeared twice and two made four separate 
appearances.
Nearly all of New Haven's thieves were convicted (96%) 
and the punishments they received was determined by the
69discretion of the court— as the cases of pilfering suggest.
Figure 4.3 
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Each crime was assessed on an individual basis, thereby 
giving magistrates the option of meting out punishment fit­
ted to the offense. In practice this meant that there was 
little distinction between the sanctions employed against 
recidivists and non-recidivists. One might expect that the 
former were punished more severely, but that was not always 
the case, even though the law directed recidivists to re­
ceive stiffer sentences. Indeed, as a group non-recidivists 
received a higher percentage of whippings (10. or 45%) and 
fewer fines (5 or 20%). For recidivists, the larger of the
two groups, the figures were 16 or 35% for both whipping and 
70fines. It should be noted, however, that, as in the case 
of alcohol abuse, discretion was used liberally because many 
cases of theft were compounded by other crimes, such as 
lying or stealing on the sabbath.
The typical thief was, like the drunk or tippler, also 
male, young, and unmarried. Forty-eight (81%) of the 
town's thieves were males, and based on very limited demo­
graphic data (5 cases) the average thief was in his mid­
twenties. Nineteen of the group were servants (ages 
unknown). This suggests, however, that the typical thief 
was younger still. Eighteen of the offenders were married 
at the time of their first violation, while 21 are defi­
nitely known to have been unmarried. It is probable that 
the remaining 20 thieves and pilferers, which included 
five Indians and four Negroes, were also unmarried. The 
11 females (19%) in the group tended to mirror the male
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population. They were young (three whose ages are known 
were 17, 22 and 48) and unmarried. Five of the 11 were 
servants and there were no Indian or Negro females thieves.
New Haven's thieves therefore shared much in common 
with the town's alcohol abusers. Both groups of offenders 
typically consisted of a population of single white males 
under twenty-five years of age. Both groups had their 
share of female offenders, 19% and 5% respectively, and 
both had roughly equal percentages of racial minorities 
(15% and 13%). Most of these lawbreakers were similar to 
the extent that they appeared before authorities on but 
one occasion. As a group, they were not career criminals 
who merited exclusion for deviance. And whether recidi­
vists or not, most of the sentencing which took.place was 
done at the discretion of the court. Thieves were the more 
severely punished of the two, but that simply reflects the 
belief that theft was a more serious offense. Nevertheless, 
none of New Haven's thieves were actually branded for their 
initial offense as the law directed. The stiff penalties 
were written into the codes so magistrates could punish 
"incorrigible" thieves accordingly. And the same was true 
with other crimes as well. As it turns out, extreme 
sanctions such as branding, banishment, and execution were 
reserved for those considered truly deviant. New Haven's 
delinquents were fined, whipped, and stocked precisely be­
cause it was felt they could be "reclaimed." Perhaps a 
few, like Mrs. Fancy, would later be excluded for deviance,
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but most retained their membership in the community.
The same flexibility and discretion that marked the 
sentencing of youthful tipplers and thieves also was used 
to control the growth of "uncleanness" in New Haven.
In the shadowy years of pre-code law in Massachusetts,
Thomas Shepard wrote to John Winthrop and asked the governor
to make a law "for the punishing of that sin which... will
71soon poison these societies." Shepard was referring to 
the "sin of fornication" and his concern would be echoed by 
Connecticut officials a quarter of a century later. Yet in
1676, society was not poisoned. True, King Philip's War was
interpreted as having been a sign of God's displeasure with 
His chosen people. Church membership and religiosity in 
general had declined. And most of the architects of the New
England Way had died. Society had changed, but, to repeat,
it was far from poisoned. Towns continued to be founded 
and older settlements continued to expand. People seemed 
quite comfortable with their ever broadening economic 
horizons. And families still remained viable social insti­
tutions. Although fornication was clearly on the increase 
in the waning years of the seventeenth century, Shepard's 
gloomy prophecy was inaccurate.
Indeed, in 1642 and 1676, two years known for remon­
strances against pre-marital sexual intercourse, prosecu­
tions in New Haven were infrequent. In fact, the first 
and fourth decades combined accounted for but 10 or 12% of 
the 79 appearances made for fornication between 1639 and
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1698 (Figure 4.4). These decades represented, in the 
scheme of a rather unequal distribution of fornication 
cases, periods of calm before two storms. Following the 
initial ten years of settlement, when 6 or 7%, of the cases 
were heard, there was a steady increase in prosecutions 
which appears to have been tied to the sexual exploits of 
the rising second generation. In the decade from 1658 to 
1668 when the settler's first born were entering their 
twenties, nearly a quarter (24%) of all the prosecutions 
for illegal copulation were made. Then, almost as suddenly 
as they rose, prosecutions dropped to a scant four (5%) in 
the decade ending in 1678 and seven (9%) in the next ten 
years. Then, even more precipitously than they rose in the 
1660s, prosecutions climbed to a staggering degree in the 
1690s when 36 or 45% of the cases heard for the entire cen­
tury were prosecuted. Quite simply, another generation was 
72coming of age.
Although this increase in fornication by the third gen­
eration may have shocked some of Connecticut's conservative 
divines and lawmakers, there were undoubtedly many parents 
and masters who took the misconduct in stride. In fact, 
many had experienced similar behavior when they were coming 
of age in the 1650s and 1660s; the third generation did not 
invent pre-marital sex. If there was one difference between 
the two generations, it lay with increased incidences of 
pre-marital pregnancy with the third. Second generation 
young adults whose sexual misconduct led to pregnancy were
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punished by the courts and then "enjoined to marriage."
With the third generation, most cases were discovered
through the birth of a child who was conceived some months
prior to marriage. Moreover, voluntary marriage of couples
who intended to marry from the outset had become common- 
73place. Most scholars now believe that increased promis­
cuity was difficult to regulate and as such came to be gen­
erally accepted. Indeed, as David Flaherty has noted, late
seventeenth-century delinquents came to be viewed "with a
74mixture of tolerance, amusement, and titillation."
The best test of this tolerance lies not in the occa­
sional lamentations of ministers and colony officials, but 
in the sentences that convicted fornicators received. Be­
tween 1639 and 1698, 71 individuals were responsible for 
79 appearances before authorities. Slightly over half of 
the group (38) were non-recidivists. Thirty-three had 
violated other local or colony statutes in addition to 
committing fornication. But only six of these recidivists 
had prior records of sexual misconduct. Perhaps some of 
these, like Thomas Badger who had been severely punished 
before his fornication trial for "defiling himself by 
divers unclean passages with one of his master's children
not above six years of age," were excluded for deviance
75at the time of their second offense. However, none of 
the six appeared for sexual misbehavior more than twice; 
there were no overt career sexual offenders in New Haven.
As such, there was little distinction between punishments
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recidivists and non-recidivists received. As in the case
of alcohol abuse and theft, magistrates assessed each case
individually and made use of discretion when sentencing
offenders. By law, this meant that authotities could, with
the exception of death, punish delinquents as they saw fit.
Overall, 96% of the appearances resulted in convic- 
76tions. Of the 70 punishments meted out, 23 (33%) were
whippings, 43 (61%) were fines, and four (6%) included
77other forms of punishment, such as child support. A pair 
of cases typifies the trend in sanctions over the course of 
the century. In 1652 Robert and Susan Meaker were presented 
for a "high breach of the law of God, in committing fornica­
tion, defiling one another before marriage." The pair was 
convicted and ordered to be whipped. Twenty-two years later, . 
in 1674, Robert Augur, the nephew of a local physician, and 
his wife Mary, the 23 year old daughter of magistrate Matthew 
Gilbert, were convicted by their own confession of fornica­
tion prior to marriage. For their misconduct, the couple
78was ordered to pay a £5 fine. Significantly, the provi­
sion for punishment was the same in each of the cases.
What had changed was the attitude of officials regarding 
the seriousness of the offense. Gone by 1674 was rhetoric 
about unrighteousness; the Augurs were tried and convicted 
unceremoniously. And so it was with most second and third 
generation offenders. Indeed, prior to 1669, 21 or 91% of 
the whippings occurred. Only on rare occasions, such as 
in 1692 when Cush, a Negro servant of Richard Rosewell who
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was whipped at the "place of execution" for fornicating
with a white woman (who went unpunished), was corporal pun- 
79ishment used. Conversely, only six or 14% of the fines 
were handed out prior to 1669. Furthermore, those that 
were levied in the early years of settlement tended to in­
volve special circumstances. For example, Rebecca Turner 
was fined £10 in 1649 for fornicating with Thomas Meaks.
She escaped a whipping only because a mid-wife testified
80that she had "sore breasts and a forward child." Over 
time, punishments like those inflicted upon the Meakers 
declined, while those received by couples like the Augurs 
rose.
In part, this is explained by changing values. But it 
is also explained by the fact that most fornicators in the 
last half of the century were descendants of the original 
"pillars" of New Haven. Few servants or members of other 
minorities were presented. Cush was the only Negro prose­
cuted. And although Margret Trowbridge and Mary Butler were
both fined 40s in 1691 for fornicating, their mutual partner
81Robin, a "wicked Indian" who ran away, went unpunished.
Robin was the only Indian accused of fornication; both he 
and Cush were atypical offenders. Most were young, white 
sons and daughters of permanent residents. Forty-one of 
the 71 fornicators were males whose average age at their 
trial (N=13) was 25. Their 30 female counterparts tended 
to be three years younger (N=ll). In other words, they 
were, like delinquent drinkers and theives, well known
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fixtures in the community who generally appeared before 
authorities on one occasion for morals violations. They 
also tended to be in their mid-twenties, white, and un­
married at the time their crime was committed. And the 
punishments these delinquents received were mild. Impor­
tantly, these were determined at the discretion of the 
court. If delinquency had been a true problem, offenders 
would have been punished severely. But they were not. By 
late in the century especially, the severity and rhetorical 
expostulations associated with trials in the early years 
had vanished. Officials had come to accept with reluctance 
the realization that morality could not be legislated and 
the increased use of mild sentencing bears testimony to the 
change in attitude.
Chronicling changing attitudes about morality is a dif­
ficult task at best. What is considered moral to one 
group or even subgroup at a given point in time varies con­
siderably. The ideals and values of the Davenport house­
hold serves as an example. John Davenport, the author of 
the Fundamental Agreement and numerous sermons intended to 
guide the youth of New Haven along the path of righteous­
ness, had a concept of morality and obligation that un­
doubtedly differed from that of his maid servant Hester 
Clark, who considered it acceptable to ride off into the 
night with Isaac Moline to savor fruits of the flesh. It 
also differed from that of his servant Edmund Tooly, who
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participated in a "drunken gathering" for which he was 
fined. Davenport’s servants were, like other young adults, 
passing through a stage of life that was understood to in- 
elude a variety of temptations associated with coming of 
age. That different notions of morality could exist within 
the confines of a single household serves as a reminder 
that great variation must have existed in a large community 
over the course of a century. Moreover, if Davenport could 
not influence those under his roof enough to prevent them 
from engaging in delinquent conduct, how could authorities 
of the town or colony expect to be more successful?
In all probability they were not. Basically, all they 
could do was hope that violations of moral statutes did 
not get out of hand. Although most of New Haven's young 
adult population appears to have never compromised the 
moral order, there was a small group of delinquents who 
did. Members of this group did things like drink exces­
sively, pilfer watermelons, and enjoy pre-marital sexual 
intercourse. These were individuals who for some reason 
temporarily rejected the moral values and obligations 
taught to them by their parents and masters. Their be­
havior took them beyond the bounds of the basic unit of 
social control— the family— and placed them in a setting 
where they had to answer to God's vice-regents, who were 
required by their covenant with Him and by law to punish 
offenders. In realistic terms, what could magistrates 
really do? Whip all thieves and fornicE;ors? Stock all
218
drunks? Should they punish young people excessively for 
what amounted in actual practice to a single moral lapse?
Given the rhetoric of the puritans we half expect that 
they would. And indeed on occasion they did. Yet while 
all delinquent conduct was frowned upon by authorities, 
most offenders received mild penalties. Eighty-three per­
cent of the alcohol abusers were punished by fines. For 
fornication and theft, the figures were 61% and 29% re­
spectively. These varying percentages reflect the differ­
ent types of penalties required by law, as well as their 
interpretation and application by magistrates who used dis­
cretion constantly. Magisterial discretion was a central 
feature of the social control apparatus because it permit­
ted rulers to assess each case on an individual basis, to 
punish the "youth of honest conversation" differently from 
an "old notorious lyar." It is this kind of flexibility 
which allowed magistrates to punish delinquents one way and 
perceived deviants in an entirely different fashion, to rid 
society of individuals like John Knight, but continue to 
embrace younsters like John Frost, Esborn Wakeman, and 
Samuel Miles.
Although over time magistrates did little to stem the 
flow of delinquent behavior, they nevertheless vigorously 
screened out people whose conduct and character went be­
yond the limits of simple delinquency. Exclusion for de­
viance was an effective means of controlling serious 
breaches of the moral order, even though it was used
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sparingly. The town's most notorious criminals underwent 
well-attended trials which became showcases within which 
the basic values of the community were periodically put on 
display. Some of the known deviants were, like John Knight 
or George Spencer, excluded for unnatural sexual misconduct. 
But there were others, like Humphrey Norton, whose reli­
gious and political views were so damaging that he war­
ranted branding and banishment. Although we know little 
about their misdeeds, still others, like the Hunts or 
Edward Woodcliff, must have behaved so poorly that they 
too merited special sanctions. When it occurred, exclusion 
was useful because it punished deviants for their crimes 
and protected more God-fearing members of the community 
from their "baneful influence."
But most of those who violated colony laws were by no 
means considered deviant. Evidence of overt exclusion is 
so slight that it would not be inaccurate to estimate New 
Haven's deviant population at less than 50. Although 
there must have been deviants who stole and fornicated 
contrary to law, most offenders who seemed to compromise 
the moral order were young people reared in New Haven who 
at one point in their lives temporarily "fell from grace." 
Using alcohol abusers, thieves, and fornicators— in all 
50% of those who violated colony statutes— as a base, it 
is clear that they were predominantly unmarried white 
males in their early-to-mid twenties. These delinquents 
differed from those who contravened local bylaws, for the
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petty offenders of Chapter 3 were more numerous, typically 
ten years older, and married; they had already passed 
through the stage of life that produced most delinquent 
behavior. However, there is something that both groups 
shared in common: they all tended to be "insiders" who
retained membership in the community. This was also a 
trait common to individuals who contentiously dragged 
their neighbors into court to settle civil disputes— some- 
ting that forced authorities to address an altogether dif­




1. For Knight's military disobedience see New Haven Records, 
I, 487 and 477; for the drinking, Town Records, I, 56.
The records of his trial for abusing the Hall children 
are no longer extant (complete colony records begin in 
1653), but his previous exploits were highlighted in the 
May session of the court which is found in New Haven 
Records, II, 137-138.
2. The proceedings of this case were omitted from Town 
Records, I, because they contained material "undesirable 
for publication" (n., 136), but can be consulted in the 
original Town Records, I, 101-102. In his study of homo­
sexuality Robert F. Oaks suggested that sodomy was more 
widespread than previously thought. That some of these 
cases were handled privately and therefore never reached 
even manuscript records adds credence to Oaks' hypothe­
sis. See "'Things Fearful to Name': Sodomy and Buggery
in Seventeenth-Century New England," Journal of Social 
History (Winter, 1978), 268-281, 268-272.
3. For Miles’ 1672 appearance see County Court Records, I,
55 and 58. For Frost's subsequent trials, New Haven 
Records, II., 169-171 and 466-467, plus omitted portions 
in New Haven Records, II, 328-332. As a post-script to 
lawmaking in New Haven it is worth mentioning that the 
first arson laws were written immediately following 
Frost's trial in 1656.
4. See, respectively, provisions in the Ludlow Code, Con­
necticut Records, I, 515 and then 77, in the Eaton Code, 
New Haven Laws, 19, and in the Connecticut Code of 1673, 
Connecticut Laws, 83.
5. As noted earlier, Samuel was the son of Richard Miles, a 
deacon, deputy to the General Court and town selectman. 
Esborn was the nephew of John Wakeman, also a deputy and 
at one time, the town treasurer. Frost was the servant 
of community stand-out William Gibbard, a deputy and 
selectman who may have been entrusted with the care of 
the youth by a George Frost who returned to England in 
the 1640s.
6. In the years 1639-1698 a total of 1438 appearances were 
made. The overwhelming majority (62%) was for petty 
crime— the context and importance of which was discussed 
in Chapter 3. Although considered important, the moral 
order, judging from colony infractions (38%) seems to 
have been threatened less than previously thought..
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7. New Haven Records, I, 113, for the jurisdiction of the 
Plantation Court; Connecticut Records, II, 25 and 108 
for the County and Commissioners' Courts respectively.
8. Some proceedings of the colony between 1643 and 1653 
appear in New Haven Records, I. More than likely the 
number of residents haled before the Magistrates'
Court during this period, and thus unknown, was small. 
The reason is twofold. First, in the 12 year period 
beginning in 1653 only four individuals appeared before 
the court for violating colony laws. Second, if cases 
were serious enough to reach the Magistrates' Court, it 
was not uncommon for them to be mentioned in other sets 
of records.
9. Punishment for profaning the Sabbath was rather broad, 
including fine, imprisonment, whipping, and death. The 
provision for death, however, was deleted from the Con­
necticut Code of 1673. See New Haven Laws, 47; and Con­
necticut Laws, 132.
10. Evidently they burned part of someone's fence; County 
Court Records, I, 234.
11. See New Haven Laws and Connecticut Laws, 24-25 and 59 
respect ively.
12. County Court Records, I, 110. Brooks' wife, the former 
Mrs. Samuel Blakesley had her own troubles with the 
court. In 1673, two years prior to marrying Brooks and 
at the time a widow, Hannah was convicted of "lacivious 
carriages" with several people and of entertaining 
youths at "unseasonable hours." She received a £5, 10s 
fine, but the court noted that she should have been 
whipped but spared her because of her "frailty." Ibid., 
p. 72. Brooks was also an indigent. In 1686 after 
being convicted for fighting, he was sentenced to pay a 
40s fine and post a £10 bond. Half of the fine was re­
mitted because he could not pay it. Brooks' persistent 
misconduct led to fortfeiture of his bond; on this oc­
casion he was whipped and the court ordered notices 
prohibiting the sale of liquor to Brooks to be placed 
on "public posts." Ibid., 162-164.
13. Ibid., 205. It also appears that the court had quasi­
admiralty jurisdiction because in 1671 William Collins 
was convicted of drunkenness and disorderliness on 
board the ship Recovery. Ibid., 42.
14. For the agreement see Ibid., 40-41; for the Halls, p.
58. More can be found on the illusive subject of bonds 
by consulting Paul Lermack, "Peace Bonds and Criminal 
Justice in Colonial Philadelphia," Pennsylvania Magazine
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of History and Biography, C, (April, 1976), 173-191.
And for the acquittal, which was one of ten received 
by those accused of violating colony statutes, see 
County Court Records, I, 177.
15. Town Records, II, 65-71.
16. Connecticut Laws, 126.
17. Town Records, II, 26-30.
18. County Court Records, II, 21.
19. Ibid., I, 164.
20. Parents themselves were sometimes "delinquent" because 
they travelled away from home— sometimes for extended 
periods— leaving children unsupervised. Edmund Morgan 
noted that occasionally this led to prosecution of 
adults; Puritan Eamily 65-66. The aftermath of similar 
circumstances in New Haven illustrates why the practice 
was frowned upon. In 1666, Rebecca Potter, age 23 and 
the daughter of a convicted bugger, was given permission 
by her mother to house-sit for James Clark while he and 
his wife were away. She took care of the house, but 23 
year old William Thorpe took care of her; nine months 
later she gave birth of a "natural child." Town Records 
II, 184.
21. For Hutchinson see Massachusetts Records, I, 207; for 
the Browns, Ernest W. Baughman, "Excommunications and 
Banishments from the First Church in Salem and the Town 
of Salem, 1629-1680," Essex Institute Historical Collec­
tions, 113 (April, 1979), 89-104, 91; for Partridge, 
Bradford F. Swan, "Frontier Justice in Newport— 1652," 
Rhode Island History, 33 (February, 1974), 3-7; and for 
Knight, New Haven Records, II, 137-138.
22. Haskins, Law and Authority, p. 51. Pre-emptive measures 
like prohibitions on strangers can be seen in New Haven 
and Dedham, to name just two communities. See New Haven 
Records, I, 40 and Lockridge, New England Town, 8-9.
23. See Wayward Puritans, 165-166 and his rationale on 167- 
170.
24. "Puritan Criminals," 138.
25. Wayward Puritans, 5-6.
26. Guido Ruggiero, "Sexual Criminality in the Early Renais­
sance: Venice, 1338-1358," Journal of Social History,
8 (Summer, 1975), 18-37, 18-19. Even within Venice
224
variations existed. For instance, it was acceptable for 
elites (who made the laws) to rape women of low social
standing, but unacceptable for a laborer to rape a
noblewoman.
27. Erikson, Wayward Puritans, 7.
28. See, for example, Arnold S. Linsky, "Who Shall be Ex­
cluded: The Influence of Personal Attributes in Com­
munity Reaction to the Mentally 111," Social Psychiatry,
5 (1970), 166-171, and William A. Rushing, "Individual 
Resources, Societal Reaction, and Hospital Commitment," 
American Journal of Sociology, 77 (1971), 511-526. In 
his study of Wiltshire, M.J. Ingram cited the "selective 
bias" in favor of local residents. Specifically consult 
Table 3 (on indictments) in "Communities and Courts," 
132-133.
29. James D. Orcutt, "Societal Reaction and Response to Devi­
ation in Small Groups," Social Forces, 52 (1964), 259- 
266.
30. Irving Piliavin and Scott Briar, "Police Encounters with 
Juveniles," American Journal of Sociology, 70 (1964), 
206-214.
31. New Haven Laws, 20.
32. Jones, Congregational Commonwealth, 103.
33. Randolph Trumbach, "London's Sodomites: Homosexual 
Behavior and Western Culture in the 18th Century," 
Journal of Social History, 11 (1977), 1-33, 11. Also 
see Caroline Bingham's analysis of "Seventeenth-Century 
Attitudes Toward Deviant Sex," in Journal of Interdis­
ciplinary History, I (1971), 447-472.
34. Erikson, Wayward Puritans, 196-198; Foster, Their Soli­
tary Way, 31-35.
35. Massachusetts Records, I, 203. During his bestiality 
trial (in 1642) comments by Spencer place his arrival 
in New England in either 1636 or 1637. Spencer was 
perhaps from Kempston, Bedfordshire, since he claimed 
he knew a New Haven resident from that locale before 
coming to the new world.
36. One of those Spencer drew into the conspiracy was his 
friend William Broomfield who was whipped and "ordered 
to wear irons during the magistrate's pleasure." A 
month earlier, Broomfield, who apparently journeyed to 
New Haven with Spencer, "was set in the stocks for pro­
faning the Lord’s Day and stealing wine from his master
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which he drank and gave to others." New Haven Records,
I, 28-29, and 31 for removal of the irons. Broomfield 
evidently left New Haven shortly thereafter and went to 
Connecticut where he was convicted of "drunkenness and 
striking a watchman" (in 1645) and was placed under a 
£20 bond. Connecticut Records, I, 130. Some months 
later a man was fined for "entertaining Broomfield."
That he should be referred to by his last name is signif­
icant because this seems to have been reserved for unde­
sirables. Ibid., 135. Indeed, prior to his trial for 
sodomy, John Knight was identified by his surname. See 
New Haven Records, I, 403.
37. Unless otherwise noted, material from the Spencer case 
is drawn from New Haven Records, I, 62-73.
38. Similar "speeches" were made by other deviants prior to 
their executions. While Spencer's was only alluded to, 
that of a Boston woman convicted of infanticide was more 
complete; indeed it was published as a broadside. See 
The Declaration, Dying Warning and Advice of Rebekah 
Chamblit (Boston, 1733). Perhaps the most famous of 
these was the confession of Esther Rogers, a 21 year old 
executed for infanticide because of two illegitimate 
births resulting from fornication with Negroes. See
John Rogers, Death The Certain Wages of Sin (Boston, 1711). 
A related account of such speeches is found in Ronald A. 
Bosco, "Lectures at the Pillory: The Early American Ex­
ecution Sermon," American Quarterly, 30 (1978), 156-176.
39. Repentance by all condemned criminals, but especially 
felons was an important indication that the offender 
acknowledged his transgressions of the moral standards 
of the community and at the same time re-affirmed the 
justice inherent in his punishment. See Erikson, Way­
ward Puritans, 195 and Lee, "Discretionary Justice," 
128-129. New Haven authorities evidently consulted 
Winthrop about possible sentences for Spencer. See 
Savage, ed., Winthrop's Journal, II, 73.
40. New Haven Records, II, 132-133.
41. New Haven Records, II, 85-86. The issue of both pene­
tration and ejaculation was important in some criminal 
cases. In England a person could be convicted of sodomy
only if both could be proved with certainty— obviously a
difficult task, which is why authorities had to some­
times settle on attempted sodomy which was easier to 
prove, but which carried a less severe penalty. Trumbach, 
"London's Sodomites," 21.
42. New Haven Records, II, 440-443. One aspect of exclusion 
for deviance is that it makes others aware of collectively
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held values. Erikson, Wayward Puritans, 4. To author­
ities, it might have appeared that Potter's continued 
behavior in spite of previous executions for the same 
offense reflected a repudiation of the "policies of 
perfection."
43. In 1656, on the advise of the New England Confederation, 
New Haven passed a law prohibiting Quakfers from the
jurisdiction. New Haven Records, II, 217.
44. George D. Langdon, Jr., Pilgrim Colony: A History of
New Plymouth, 1620-1691 (New Haven, 1966), 73.
45. Quoted in Calder, New Haven Colony, 96. Norton's des­
criptions are found in his New England's Ensign (London, 
1656). For more on Norton's views, consult Frederick B. 
Tolies, "A Quaker's Case- Humphrey Norton to John 
Endicott, 1658," Huntington Library Quarterly, 14 (1950), 
415-421.
46. Unless otherwise indicated, accounts of the trial pro­
ceedings are found in Town Records, I, 339-343.
47. New Haven Colony, 96.
48. Erikson, Wayward Puritans, 127.
49. New Haven Records, I, 84.
50. See Ibid., 89 for the theft, and 233-239 for the subse­
quent charges and trial proceedings.
51. Ibid., 35.
52. For more on the importance of boundaries see Erikson, 
Wayward Puritans, 10-13.
53. Connecticut Records, II, 280-283.
54. Ibid., III, 148.
55. See, respectively, Connecticut Laws, 100, 81-82, 108-110 
and New Haven Laws, 32, 17-18, 37-39.
56. Winthrop Papers, IV, 474-475.
57. New Haven Records, I, 74-75 and County Court Records, 
II, 28-29.
58. David Flaherty observed that relaxation in punishments 
suggests growing acceptance by officials of certain 
kinds of immoral conduct. See "Law and Enforcement of 
Morals in Early America," in Donald Fleming and Bernard
227
Bailyn eds., Perspectives in American History, V (1971), 
203-253, 229.









60. New Haven Records, I, 306-307.
61. Forty-nine individuals appeared for other non-alcohol 
related offenses, leaving 31 whose single act of in­
temperance accounted for their only court appearance.
One of the group of six who appeared three times before 
1698 (Joseph Thomas) also appeared in 1700 and was 
placed under a £20 bond.
62. One of the females, Sarah Collins, was 20 and married 
when she made her first appearance in 1670 and was 
fined 10s.
63. For the law see Connecticut Records, I, 534. For the 
convictions, Town Records, II, 187. Similar stepped 
punishments existed in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. 
Consult Fitzroy, "Richard Crosby Goes to Court," 18, 
and Lee, "Discretionary Justice," 122-123.
64 Thus 90% of the cases ended in convictions. Nine cases
resulted in acquittals (1 ), postponements which were 
never continued (2), were dropped (3), or were voluntary 
appearances made to request the remission of previous 
penalties (3).
65. County Court Records, I, 155 for the Indian, and New
Haven Records, I, 133 for the use of discretion.
66. No stocking or whipping was used to punish delinquent 
drinkers after 1668.






1678 10 13. 5
1688 13 17
1698 8 10. 5
Totals 76 100
68. For the theft see New Haven Records, I, 26, and for the 
pilfering, County Court Records, I, 136.
69. Seventy-three of the 76 appearances ended in convictions. 
One case was postponed and never continued, there was 
one acquittal, and one remission request.
70. Forty percent of the punishments non-recidivists re­
ceived (classified as "other") included stocking, pri­
vate correction, and pure restitution. Thirty percent 
of the recidivists received similar sentences. Only 
one of the group, Andrew Low Jr., was a career thief 
and it is possible that he was excluded for deviance.
His repeated acts of theft (4) caused him to be placed 
in chains with a lock and to be severely whipped. He 
evidently left New Haven by 1650. See New Haven Records, 
I, 46, 56, 89-90.
71. "Thomas Shepard to John Winthrop., 1642," Winthrop Papers, 
IV 345-346.







1698 36 45. 3
Totals 79 100
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73. For more on pre-marital pregnancy consult Smith and 
Hindus, "Premarital Pregnancy in America."
74. "Law and the Enforcement of Morals," 236.
75. New Haven Records, I, 61.
76. There were seven postponements and two remission requests.
77. Of the 43 "fines," 14 or 32% were fines to which was 
linked the proviso that the offender could be whipped if 
he could not come up with the necessary cash.
78. Town Records, I, 124-125, and County Court Records, I,
81.
79. County Court Records, I, 203.
80. New Haven Records, I, 471.
81. County Court Records, I, 194.
CHAPTER V
CHALLENGES TO SOCIAL 
HARMONY: CONTENTION
At a session of the Plantation Court held in December of 
1645, "Hannah Marsh complained that Mr. Brewster called [her 
a] Billingsgate slut, and that she was sent for on shipboard 
to play the slut." Brewster's remarks referred to a voyage 
from Massachusetts to New Haven during which Hannah had al­
legedly been very "forward" and the "cause of much contention 
and unrighteousness." Although not specified in the records 
as such, the issue raised in Marsh's complaint was slander—  
the cause of 53 similar private disputes heard by local or 
colony authorities during the seventeenth century. Marsh 
initiated her suit because she desired the "repair of her 
reputation;" in the end, Brewster publically acknowledged 
that he was "sorry he spoke rashly, and that he intended no 
such charge against her."”'"
Presumably Hannah Marsh was satisfied with Brewster's 
apology. There is no indication in extant records that 
their conflict was continued in subsequent sessions of the 
court. Local officials had done their part in resolving 
the contentious situation. Yet differences between indi­
viduals like Marsh and Brewster were a pervasive fact of 
life in early New Haven. Within months of the settling of 
government, Humphrey Spinnage and Thomas Saulle had appeared
230
231
in court and requested local officials to settle a dispute. 
Their action was the first of 370 civil suits recorded be­
tween 1639 and 1701. Whether or not this is an indication 
that "by nature the puritans were prone to litigiousness,"
or that dragging one's neighbor to court "was a favorite
2
form of indoor sport," remains to be seen. At the very 
least it suggests that civil disputes were plentiful and, 
by implication, that if left unchecked, threatened to com­
promise harmony in the well-ordered community.
There can be little doubt about the divisive aspects 
of litigation. The act of entering a complaint is prima 
facie evidence of discord; plaintiffs sue defendants because 
they feel that somehow they have been wronged. Every civil 
action, whether centering on replevin or defamation, had the 
potential for drawing in others and disrupting social har­
mony. Indeed, it is quite possible that a bitter civil suit 
promoted more disorder than any single act of deviance, like 
bestiality, which in effect was a victimless crime. But 
notwithstanding the contention associated with litigation, 
it is possible that the process of resolving private dis­
putes in court was a means of securing tranquility in the 
long run.
Recent scholarship on litigation suggests that this was 
one of its principal functions. In eighteenth-century Mas­
sachusetts, for example, civil actions were encouraged as a 
way of settling private controversies before they led to 
violent confrontations between disputants. A similar position
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has been taken relative to litigation in early modern En­
gland where an increase in the number of lawsuits is believed 
to have "balanced a decline in the incidence and social ac­
ceptability of violence, and marked an important step to­
wards a more peaceful and settled society." Closer to home, 
David Thomas Konig has emphasized that litigation in Essex 
County Massachusetts was a "useful agent of orderly and de­
sirable social change," and that it reaffirmed the values 
and social norms of the well-ordered community. Thus, while 
it is accurate to say that civil suits were sources of ten­
sion and disharmony, it is conceivable that litigation also
3
promoted order.
Despite explicit recognition of this paradox by scholars, 
our acquisition of specific knowledge about the quantity, 
context, and resolution of private disputes is minimal. In 
order to assess the role litigation played within the local 
community we must ask questions about the distribution of 
lawsuits over time and the kinds of controversies which 
arose. What, if anything, do these reveal about the role 
litigation played in promoting order? Because the process 
of filing a suit was linked to law and legal procedure in 
general we need to know more about the resources litigants 
had at their disposal to pursue their interests in court. 
Furthermore, it may well be appropriate to try and discover 
if there was a relationship between private controversy and 
the evolution of law in the community. Is there evidence 
that litigation was in fact a "useful agent" of social
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change? If so, this might have some bearing on the way
disputes were resolved. Indeed, it may well be that changes
in the process by which cases were concluded can shed light
on the attitudes of rising generations, just as earlier a
softening in the punishment for fornication indicated a new
perspective on morality. Finally, the context of certain
kinds of disputes should be examined. Is there an indication,
for instance, that slander suits were a means of venting
pent up aggression, as seems to have been the case in other 
4
locales? If so, how effectively were authorities able to 
control these potentially divisive situations? Only by 
first identifying and assessing these fundamental details 
about litigation can broad determinations be made about its 
relationship to order in early New Haven.
If the rhetoric of New Haven's "pillars" and the archi­
tects of the New England Way in general had been embraced 
faithfully, there would have been little need to resolve 
private disputes through law; residents would have been so 
righteous and "charitable" in their relations with one 
another that contention would have been non-existent. Al­
though the founders of New Haven hoped that their Wilderness 
Zion could escape the kinds of disorders they had witnessed 
in England and Massachusetts, they were pragmatic enough to 
empower magistrates to preside over criminal and civil 
cases when they did arise. Most of the cases which came to 
their attention were criminal in nature. But between 1640
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and 1699, officials did end up hearing 359 private disputes. 
As proved to be the case with criminal offenses, the over­
whelming majority (216 or 60%) were handled by local author­
ities. Nearly all were heard in the Plantation Court prior 
to the absorption by Connecticut and the judicial reorgan­
ization giving birth to the County Courts in 1666. From 
that point on, civil causes ordinarily were entered in ses­
sions of the County Court, although minor grievances were
5
adjudicated in the Commissioners' Courts.
It seems appropriate that lawsuits were resolved pri­
marily on the local level since 95% of the cases involved 
New Ilaven residents. Only a handful of private disputes 
(18 or 5%) were filed by outsiders exclusively. Quite sim­
ply, controversies like the issue of debt in 1644 between 
Virginians Richard Catchman and Thomas Hart were heard in 
New Haven on only the rarest of occasions. For the most 
part, contention arose between local residents like Marsh 
and Brewster (239 or 66.5%). An additional 102 suits 
(28.5%) involved at least one New Havenite with one or more 
non-residents, as exemplified in a controversy in 1652 when 
James Rogers of Milford sued John Charles for "carrying" his 
servant to "Long Island, by which means he was suffered 
great damage." Most of these cases of split residence (75%) 
were similar insofar as they centered on economic issues 
like debt, replevin, and unspecified damages.
Once people filed their suits one of two things gener­
ally happened. Either their cases were resolved through a
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specific decision for the plaintiff or defendant, or, for 
one of a variety of reasons, their cases never reached a 
conclusion. For those that did, the favorable verdict 
Christopher Todd received in 1665 when he sued Cornelius
g
Williamson for debt on two bushels of meal was typical; 
plaintiffs won 195 (85%) of the 229 completed cases. In­
dividuals who initiated actions tended to be better pre­
pared with evidence that would stand up in court, had attor­
ney-like representatives to plead their cases, or presented 
more reliable witnesses. Preparation like this, however, 
did not always guarantee a victory. Indeed, 34 or 15% of 
the cases ended in favor of defendants. In 1650, for ex­
ample, Jeremiah How sued a resident of Southampton, Long 
Island for debt. How was unable to prove the £5 debt he was 
seeking to recover and as a result local officials awarded 
the Connecticut man 20s in damages (for the cost of his
9
journey to New Haven) and ordered How to pay court charges.
Although 229 of the 318 cases with known resolutions led 
to a ruling, just over a quarter of the total remained un­
finished in the sense that there was no known settlement.
The reasons for this varied. In some instances, such as the 
dispute between Spinnage and Saulle in 1639, no explanations 
are given. On other occasions, cases were non-suited be­
cause plaintiffs failed to appear in court to prosecute 
their cases. That is what happened in 1686 after Nathan 
Tuttle had warrants served on fence viewers Samuel Munson 
and Jeremiah How Jr. "for neglecting their work to his great
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damage."1^ Still others, like a 1659 case of debt between 
another member of the Tuttle family and one of the Atwater 
brothers, w-,re officially "withdrawn" after the pleading of 
the case by the plaintiff, who then ordinarily had to bear 
the court costs associated with the case.1'1' A handful of 
other cases were dropped for unknown reasons, were postponed 
and never continued, or were thrown out of court because at 
the time of the initial pleading authorities ordered the lit­
igants to seek private resolutions by "advising them to get
some friends to help issue it between them so that they may
12live in neighborly love together." Although the details 
concerning the ultimate resolution of these 89 "unfinished" 
cases are lacking, it is quite probable that they were set­
tled to the satisfaction of both parties.
The 359 cases entered in the records between 1640 and 
1699 were distributed unequally in time (Figure 5.1). Over 
the course of the century there was a downward trend in the 
percentage of cases that appear in extant records. The pe­
riod of greatest contention occurred in the early stages of 
settlement when laws, economic relations, and physical or­
ganization in the community were still ill-defined. In the 
first decade of the town's existence, 100 or 28% of all 
civil suits were filed; for the second ten years the fig­
ures were 74 and 21% respectively. As will be seen shortly, 
some of the earliest lawsuits, like Meiggs v. Gregory (1647), 
had a bearing on the evolution of law in New Haven and 
hence the overall effort to create social stability.
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Following this initial flurry of private disputes, the 
number of cases dropped off steadily for the next decade 
and a half, reaching a near low of but one case in 1661.
The overall decline in cases continued until the last years 
of the century. Thereafter, however, as was so with certain 
moral offenses, like fornication, the number of cases in­
creased to 66 or 18% during the 1690s.
The distribution depicted in Figure 5.1 is probably ac­
curate. Indeed, it bears similarities to the highs and lows 
seen in the distributions of local and colony infractions. 
But as was true with these earlier representations, certain 
cautions must be noted. Three are particularly noteworthy 
because they may have an affect on our conception of the 
way lawsuits were distributed.
First, it is clear that cases were being heard in offi­
cial capacities that also went unrecorded. Occasionally the 
County Court records include references to cases that had 
been tried originally in the discretionary Commissioners' 
Courts, for which no records remain. In 1700, for example, 
Thomas Wilmot appealed a previous judgement at a session of 
the County Court so that "it might be tried by a jury." A 
few years earlier, Joseph Baldwin appealed the ruling in a 
debt case heard at "an inferior court held at New Haven."
Perhaps each man did so with good reason, because in both
13instances the initial judgements were overturned. Ref­
erences like these indicate that private disputes were 














Sources: New Haven Records, I & II; Town Records, I & II;
County Court Records, I & II; Court of Assistants Records.
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recorded.
A second reason for suspecting that some controversies 
never found their way into official records relates to the 
informal process of resolving disputes known as arbitration. 
This out-of-court method of ironing out wrinkles in private 
relations was encouraged greatly in the early years of set­
tlement. Normally disputants pleaded their causes in formal 
court sessions and a ruling would be made by magistrates or 
the case referred to arbitration. This procedure insured 
that the action was recorded, although the outcome of many 
arbitrated cases in unknown. However, there were also in­
stances where this practice was not followed; cases were re­
ferred to arbitration directly and never appeared in formal 
court records. For instance,.in March of 1667 John Hall 
Jr., sued William Bradly "for unjust detaining of an award 
given in arbitration." Their case is suggestive in two 
respects. First, the original arbitration had not been re­
corded, hence had Bradly paid Hall as stipulated there would 
have been no record of the case. Secondly, the fact that 
the case was mentioned only after the original attempt at
arbitration failed hints that this method of non-binding
14conflict resolution was not especially effective.
Finally, the regime of Sir Edmund Andros may have had 
an affect on the number of suits filed in the late 1680s. 
Between 1687, when Connecticut was incorporated into the 
Dominion, and 1689, when it was overthrown, only three 
civil actions were reported. A comprehensive reorganization
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of the judiciary took place once the Dominion had been es­
tablished and Andros traveled to Hartford in November of 1688 
to order the County Courts dissolved. They were replaced 
by Quarter Sessions, which met sparingly before the Dominion 
fell. During that period no litigation was undertaken by 
New Haven residents. Based upon his analysis of Essex 
County, David Konig has posited the theory that colonists 
consciously "suppressed" their conflicts because the Domin­
ion courts and the use of common law threatened their "ac-
15customed system of determining title to land." Whether 
similar circumstances account for the absence of civil ac­
tions in Connecticut courts is, lacking more explicit evi­
dence, pure conjecture. The reorganization nevertheless 
may have had an affect on the general distribution and for 
this reason is worth noting.
In the final analysis there is no way of knowing how 
many lawsuits went unrecorded because they were heard in 
Commissioners' Courts or were arbitrated independently of 
the formal court structure. Yet it is reasonable to con­
clude that many of these unrecoverable cases were similar 
in content to the other 359 disputes filed between 1640 and 
1699. Indeed, the appeals from inferior courts and the 
case of arbitration just cited centered on the issue of 
debt. This is hardly surprising since most of New Haven's 
lawsuits arose over economic considerations (Table 5.1).
Heading the list was debt, the source of 118 or 33% of 
the cases. Throughout the century references like "John
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Cooper entered an^ action of debt against Mr. Allerton"
16abound in source materials. But there were also a number
of tangential causes that were linked to the economic life
of the community. Replevin, which accounted for 64 or 18%
of the cases, was one of these. In 1652 Henry Morill sued
two keepers of the herds for temporarily losing track of
his cow. The damages he sought to recover were for "two
days time he spent to seek her, beside the loss of milk."
Morill felt the keepers "owed" him for his economic losses
and the court agreed; he was awarded 3s 4d for his two days
work, 12d for his milk he lost," and court charges amounting 
17to 4s. Similarly, cases of nonfeasance tended to be filed
because plaintiffs suffered monetary losses. When Richard
Beach was sued in 1642 for "not performing covenant in the
work which he undertook to do at the mill" authorities
18ruled that "he should make good the damage." If all the
cases involving monetary losses are considered together,
they accounted for nearly three-quarters of the civil suits
19filed in New Haven.
Although economic misfortune in one form or another may 
have been the source of most of the civil disputes, there 
were others which tended to generate contention. Slander 
is an example. Between 1640 and 1699, 54 actions of def­
amation or slander were filed. These represented 14% of 
all lawsuits— by far the largest portion of non-economic 
related cases. Slander was a broad term which included in­
stances of simple name calling in the heat of an argument
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but also embraced more serious and calculated remarks aimed
at damaging an individual's reputation. It appears that
numerous slander suits grew out of neighborhood disputes,
as proved to be the case in 1666 when Peter Mallory sued
Elizabeth Hotchkiss because she claimed that the "work of
the Devil was done" at the plaintiff's house. The court
ruled on behalf of Mallory and in an effort to stave off
related actions by residents of "the farms," advised all to
"live more quietly and peaceably for the future, and not
20throuble the Court with anymore Vexatious suits." This
admonishment sheds light on the way slander suits in general
were regarded— that they were silly and often unnecessary.
For this reason both the New Haven and Connecticut colony
codes included provisions for punishing individuals who
capriciously dragged someone to court. The laws, headed
"Damages Pretended" or "Vexatious Suits," warned that false
actions pretending "great damages or debts, to discredit,
trouble, or vex his, her, or [an] adversary," would lead to 
21a fine. Ideally, the kind of contention generated in 
Mallory v. Hotchkiss could be avoided if local residents 
pursued the "policies of perfection" in their daily lives. 
Failing that, legal provisions incorporated into the codes 
were aimed at discouraging suits of this nature. Yet when 
they did reach the formal setting of the court, officials 
endeavored to resolve the controversies equitably so that 
in the future, disagreements between the same parties would 
be less likely to occur.
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Table 5.1 
Civil Actions in New Haven, 
1640-1699
Act:- on No. Pet.
Debt 118 32.9
Replevin 64 17.8
Slander 54 14. 5
Nonfeasance 36 10
Unspecified Damages 22 6.1
Animal Damages 17 4.7
Unspecified Difference 15 4.2
Other 33 9.8
Totals 359 100
Sources: New Haven Records, I 8s II; Town Records, I & II;
County Court Records, I & II; Court of Assistants Records,
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In addition to debt, replevin, and slander, there were 
other lawsuits which arose in New Haven over the course of 
the century. None of these occurred with great frequency, 
however, and therefore they tend to reveal something about 
the kinds of disorders that in the main members of the com­
munity successfully sidestepped— especially in light of con­
troversies known to have existed in other locales. In New 
Haven, for example, land boundary disputes were rare; there 
were but 10 or 3% of the total number of cases recorded be­
tween 1640 and 1699. In contrast, property litigation was
22pervasive in Essex County, Massachusetts communities.
Trespass, which accounted for nearly 7% of the cases in
Newtown, on Long Island, was the object of litigation on but 
23six occasions. As was true with other categories of lit­
igation, trespass could take a variety of forms. One of 
the most bizarre cases of trespass occurred in 1668 when 
William Edwards of Hartford sued New Havenite Joseph Baldwin 
for fornicating with his daughter-in-law. After being post­
poned several times, the case was dropped because of lack of 
24evidence. Finally, there were a handful (5 cases) of
what was called extortion but could be better described as
unrighteous business practices. When a Mrs. Pembroke
brought suit against Joseph Dormer in 1693, it was because
he had cheated her on a business transaction: the pound of
beeswax he sold her was later found to contain a stone em-
25bedded in its center. If the lack of cases citing shop­
keepers and merchants with fruadulent dealings is any
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indication, then it would appear that transactions were 
generally conducted in an above-board fashion.
Filing a civil action was basically very easy, although 
rules bearing upon pleading cases were increased over time. 
Prior to the publication of the Eaton Code in 1656 there 
were few procedures relating to litigation. Initially all 
an individual had to do was complain to authorities, the 
way Hannah Marsh did, and a case could be heard to decide 
"differences that may arise." Within a few years of settle­
ment a system of set fees was established to pay the marshal 
for every warrant or attachment he issued. The first ex­
plicit statement of jurisdiction was made in 1643 when the 
New Haven Colony was formed. At that juncture it was offi­
cially noted that Plantation Courts could hear all civil 
causes which did not exceed £20 in damages. Suits for
damages higher than that amount were reserved for the Mag-
26istrate's Courts.
That is where the procedures stood until the Eaton Code 
was compiled. Then it was specified that litigants had to 
be at least 21 years of age and that filing fees totaling 
10s were to be assessed to each plaintiff. Essentially, 
these were the only procedures. Any adult with 10s could 
file to have a difference resolved. However, so that the 
poor would not be prejudiced against, the code provided 
for plaintiffs to sue "In forma pauperis." When the Con­
necticut Code was published in 1673 the section on "Actions"
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was broadened somewhat to require "at least five days no­
tice" to defendants to prepare their cases. Costs were 
also increased slightly and a section on "Small Causes" 
was added setting a 40s ceiling on cases heard in Commis­
sioners' Courts which.,had a filing fee of just 2s. In all
courts the plaintiff retained the right to non-suit him-
27self before a verdict was reached.
Overall there were seven provisions in the Eaton Code 
and twelve in the Connecticut Code directly bearing on lit­
igation. Both codes reflect a verbatim borrowing from the 
Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts in matters pertaining 
to private law, although the Connecticut compilation did 
have some different headings. This is hardly surprising 
given the fact that it was written a quarter of century 
later. For the most part all three codes included sections 
relating to major categories of litigation. Those portions 
on "Bills and Specialties," stipulated what was considered 
to be a "good debt." In the case cited earlier where John 
Cooper sued Isaac Allerton, his principal evidence was "a
bill dated November 5, 1653" which the court judged valid
28thereby enabling Cooper to win his case. Other sections 
of the codes dealt with actions ranging from "Replevry," 
whereby plaintiffs could "satisfy damage," to Suits Vexa­
tious" and "Barratry," which were aimed at slanderers who 
were predisposed to drag neighbors to court on the least 
provocation. Though limited, these procedures and rules 
were included in the codes to help authorities resolve
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29private controversies in an equitable fashion. And the 
codes were useful to litigants like Mary Osborne who was so 
upset by an unfavorable verdict that she requested members 
of the court to "consider of the law page 37" which em­
powered justices to alter awards granted by juries. On
this occasion her knowledge of the law worked to her advan-
30tage and the award was reduced.
While these provisions were formulated to establish 
guidelines for civil actions, litigation in turn played a 
role in shaping criminal statutes and regulations which were 
designed to promote order in the community. Recall, for a 
moment, Meiggs v. Gregory, where officials were confronted 
by a novel set of circumstances which posed a threat to 
order. From Meiggs' perspective, the issue in his suit was 
nonfeasance. Yet as the details of the suit emerged, offi­
cials realized that more was at stake. The larger question 
of quality control and unrighteous business dealings cap­
tured the attention of civil officials who perhaps came to 
view Meiggs' cause of assumpsit as secondary. Although 
they had encountered blatant violations of bylaws governing 
weights and measures prior to 1647, Meiggs' suit emphasized 
the need to "branch out" still further through legislation
and to create an agency of control charged with the respon-
31sibility of inspecting shoes and leather. In essence, 
the suit played an important role in promoting order 
through consumer legislation which was begun within months 
of the case. It also generated official inquiries into
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coopers gauges and the measures of other artisans. Indeed, 
as suggested at the close of Chapter 3, the suit may have 
been responsible for the enforcement of weights and mea-
32sures bylaws that cost Mrs. Gregson and company 12d each.
Most cases of nonfeasance did not have such a pro­
nounced impact on the apparatus of social control in early 
New Haven. There were, however, other kinds of disputes 
that did have a direct bearing on defining social order. 
Certain debt or damage cases contributed to new legislation 
and as such bore a relation to criminal prosecutions. More­
over, cases relating to crop damage caused by livestock in 
the long run served to promote order.
As illustrated earlier relative to law and petty crime, 
livestock control was a problem in New Haven. Most of the 
town's bylaws concerned the control of livestock and the 
maintenance of fences. And with the exception of the pros­
ecution of military offenses, these ordinances were vio­
lated more than any others. The height of enforcement oc­
curred in 1649 and 1650 when 70 or 68% of the 102 livestock 
violations were prosecuted. This in turn was preceded by a
two year period beginning in 1647 when nearly a quarter of
the livestock control laws were passed. And, to add a 
final bit of perspective to the context of livestock man­
agement, it was in the years 1644 and 1645 that 41% of the
civil suits for damages caused by animals were filed. This
sequence of events— litigation, legislation, and enforce­
ment-occurred in a concentrated period of time and suggests
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that more than one cause and effect relationship may have 
existed.
The decade between 1640, when the first order restrict­
ing hogs in the neck was issued, and 1650, when most of New 
Haven's livestock violations took place, holds the key to 
appreciating how these three elements of social control were 
related. For reasons outlined in previous chapters, it ap­
pears that local officials were slow to recognize and re­
spond to problems associated with controlling livestock. 
Although several orders were made in the early years of 
settlement, it was not until 1644 that the first bylaw was 
passed. And it was not until the position of public 
pounder was instituted in 1648 that truly effective enforce­
ment began. Gradually, officials realized that meaningful 
measures of control had to be introduced into the community.
The realization came in the form of private controver­
sies between friends and neighbors who suffered damages 
caused by roaming animals. In fact, the first of the 17 
suits relating to livestock damage was heard in 1640, a 
month after the first orders were issued. In a case lacking 
details, the court determined that "Mr. Wilks shall pay 5
bushels and a half of Indian corn to Thomas Buckingham for
33corn" destroyed by the defendant's hogs. It would be 
nearly two full years before the next suit was recorded, 
but the issue was still the same: John Owen "had some
damage done in his corn by hogs" through the neglect of a 
group of residents who had not "made up their fence in
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34season." During this period a few orders were issued, 
but it was not until 1644--five years after settlement—  
that authorities began to take purposeful steps towards 
stemming what was becoming a contentious situation.
The cause which set the social control apparatus into 
more complete motion was filed by the gunsmith, Thomas 
Nash, in 1644. Nash's complaint was made because he "suf­
fered damage done in his corn to the value of nine bushels 
by hogs in their quarter," or neighborhood. Authorities 
responded by ordering a committee to "view fences of the 
said quarter" and assess damages on respective owners. 
Recovering damages was one thing, but getting owners to 
repair their fences "speedily" was another. A few months 
after his hearing Nash returned to court and requested 
satisfaction for an additional twelve bushels that had 
been ruined because quarter fences were either defective 
or completely down. Figuring in the blame was none other
35than the Town because its fence "was not set up in time."
It appears that Nash's second appearance had a hand in con­
vincing authorities of the need for a more effective means 
of dealing with the problem. Finally, rulers recognized 
that the "plantation has been much exercised with hogs 
destroying of corn." All agreed that it was time to take 
into "serious consideration how they might prevent the 
like damage" in the future. The solution lay, or so it
seemed, with appointing fence viewers for each of the 
36quarters.
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Ultimately, however, these informal committees proved 
to be ineffective. Indeed, more suits for animal damage 
were filed in the year following implementation of the com­
mittees than at any point in the town's history. After John 
Walker brought suit against Thomas Morris in 1645, the mar­
shal warned members of the quarters to "get the defective
37fences mended." Unfortunately, Thomas Kimberly's warning
did not exactly cause planters to run out and repair their
fences. After all, at this point in time there were few
laws on the books capable of leading to prosecution for
failing to maintain fences. Perhaps this is why Theophilus
Eaton had to report in 1648, that "many are discouraged
from the labor of husbandry, because their corn, when they
had sown.it, is spoiled." Finally, after several years of
frustration, contention, and informal attempts to resolve
the problem, authorities created the position of public
38pounder and backed it with meaningful legislation.
It was immediately following the appointment of John 
Cooper as pounder and the establishment of bylaws with 
fixed penalties that the problem appears to have been con­
trolled. But it took the prosecution of negligent property 
owners to insure conformity. Indeed, within two years of 
Cooper's appointment, 70% of all known violations of the 
livestock control bylaws were prosecuted. In light of this 
progression of events, the role litigation played in bring­
ing a semblance of order to the community appears to have 
been significant. If, in fact, litigation served to promote
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order and stability, then a sizeable portion of the civil 
suits stemming from animal damages should have occurred 
prior to the passage of bylaws and the prosecution of of­
fenders. That is precisely what Figure 5.2 suggests. Be­
fore 1648, when the pounder was appointed and a quarter of 
the livestock control laws were passed, nearly 60% of the 
civil actions had been filed. Conversely, just 1% of the 
violations had been prosecuted— a reflection of the fact 
that there was little enforcement prior to 1648. The clus­
tering of violations in the three year period from 1648 to 
1650 reflects both the formulation and enforcement of live­
stock control ordinances. In that period, 70 or 74% of the 
95 violations prior to 1663 were prosecuted. Thereafter, 
prosecutions dropped dramatically, as did the percentage of 
civil actions. Furthermore, it has already been demonstrated 
that criminal cases prosecuted after 1650 tended to result
in postponements or acquittals— an indication that the prob-
39lem was being brought under control.
Although it appears that livestock control was less 
troublesome by the 1650s, civil suits continued to be filed. 
Yet even these point to a change from the causes heard in 
the 1640s. For instance, in 1657 Edward Perkins sued a 
Dutchman named Steendam for damages done to two acres of 
peas. The culprits were hogs who had squirmed through a 
hole in the defendant's fence. Steendam was aware of the 
defects and had previously "agreed with men to make it new." 
He therefore tried to pass the damages on to the workers.
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Figure 5.2
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The court said no, awarded Perkins six bushels of peas plus 
court costs, and then told the defendant that "he may seek 
remedy from those who were to do his fence and did not. " ^  
Unlike the earlier suits which were characterized by bla­
tant neglect or the complete absence of fences, Steendam 
had taken steps to have his repaired— an indication that he 
was attempting to conform to the regulations. Similarly, 
testimony in a case from 1651 provides another hint that the 
problem was being brought under control. In a suit between 
Thomas Powell and William Gibbard centering on the former's 
corn crop which had been "eaten and spoiled," local fence 
viewers played a primary role in determining damages in the 
case. It was through active participation by viewers who 
were requested to decide if the damage was caused by hogs
or by cattle that a judgement on behalf of Powell was 
41reached. The presence of the viewers indicates that the
livestock problem was being faced head-on. Over time,
their role increased and in 1654 viewers (unlike those of
the 1640s) were ordered to take a public oath "to discharge
42the trust committed to them."
By 1654 the circumstances surrounding the control of 
livestock were different than they had been a decade ear­
lier. The legal basis for control had since been expanded, 
with litigation playing a fundamental role in promoting 
change. In the early years of settlement most of the legal 
activity associated with livestock control was manifested 
in lawsuits for damages caused by animals. Bylaws and their
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enforcement were non-existent. By the fifties, however, 
many orders and local ordinances had been passed, offenders 
were being prosecuted, the pounder was a viable position of 
authority, and the office of fence viewer had become insti­
tutionalized. This change is suggestive on two counts.
First, it appears that certain civil actions served a func­
tion by helping to bring physical order to the community. 
Surely litigants did not file suits with this express goal 
in mind; their immediate concern was to recoup monetary 
losses. Their suits, however, called to attention the need 
to limit contention through legislation which became the 
basis for punishing transgressors. It may well have been 
that penalizing petty offenders individually fostered sta­
bility by limiting conflict between two or more parties. 
Second, the fact that laws were passed and violators were 
prosecuted suggests that institutionalization, not good will 
or utopian rhetoric, was needed to order livestock offenders 
in New Haven. Simply put, individuals failed to meet their 
obligations voluntarily and in response to this negligence, 
law became a more pervasive force in the community.
This tendency for the town to become increasingly "in­
stitutionalized," for it to rely less on informal procedures, 
relates directly to another facet of conflict resolution in 
New Haven— arbitration and its decline over time. It was 
suggested earlier that this informal method of resolving 
private controversies was encouraged in the initial years
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43of settlement. And it was utilized heavily at first even 
though it never came near to being the foremost means of 
ending disputes. Yet, in 1645 when Richard Malbon sued a 
Mr. Caffinch "for damage done in his corn.at several times," 
arbitration was employed. Caffinch, who evidently had com­
mon business interests with the plaintiff, argued that the 
damage "came by defect of their own fence." Because offi­
cials believed the case was "something dark," both parties 
consented to allow the matter to be resolved by three indi­
viduals who were to "view and arbitrate and determine" the
44outcome of the case. But almost as frequently as it was
used to iron out problems in the 1640s, references to dis­
pleasure with this technique of resolving disputes surface 
in records of the 1650s. When Thomas Powell sued William 
Gibbard in 1651, both parties were urged to submit their 
difference to arbitration. Originally Powell agreed, but 
Gibbard declined. Then, when the latter finally accepted 
the proposal, the plaintiff refused; "He now desired it
might by issued by the Court, [so] that he may have no more
45trouble about it." Powell's remarks suggest that arbi­
tration lacked the speed and authority associated with 
court ordered decisions. Although reasons for rejecting 
arbitration undoubtedly varied, it is clear from Figure 
5.3 that over time it lost its appeal as a means of con­
flict resolution.
The basic function of arbitration was to stiffle pri­
vate disputes before they reached the public spotlight
257
and, perhaps more importantly, to allow disputants to have 
a role in determining the outcome of the case. In so doing 
the spirit of compromise generated by participation in de­
termining awards became a possible avenue for limiting fu­
ture contention. If the trend in New Haven is at all indi­
cative of other locales, then the procedure was used most 
extensively during the first 25 years of settlement in com­
munities founded prior to 1650. It was utilized in Boston 
as an alternative to local and colony courts. It was used 
in Dedham, where it was presumably "an ephemeral but effec­
tive" means of resolving debt and slander cases. And it 
was employed extensively in Essex County communities in an
effort to defuse contentious conduct in a peaceful and
46loving fashion. Arbitration was also used in England 
where it was considered to be "of great importance in lim­
iting bitterness and conflict" without resorting to formal 
47litigation. In areas where it was used, it appears that 
restricting the scope of contention was the foremost aim of 
arbitration.
Unfortunately, our understanding of the nuts and bolts 
of the process is fragmentary and therefore makes it diffi­
cult to assert with confidence why this means of resolving 
disputes was slowly phased out. For example, we do not 
know how most of the arbitrated cases were resolved; any
number of the actions brought before the bench could have
48originally been the subject of arbitration. We do not 
know with certainty how long it took the typical case
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submitted to arbitration to be resolved. Nor do we know 
precisely how binding were the awards given in arbitration. 
In the case cited earlier, where John Hall sued William 
Bradly, the issue might have been prompted by Bradly's re­
fusal to take the arbitrators judgement seriously. This 
lack of knowledge about the procedure is odd, given the 
important role it was supposed to have played in the cove­
nanted communities of New England.
Nevertheless, we do know enough about the way the pro­
cess worked to gain some appreciation of why it was useful. 
Once "judicious men," "three indifferent neighbors," or 
"friends" had been selected as mediators, they reviewed the 
circumstances of the case. If necessary, they could call 
witnesses, although formal legal procedures like serving 
warrants probably were not used. Finally, the arbitrators
would sit down with the contending parties and "hammer out
49a practical agreement on a give-and-take basis." This 
can be seen at least partly in the details of a case arbi­
trated in Massachusetts in 1640.
The issue in the action was nonfeasance. A Mr. Norton 
was sued by his servant Richard Arresby for failing to ful­
fill the terms of a contract. The points in contention were 
the date when Arresby's service began and monies spent by 
him after his arrival in New England. In essence, Norton 
claimed that he offered Arresby 20 nobles annually (which 
pleased him), that his "time" was to begin on August 10, 
1639, and that he had not agreed to pay for Arresby's
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transportation from England. Also entering into the case 
was the status of Arresby's wife who had been a "charge and 
to no benefit, having nothing to do but milk cows." Chosen 
to arbitrate the case were Governor Winthrop and William 
Tynge, who then listened to Arresby's side of the story.
In response to Norton's position, Arresby argued that 
his time was to have begun when he landed at Dorchester on 
June 23, 1639. In addition, he pleaded that his wife "was 
entertained by Mr. Norton's consent," and that she had been 
useful because she provided "diet" for Norton's workers and 
and had made butter and cheese which she sent to Mrs.
Norton. Finally, Arresby maintained that it was Norton's 
responsibility to reimburse him for living expenses follow­
ing his arrival.
Ultimately the arbitrators reached a decision suitable 
to both parties. Their agreement stipulated that Arresby's 
time was considered to have started on July 1— something of 
a compromise. His wages "for himself and wife" were deter­
mined to be £20 annually. Norton was held responsible for 
Arresby's expenses, but the costs of his passage were "set 
against the money he disbursed for his wife,"—  a concession 
by the plaintiff. in the course of determining an equitable 
solution to the case, Winthrop and Tynge addressed each of
the major issues in the action and "hammered out" an agree-
50ment to the apparent satisfaction of both disputants.
Few examples of arbitrated cases anywhere, including New 
Haven, spell out the contending positions and final compromise
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as early as Arresby v. Norton. For New Haven, the most 
precise information about an arbitrated action is contained 
in a reference to an award granted to Thomas Pell in 1649 
after he sued John Budd of Southold. William Wells of 
Southold and New Havenite Thomas Munson were chosen as ar­
bitrators. They determined that Pell was to receive a 
bedstead, "two lockes, some bags of wool, and some hoop-roots 
and hoopoles." In this particular instance, Pell was seeking 
verification of the award so that he could enter the house
containing these items without having to worry about being
51sued for trespass by its current occupants.
Beyond this one example, details of arbitrated cases 
are virtually non-existent. Thus, in addition to the fact 
that arbitration declined over time, about all that is 
known in a concrete way is that the actions which were medi­
ated were not restricted to one particular kind of cause. 
Actions of relpevry were arbitrated, as seen in the 1645 
dispute between Nathaniel Turner and his servant over the
death of a cow "by default of the said John Hill in working
52him contrary to his master's express command." So too 
were actions of nonfeasance such as the one "depending be­
tween Robert Seely and Daniel Paul" who agreed to have two
53residents "arbitrate and determine as they shall see cause.' 
Even cases of slander were occasionally put to arbitration, 
which is what happened in 1654 when John Tompson sued 
Seely because the latter reported that during a business 
transaction the plaintiff behaved "dishonestly and in an
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54unjust way." The arbitration process was used to decide
a variety of causes including debt, trespass, differences
55between outsiders, like Catchman and Holt, and in cases 
arising from damages caused by animals. Indeed, the last 
known case of arbitration occurred in 1659 and centered on 
the issue of satisfaction for damage done to John Down's 
corn by Thomas Mulliner's horse. Evidently they were the 
last residents to agree to have their difference "referred
to arbitration," and because they did, "no sentence was
,, ,,56given m  the case."
It is perhaps fitting that the last cause to be arbi­
trated in New Haven would end officially on an inconclusive 
note. It serves as a reminder of the difficulties associa­
ted with assessing the role arbitration played in limiting 
contention in the community. M.J. Ingram has summarized as 
well as anyone the import of arbitration when he noted that 
it "could give the wronged party adequate redress, but the 
relative informality of the procedure made it possible to
be flexibile... to persuade the parties at issue to compro-
57mise their rights in the interests of harmony." The 
spirit of compromise was clearly the goal of arbitration 
and frequently it worked, as evidenced in Arresby v. Norton. 
And, aside from the aim of compromise it is known that ar­
bitration was also viewed as a means of obtaining "a loving
58and peaceful end" to private disputes. It was employed 
in New Haven and elsewhere to settle controversies ranging 
from debt to slander, and for about 25 years authorities
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were able to persuade disputants to embrace the procedure 
as an alternative to formal litigation. Based on evidence 
like this, it would seem that arbitration had much to 
recommend it. For this reason it is more difficult to 
understand why it was phased out after 1660.
A number of different forces seem to have contributed 
to its decline. Comments made by Thomas Powell in 1651 
suggest one of the most important of these: the desire to
resolve actions decisively. Slowly but surely the formal 
environment of the courtroom was supplanting the informali­
ties of arbitration. Actions heard by the bench were re­
solved quickly and backed by established law. Because the 
outcomes of arbitrated cases in New Haven are so difficult 
to determine, it is impossible to document accurately dis­
pleasure with the system. Nor is it known who was growing 
weary of it. Was it the dissatisfied litigant, like Powell, 
who sought a no-nonsense solution to a source of irritation? 
Or were those on the opposite side of the bench no longer 
encouraging arbitration because they realized that it was 
often slow and non-binding? Was this tacitly recognized by 
the fact that nowhere in the codes of 1656 and 1673 is men­
tion made of arbitration?
If there was a decreased tendency by officials to urge 
disputants to arbitrate, then it could have been a response 
to an increase in the failure rate of arbitration. If what 
was happening in Essex County was simultaneously occurring 
in New Haven, then clearly the system was failing. David
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Konig has argued that the failure of arbitration reflected
the "failure of the local community" to resolve private 
59controversies. This notion is appealling because it fits 
well into other paradigms of social change— declension, 
spatial fragmentation of New England towns, and increased 
mobility and independence by the rising generations. How­
ever, it was not the community that was failing. Rather, 
it was the rhetorical and idealistic foundation upon which 
it was built. In point of fact, by the 1660s communities 
were better equipped to resolve private disputes because 
positive law had developed into a functional and pervasive 
force within them. By the sixties, for example, livestock 
damage suits had disappeared because they had originally 
promoted meaningful legal change. Throughout the century 
law on the local level reamined responsive to the needs of 
society. Furthermore, local courts continued to hear and 
determine private disputes. Perhaps the decline of arbi­
tration was less a falling off of the policies of perfection 
or an indication of community weakness, than it was a 
strengthening of the legal milieu which simply provided a 
more satisfying method of resolving private controversies.
Contrary to what one might expect, the phasing out of 
arbitration was not linked to sharp increases in major 
categories of litigation. By the 1660s cases of debt, re­
plevin, and slander were being heard with less frequency 
than had been so in the early years of settlement. Pres­
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sures associated with an increased caseload do not, there­
fore, appear to have been a factor in the decline of arbi­
tration. By 1660, 58 or 49% of the debt cases had been 
heard, as had 28 or 44% and 22 or 42% of the actions for 
replevin and slander respectively. Although the context 
within which these disputes arose is less clear than the 
circumstances of animal damage suits, they nevertheless 
accounted for 65% of the lawsuits filed in New Haven and 
as such merit examination.
Because they were related to routine economic activities 
in the community, causes of debt and replevin shared much in 
common. For instance, both were distributed similarly over 
time (Figure 5.4). As suggested above, the greatest per­
centage of these suits occurred early when, for a variety of 
reasons, the economic life of the community was most ill- 
defined. It was perhaps during the stage of acclimation to 
the new world environment that individuals seeking economic 
opportunity engaged in speculative ventures that fell 
through and that there was a greater tendency to enter into 
verbal contracts which led to lawsuits for indebtedness. 
Following the high concentration of suits in the early 
years, a steady decline began and continued for two or 
three decades. It was during this period of decline that 
arbitration was phased out. Moreover, it was not until 
the 1680s and 1690s that suits of both kinds once again
i , 60began to increase.
Unlike the intense periods of law enforcement that
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produced wide ranges in the number of offenses during a 
given period, the range of debt and replevin cases was 
narrow. On three occasions— 1647, 1690, and 1698— there 
were as many as four cases of the latter. Typically, in 
the 37 years in which replevin suits were filed, one or two 
cases was the rule. Debt actions were slightly more prev­
alent, averaging between two and three cases annually, but 
there were never more than seven suits filed in a single 
year and this occurred only twice over the course of the 
century.
In addition to sharing common distributions and narrow 
ranges, both kinds of actions had other similarities. With 
both, for example, 95% of the cases involved local residents 
seeking satisfaction in business dealings with their friends 
and neighbors. About a third of the suits had at least one 
participant who was a non-resident, however. In both cases, 
males were the sole litigants in 88% and 92% of the cases 
respectively. Only twice did females exclusively enter 
actions of debt (1) or replevin (1). And in debt cases 
which were completed, plaintiffs won 90%, while their 
counterparts in replevin suits were successful in 77%— a 
reflection of the fact that replevry frequently included 
accusations of negligence which was sometimes a difficult 
issue to prove.
The thorny question of negligence is best exemplified 
by a replevin suit filed in 1647 by merchant John Evance 
against a local mariner, John Charles. At issue was the
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Figure 5.4
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loss of a shallop and its cargoe to the value of £100. 
Evance, who was no stanger to the litigation process, en­
deavored to prove that "through gross, if not wilfull, 
negligence and default" of the defendant, "the said vessel 
was cast away or broken, and a quantity of peas belonging
to himself, with certain pipes of Madera wine belonging to
61others, were lost." The case was originally put to ar­
bitration, but Charles refused to agree to the award 
granted to Evance. The arbitrators in the case were men 
"that have long bred the sea" and who were "well exper­
ienced in such cases." When asked why he did not accept 
the award, Charles claimed that he was not in charge of 
the vessel and therefore not responsible for its well­
being. JBecause of this turn of events, the merchant was 
"constrained to crave help and justice" by the court.
Charles' role in the voyage thus became a principal 
point of contention. In fact, before pursuing the ques­
tion of negligence, "the plaintiff was required to make 
proof" that Charles was indeed master of the shallop and 
that the loss then resulted through "his neglect or 
default." The issue was complicated because Charles was 
a last minute replacement for Thomas Jeffries, the man 
originally designated to serve as master. Charles claimed 
that he went along "voluntarily" because he had "some oc­
casions of his own" in Guilford. However, Jeffries and 
several other witnesses testified that they understood 
Charles' role to be that of master. The two seamen who
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accompanied the defendant stated that during the trip they 
did "what he said John Charles commanded them." Another 
master was asked what he considered to be usual practice, 
whereupon he answered "that if anyone were shipped’in the 
room of a master of a ship and had his power, that then he 
conceived he was master." In response to this testimony, 
Charles held fast to his position, adding that he had re­
quested no wages and therefore could not have been the 
master of the vessel. Ultimately, however, the court re­
jected Charles' defense, asserting that in "his own con­
science" Charles thought of himself as master and "would 
have required master’s wages if he returned safe."
Once a determination was reached relative to Charles' 
role, the question of neglect was proved with little diffi­
culty. Evidently the shallop was docked at Guilford for 
two days with a full cargoe when suddenly a storm developed. 
Thomas Jeffries testified that "it was a dangerous place to 
ride" out a storm and that as a precaution the vessel 
should have been anchored in a nearby channel so that it 
"could run up the river with little difficulty” and thereby 
be saved. Finally, during the storm Charles and his crew 
"did all foresake her," resulting in the loss of ship and 
cargoe.
In the face of this testimony Charles was asked whether 
or not the master of the vessel should be held responsible 
for its loss? His answer was a cautious yes: "that if he
were proved master, there was a great neglect." Essentially
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all parties agreed that the boat was lost through negli­
gence, but before this could be proved, officials had to 
first determine who was in charge. When all the witnesses 
has spoken, authorities concluded that Evance would not 
have permitted Jeffries to miss the voyage if the defen­
dant "had not been procurred in his room," and "that the 
treaty with John Charles in this business, the time he 
took for consideration, and his consent at last, all tended 
to that purpose." In the end, Evance received the justice 
he was "craving." For his gross neglect and "unworthy car­
riage in such a place of trust," Charles was ordered to pay 
the plaintiff £67.
Evance was one of 28 other plaintiffs in replevry suits
who won. In each instance recovery of lost or damaged
property was sought by individuals who filed suits. Most
replevry causes were not as complex as Evance v. Charles
and the amount of awards requested was generally smaller.
More typical was Thomas Barnes' suit against Ralph Dayton,
whose son was charged with neglect in the drowning death
of the plaintiff's cow while watching the herds. In this
instance the court ruled for the defendant; the loss was
considered "an afflicting providence of God which the said
62Barnes must bear himself." Whether plaintiffs sought to 
recover as much as Evance or as little a.s Barnes, authori­
ties diligently weighed evidence in an effort to bring 
equitable solutions to private controversies. If the 
absence of appeals is any indication of the attempt to
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control bitterness, then perhaps officials performed their 
appointed task successfully.
Lawsuits for indebtedness were similar, if not more
plentiful, insofar as they related specifically to routine
economic activities of the community. Although they were
not as difficult to unravel, actions for debt were more
varied than those for replevin. But because they tended to
be less complicated, surviving records contain less detail
about cases of debt. All too often, references appear as
follows: "In the action wherein Joseph Smith is plaintiff
and John Downs contra defendant the court finds for the
63plaintiff 20s ard costs of court which is 7s.” This does 
not mean that details are unrecoverable and a sampling of 
more complete cases reveals the variation that existed in 
debt actions.
In 1652, for example, Philip Galpin sued Lancelot Baker 
for a debt amounting to 20s in "trading wampom." Galpin 
had given the wampom to Baker, instructing hirn to "buy some 
hoppes at Connecticut." However, if he could not acquire 
them, Baker was to turn the money over to John Webb of 
Hartford as payment for ten bushels of apples. Baker did 
neither and when Galpin's wife requested the money back, he 
refused. Instead, he offered the Galpins some apples which 
he had purchased from Webb even though he admitted to having 
the wampom in his possession. The court ruled for the
plaintiff and Baker was ordered to return the 20s and pay
4 - 6 4  court costs.
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Six years later, in another of the varied debt cases, widow 
Elizabeth Peakin sued John Tompshon "for a debt of roughly 
£7 due to her for work done by her late husband." As evi­
dence she submitted his account book and a covenant between 
Tompson and her husband. The former freely acknowledged 
the debt, but he contested portions of it for three reasons. 
First, he claimed that it was improper for Peakin to charge 
9d a day for the "victuals and drink" of his workers. Sec­
ond, that costs for tools should not be included in the 
debt because Tompson had provided them. Finally, that 
Peakin's wage of 3s a day for his own work was too high. 
After pointing out to the widow that she was "very quick in 
prosecuting, seeing the money were due but yesterday," the 
court ruled in her favor, but moderated the debt slightly—  
workmen were allowed 6d instead of 9d and Tompson was re­
leased from paying for the tools. As to Peakin1s wages, 
they were allowed in full "seeing he was a master workman" 
who labored "early and late" at his job. But because she 
was so eager to prosecute, despite Tompson’s offer to set­
tle out of court, Mrs. Peakin was ordered to pay for half
65of the court fees associated with her case.
Perhaps the most frequent action for debt concerned 
"unpaid" bills for products purchased by local residents. 
More typical, therefore, then the preceding cases was the 
lawsuit between Samuel Cooke and Thomas Mix heard by the 
Plantation Court in 1669. As plaintiff, Cooke charged 
that Mix owed him.£l 3s 7d "together with such damages as
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the Court shall adjudge." The debt was for an unspecified 
quantity of shoes purchased by the defendant who had of­
fered to pay for them with corn. Evidently, however, Mix 
extended this offer only after a warrant for prosecution 
had been filed and the amount tendered was considered in­
adequate by Cooke. Mix made no attempt to repudiate the 
debt, and after all the evidence had been presented, he was 
ordered to pay the plaintiff the full amount in addition to 
bearing half of the court charges. As proved to be the 
case with widow Peakin, Cooke was told he had to pay the 
other half. In fact, he was admonished for "needlessly 
troubling the court and his neighbor" and was left with the 
warning that if "he should [here]after be found in such
needless and vexatious suits," he faced punishment by the
66court "as the law directs in such eases."
Although the dispute between Cooke and Mix is illus­
trative of the circumstances which prompted most cases of 
debt, it was also atypical insofar as authorities believed 
the cause to have been vexatious. Clearly, the majority 
of actions for debt did not end with admonitions by the 
court. Because they did not, and because there is a 
paucity of debt related material in extant records, it is 
difficult to assess the amount of true contention and dis­
order which were generated by cases of an economic nature. 
Nonetheless, reference to the fact that Cooke had needlessly 
troubled his neighbor suggests that ill-feeling very well 
could have existed between the litigants. Similarly, widow
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Peakin's refusal to settle out of court with John Tompson 
leaves the impression that here too bitterness and strong 
disagreement existed. But because the major issue in each 
of these actions was debt, its resolution, not the extent 
of personal antagonism, received the principal attention 
of the bench. Thus, most of our insights into how disrup­
tive private controversies could in fact be, come from 
cases like slander and defamation where attacks on indi­
viduals reputations required the unswerving attention of 
authorities.
When Hannah Marsh filed suit against Mr. Brewster be­
cause he called her a Billingsgate slut, she was seeking 
redress by the court. This came in the form of a public 
apology by the defendant who was told he had to "repair 
her reputation." Nearly all of the 54 slander suits filed 
in New Haven between 1640 and 1699 were caused by similar 
name-calling or accusations which were perceived by plain­
tiffs as being unjust and damaging to their reputations. 
Slander suits throughout the century were filed in a ran­
dom fashion and do not appear to have been linked to any­
thing unusual in the community, like the problems of live­
stock control which led to litigation in the 1640s. As 
proved to be the case with petty offenses and other kinds 
of litigation, the majority of New Haven's slander cases 
were heard in the first few decades of settlement (Figure 
5.5). The most prolonged period of litigation for slander 
occ .rred between the mid-forties and early sixties when
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over 50% of the suits were filed. The most pronounced 
period of slander related controversies took place in the 
early 1670s when 11 or 20% of the cases were heard. From 
that point on, the number of suits declined steadily until 
the early 1690s when three or 5% of the cases were recorded 
One, a suit filed in 1694, serves as a reminder that liti­
gation was continuing on the local level even though there 
are no extant records of the inferior courts. In what ap­
pears to have been part of a neighborhood conflict involving 
quarreling and lying, John Downs entered an appeal in the 
County Court of a decision rendered against him by local 
justices. The original verdict was overturned, but Downs
was left with the warning "to be more cautious" with his
67neighbors in the future. Thus, as was the case with all 
our distributions, the one depicted in Figure 5.5 must be 
viewed as tentative, especially after 1666.
Slander suits, like most of the cases of civil litiga­
tion filed in New Haven, involved local residents almost 
exclusively. Fifty-one or 94% of the cases were filed by 
local residents; only three suits were heard between non­
residents. And, as also proved to be the case with debt 
and replevin, in slander suits reaching completion, 87% were 
won by the plaintiff; four or 13% were determined in favor 
of the defendant. In addition, most of the individuals in­
volved in slander suits were, like John Downs, male members 
of the community. Seventy percent of the cases involved 
males exclusively, another 15% were cases like the one
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between Marsh and Brewster which embraced members of both 
sexes, and 15% were filed just by women. Moreover, the 
eight slander suits entered by females represents 68% of 
all those cases wherein women were the only litigants.
It is not surprising to find that most of the slander 
cases occurred between local residents and that women were 
embroiled in these with greater frequency than in the major 
ity of actions, like debt or replevin, which were related 
to business transactions and the economy in general. The 
likelihood of defaming a stranger was much less than 
speaking disparagingly about a neighbor or relative who 
was disliked. Whether male or female, however, the testi­
mony taken in slander cases reveals certain common character 
iztics. First, the general aim of the litigation was to 
"restore" the plaintiff's reputation. Second, the cases 
were generally marked by true contention. And, third, im­
mediate neighbors were frequently distracted, if only 
tangentially, by the so-called private conflict of the 
litigants. It is in this respect that the disorders as­
sociated with slander actions worried public officials.
Among other things, it was feared that if these suits were 
not resolved efficiently and equitably, violence (and a 
spill-over into the realm of criminal law) might follow.
The conflict that raged for several years within one 
New Haven family is an example of a particularly disrup­
tive case which was difficult to resolve. Central to the 
dispute was Ebenezer Brown, one of the town's most prolific
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recidivists who, in the span of 27 years, violated local 
or colony statutes on ten different occasions. His inabil­
ity to fulfill his duties as a husband led to conflict be­
tween his mother-in-law, widow Rebecca Vincent, and his 
mother, widow Mary Brown, in 1668. The exact nature of 
the slander is unknown, but it may well have been related 
to Ebenezer's treatment of his wife Hannah and remarkds 
made by her concerned mother. In the initial confrontation 
the court ruled on behalf of Vincent; Brown threatened to 
appeal the decision to the Court of Assistants, but let her 
petition drop without an explanation. Immediately following 
this hearing, Rebecca turned around and sued Mary for slan­
der; she won her case, was awarded £4 by the jury, but the
68award was moderated by the court to 40s and costs.
As it turns out, the issue was far from settled. At the
same session of the court, widow Vincent accused Ebenezer
of "sinful miscarriages" which somehow affected her daughter.
Brown was ordered to be whipped, but his wife intervened and
69the corporal punishment was remitted. Perhaps Hannah 
should have let her husband be "corrected," because his ap­
parent neglect or mistreatment of her continued and in 1669
the court ordered him to find a suitable home for his now 
70pregnant wife. Five years later, at another session of 
the court, Samuel Todd entered an action against Rebecca 
Vincent and her daughter because they spread the rumor that 
his wife "hugged and kissed Ebenezer" Brown. Unlike the 
earlier cases, this was withdrawn when the plaintiff and
Figure 5.5 
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his wife reportedly came "to an agreement" with the defen- 
71dants. Four years after the resolution of that conflict,
Ebenezer was taken to court and sued for slander by Benjamin
Bunell after this particularly wayward member of the Brown
clan reported that one day he saw the plaintiff's wife
"drunk as a bitch." The court ruled that Bunell was un-
72justly wronged and ordered Brown to pay £5 in damages.
The series of civil and criminal actions involving mem­
bers of the Brown family illustrates divisiveness which was 
connected to many slander suits. To be sure, the Browns were 
fighting out in court a domestic dispute which was caused 
by Ebenezer. Yet on at least one occasion their conflict 
led to the involvement of non-family members like Samuel 
Todd. As such, the Brown's conduct was the kind which 
leaders most hoped to avoid. It set a poor example for 
other married couples; it set in-laws like Rebecca and Mary 
against one another in public view; and it was allowed to 
spill over and draw outsiders into the fray. Perhaps to 
the relief of rulers, the Brown family quarrel was one of the 
very few which dragged on over a long period of time. After 
all, one of the foremost aims of litigation was to resolve 
conflict before it escalated. The Brown dispute was, how­
ever, also unique because the restoration of a damaged repu­
tation does not appear to have been the principal issue as 
it was in most cases of slander.
Lawsuits where the "repair" of one's reputation was the 
point at issue could be equally contentious. In 1659, for
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instance, Richard Beckley sued the recently widowed Frances 
Hitchcock who, for some unknown reasons, claimed that the 
Beckley's neglected their parental obligations. in addi­
tion, Hitchcock reportedly stated that Mrs. Beckley was a 
"liar and a backbiter," who "went about with the work of 
the Devil," and as such "made difference amongst neighbors." 
The case was originally put to arbitration, but that in­
creasingly unsatisfying process failed to resolve the con­
flict. The arbitrators determined that the widow "should 
give satisfaction in the presence of her neighbors," but 
the defendant's apology "was very short compared with her 
miscarriages." Because the arbitrators could not force the 
widow to offer a more sincere apology, the Beckley's were 
left with little choice but to file suit in Plantation 
Court.
Once formal suit was filed, the disagreement escalated 
when Mrs. Hitchcock further slandered the plaintiff and his 
wife by charging their children with breaking the Sabbath. 
At this point the records indicate that Beckley v/as "angry 
and grieved" by her behavior. All attempts to gain satis­
faction from the disorderly widow had failed. Once the 
testimony of the plaintiff and defendant had been heard, 
along with that of the arbitrators and neighbors affected 
by the conflict, the court reached the conclusion that 
Frances had a "rotten and corrupt heart" and that the 
"poison of asps" was "under her lips." Accordingly, "in a 
way of reparation," Beckley was awarded £10 and Hitchcock
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was fined 40s "to the public for her corrupting discourses 
to others."
Beckley v. Hitchcock was a particularly divisive case 
and it summarizes well the basic characteristics of slander 
suits and why they needed to be controlled. First, the 
Beckleys were seeking "reparation" for remarks or rumors 
directed at them which the court deemed uncalled for. Pres­
sing on with the suit even after Hitchcock had made an 
anemic apology indicates their resolve. In their case, 
financial recompense proved to be both a satisfying and an 
effective means of quieting the defendant. Frequently, 
however, public apologies alone served that purpose. This 
is what satisfied Hannah Marsh in 1645. And when three 
youths slandered the daughter of John Thomas by circulating 
the rumor that she refused "to lye with her husband." they
had to publically acknowledge their error so that Thomas'
74"daughter might be cleared."
Secondly, the controversy between Beckley and Hitchcock
had had a deleterious affect on their relationships with
neighbors. The arbitrators in the case evidently spent
several days with the litigants and their neighbors in an
attempt to iron-out the wrinkles in their relationship.
Other divisive slander suits, like Mallory v. Hotchkiss,
also affected immediate neighbors. Moreover, the court
records are dotted with cautions like the one given to
Nathan Thorpe and Joshua Hotchkiss in 1673 for "more
75neighborly and peaceable behavior in the future." Most
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references to conflict among neighbors surface in conduc­
tion with suits for slander, but others, like a bitter re­
plevin suit between John Winston and Timothy and Samuel
Ford, ended with warnings that the defendant's behavior
76had been "injurious to his neighbors."
Finally, remarks like these suggest that all suits had 
the potential of being disruptive and contentious. Beckley 
was reported as being "angry" with Hitchcock, whose conduct 
was obviously a source of concern for more people than just 
the plaintiff ant his wife. The unusually handsome settle­
ment awarded Beckley underscores how contentious the case 
had been. The lengthy and bitter dispute among members of 
the Brown family suggest that public endeavors to control 
private disagreements would indeed sometimes be very diffi­
cult. From the start of settlement authorities realized 
that private controversies were bound to arise. If these 
could be kept to a minimum, so much the better. But when 
suits were filed in court or even referred to arbitration, 
leaders assuredly sought better results than indicated in 
the Brown controversy. Occasionally, some of the disputes 
escalated following the litigants initial court appearance. 
In 1657, a case of extortion eventually blossomed into a 
full blown suit for slander. Six years later, an unusually 
vociferous replevin action led to a battery suit after a 
servant of the plaintiff Isaac Beecher was beaten by one of 
the defendants. And, in 1665, after being accused of at­
tempting "to violate the chastity" of two sisters, Patrick
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Moran sued their mother, "old goody Pinion,: for slander
and won his case even though he was urged to "carry it
77more prudently in the future." Instances like these and 
the Brown case occurred infrequently at best; in the main, 
authorities appear to have resolved civil disputes effec­
tively once they reached the formal setting of the court.
Not only was this true for cases of an economic nature, 
but also with actions for slander which, without question, 
tended to be more disruptive than any others. Residents 
of New Haven may have been contentious on occasion, but 
because the courts were consistent and effective agencies 
of social control over the course of the century, the 
planters also remained a well-ordered people.
"Contention" is a word that conjures up images of pro­
tracted controversies and disagreements between disputants. 
It suggests a depth of enmity that we know must have existed 
but which at the same time is next to impossible to document 
with regularity. To a certain extent, therefore, the act of 
filing a suit, especially where slander, trespass, or bat­
tery were issues, must remain our principal indication that 
contention existed in early New Haven. Very often individ­
uals became vexed in their relations with one another and 
undoubtedly suppressed their feelings without seeking legal 
remedies to their problems. Piling suit in essence repre­
sents their inability to resolve conflicts in a "peaceful 
and loving" fashion.
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Judging from extant records, slander suits threatened 
social harmony more than any others. They frequently in­
cluded strident exchanges between litigants and had a ten­
dency to draw neighbors into the dispute. Whether or not 
this indicates, as John Demos has speculated for similar 
cases in Plymouth, „hat a "man cursed his neighbor in order
to keep smiling at his parent, spouse, or child," is de- 
78batable. What is relatively certain, however, is that 
cases of slander and defamation upset the tempo of life in 
the community to the point where conflicts had to be re­
solved in the formal setting of the court. The courts were 
there for that reason, as were provisions for filing suits 
in the New Haven and Connecticut Colony codes.
But victims of slander were just a small percentage of 
those who utilized legal avenues to right wrongs which were 
perceived to have occurred. The majority of suits touched 
on a variety of routine economic transactions in New Haven. 
Although the context within which the suits for debt and 
replevin were filed is not too difficult to understand, the 
amount of contention or disorder associated with them is. 
Was, for example, John Evance deeply angered by the ne­
glect of John Charles, and if so did it continue to under­
mine their relationship? Perhaps so, but the fact that 
Charles did not appeal the decision or file a countersuit 
suggests that authorities had done their part in ending 
the controversy equitably.
That, after all, was one of the principal functions of
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litigation. But it is also true that in certain instances 
civil actions helped to promote order by calling to atten­
tion the need to pass laws as a means of staving off future 
disputes. This is what happened in the 1640s and 1650s 
relative to livestock control. Even though rulers were 
aware of the need to legislate in the area of fencing from 
the outset of settlement, it was not until after a series of 
lawsuits filed in the forties by men like John Owen and 
Thomas Nash that bylaws were actually written. In this in­
stance litigation clearly fostered meaningful change and 
greater institutionalization in the form of both local or­
dinances and positions like the public pounder.
The tendency for the community to become inc:reasingly 
institutionalized is a constant theme of legal development 
throughout the seventeenth century. Whether in the form of 
increased numbers of bylaws, positions of authority, legal 
codes, or new courts, formal legal remedies were chosen 
means of promoting order. The decline of arbitration as a 
method of conflict resolution is yet another example.
Rather than indicating a failure of the community to di­
minish contention, .kh&. phasing out of arbitration reflects 
the breakdown of the policies of perfection as articulated 
in 1639. In theory, the spirit of compromise exemplified 
in cases like Arresby v. Norton was appealing. However, 
the comments of Thomas Powell who in 1651 refused to have 
his suit arbitrated so that "he may have no more trouble 
about it" are revealing. They suggest, as does most of the
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evidence presented here, that over time order came to be 
defined through legal provisions and courts designed to 
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CONCLUSION
Richard Bushman opened his study of Connecticut with 
the statement that puritan rulers in the last quarter of 
the seventeenth century "valued order above all other 
social virtues. Disorder and sin were equivalents in their 
minds" (From Puritan to Yankee, 3). Few researchers would 
call into question the applicability of the first portion 
of his remarks; throughout the century order remained a 
persistent theme of puritan rhetoric. But so too did the 
notion that disorder was equated with sin, a point rein­
forced by even a casual excursion into the writings of 
Gurdon Saltonstall or Cotton Mather. In many respects, 
however, both ministers were throwbacks to an earlier age 
when the exhortations of men like John Cotton and John 
Davenport literally determined the character of society. 
Moreover, if one were to assess New England society on the 
basis of ministerial tracts alone, it is possible to con­
clude, as did Perry Miller, that the behavior of puritans 
reflected a commitment to an "unbroken body of thought" 
that lasted for nearly a century.
Yet other forms of evidence suggest that behavior 
changed significantly. The vital records of New England 
communities indicate that birth rates dropped. Ecclesi­
astical records have been used to document the decline of 
church membership experienced in many locales. And town
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records have yielded material about changes in the personnel 
of government that occurred late in the century. Indeed, 
once re-examined by social historians, evidence like this 
has explained the behavior of puritans in a different light 
than that depicted in the writings of the articulate few. 
Court records are yet another source for determining the 
behavior of puritans who wrote laws, broke them, and used 
them to resolve private controversies. Information con­
tained in New Haven court documents suggests that far from 
being inflexibly grounded upon the "judicial laws of Moses," 
the town's legal apparatus was responsive to the needs of 
society. Law was both a reflection of changes in behavior 
and used as a means of controlling it.
Law and legal institutions probably were utilized to a 
greater extent than envisioned by the founders of New 
Haven. Leaders like John Davenport were convinced that a 
broad-based commitment to a God-ordained social order would 
prevent serious disorders from surfacing. Theirs was an 
ideal vision of society that was inextricably tied to the 
prospects of erecting a Wilderness Zion unmolested by the 
corruptions prevalent in England. Theirs was to be a well- 
ordered and covenanted society constructed around institu­
tions that promoted correct moral conduct. The family, 
with its network of hierarchical relationships, figured 
prominently in the formula for success. Indeed, these 
"little commonwealths" constituted the first line of de­
fense against social disorder. The church, which was open
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to all who offered convincing professions of faith, served 
as another agency of control and periodically used its 
power to maintain purity by disciplining delinquent saints. 
And for those who were technically beyond the pale of 
church authority, God's vice-regents were empowered to pun­
ish unrighteous members of the community. Magistrates re­
ceived their powers through a unanimous and voluntary man­
date by New Haven's free planters and as a "moral hedge" 
invoked the laws of Moses to determine ungodly behavior. It 
is little wonder that at the outset of settlement, when the 
policies of perfection were strongest, the architects of 
the New England Way believed that disorder was synonymous 
with sin.
Within a few years of "transplantation," however, dis­
orders arose which necessitated legal remedies that were 
traditional and secular. The most important period of 
legal development in New Haven was the 1640s when 53% of 
the 114 bylaws were written. These town ordinances ad­
dressed a variety of practical problems ranging from fire 
prevention to the control of livestock, which alone, ac­
counted for 35% of the legislation. While men like Matthew 
Gilbert may have been God-fearing enough to be chosen as 
magistrates, it was their inability to have fences "made 
up in due season" that necessitated bylaws. The threats 
to order that surfaced when fences lay down or chimneys 
remained unswept were not instrinsically related to sin. 
Rather, they were disorders with which even the most
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enthusiastic member of the errand into the wilderness had 
to contend. Lawmaking on the local level was in effect a 
secular response to the particular needs of the community. 
Even on the colony level where laws were periodically 
codified, flexibility was evident. Indeed, 69% of the 
statutes in the Eaton Code of 1656 and 80% of those in the 
Connecticut Code of 1673 were secular in nature. The rul­
ers who compiled the codes were realistic enough to include 
laws that were most applicable to the needs of society and 
alter or drop those that were not. They came to recognize 
that even the highly regarded laws of Moses were sometimes 
anachronistic. Whereas Biblical law constituted 31% of the 
Eaton Code, 17 years later that figure had dropped to 20%. 
Moreover, the order that was promoted through lawmaking in 
the new world differed markedly from that given priority in 
1639.
So too did most of the disorders as reflected through 
law enforcement which took place on both the local and 
colony levels. Violations of bylaws governing aspects of 
life relating to timber cutting, military preparedness, or 
livestock control were clear challenges to the physical 
order of the community. As in the case of lawmaking, it 
was during the first decade that many (43%) of the 897 ap­
pearances were made. An additional 39% of the cases were 
prosecuted before 1659, thus suggesting that the formative 
years were crucial in terms of defining physical order.
The sharp decline in petty crime after 1660 may well be an
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indication that disorders had been overcome, that through 
a combination of selective legislation and enforcment prob­
lems were brought under control. This proved to be the 
case with infractions of military and livestock bylaws 
which accounted for 62% of the violations. When the com­
munity was threatened by Indians or unruly livestock, au­
thorities moved swiftly to correct the disorders. Offenders 
were brought to court, sometimes repeatedly, and convictions 
were handed down in between 98% and 100% of the cases. It 
was only after enforcement forced the majority of residents 
to attend training exercises or repair their fences, that 
previous fines were remitted or that offenders with excuses 
were acquitted. These disorders were not caused by sinful 
behavior, nor were petty offenders sinners. As a group 
they were, like magistrates Gilbert and Goodyear, in their 
early thirties, married, and typically well established 
members of the community.
If we accept puritan rhetoric at face value the real 
sinners violated colony level statutes and as such chal­
lenged moral order. It was in the colony codes that "sins" 
such as drunkenness, theft, fornication, and a variety of 
capital crimes were defined. And, judging by the punish­
ments that a minority of the criminals received, some were 
considered sinners in the complete sense of the word.
These were New Haven's deviants and included among them 
were people like Humphrey Norton who was "excluded" from 
the plantation, John Knight who was deemed "unfit to live
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among men," and Mrs. Fancy who was labelled as a "notorious 
thief and lyar." Their crimes were considered so threaten­
ing that authoritiesbelifeyed they were incapable of recla­
mation. But this was not the case with most of the 541 
violations of colony laws. An overwhelming majority (61%) 
were for alcohol abuse, theft, and fornication. But rather 
than being excluded for deviance, most moral offenders re­
ceived surprisingly mild sentences. As a group these de­
linquents tended to be unmarried, in their early twenties, 
and descendants of the founders of New Haven. And although 
corporal punishment was inflicted upon a number of these 
offenders in the early yers of settlement, there was a pro­
nounced tendency to treat them with greater leniency over 
time. Punishment for the "sin of fornication" is a case in 
point. Overall, 33% of the cases resulted in whippings, 
but 91% of these occurred before 1669. Thereafter magis­
trates used the discretion at their disposal to fine "sin­
ners" for their misbehavior— the punishment meted out in 
61% of these cases during the seventeenth century. If 
rulers in 1639 believed that morality could be legislated, 
that was no longer the case a generation later.
Another threat to social harmony came in the form of 
civil litigation. The aim of litigation was to resolve 
private controversies. And although New Haven had its 
share of contentious disputes which set local residents 
at odds with one another, authorities appear to have re­
solved these in an equitable fashion. Indeed, rather than
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just disrupting social stability, civil suits sometimes 
furthered the cause of order. This is seen most explicitly 
in the case of actions stemming from animal damage to crops. 
These suits proved to be instrumental in the formulation of 
bylaws which could be used to hold negligent planters ac­
countable. Once the laws were passed and subsequently en­
forced, livestock disorders, including cases realted to 
animal damage, declined significantly. Finally, one of the 
clearest examples of how formal legal remedies helped to 
promote order concerns arbitration. If there was one aspect 
of litigation that was bound up directly in the rhetoric of 
the well-ordered society, it was this informal process of 
conflict resolution. But as other features of the ideal 
faded, so too did the reliance upon arbitration. And just 
as authorities came to rely on law to counteract physical 
and moral disorders, local residents in turn adopted es­
tablished law and procedure to end their private contro­
versies .
If it could be argued that a God-ordained commitment to 
order determined the character of law in 1639, it is equal­
ly plausible to assert that in 1701 law defined the char­
acter of order. With all due respect to the founders of 
New Haven it is accurate to state that they realized there 
would be a need to "branch out" beyond the foundations of 
Biblical law. Perhaps what they did not anticipate was 
how far, just as they failed to perceive that other insti­
tutions like the family, church, and government would
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change dramatically in the face of new world conditions. 
However, as these alterations occurred, as members of the 
rising generations struck out on their own, as church mem­
bership declined, and as the personnel of government changed, 
law followed suit. By the end of the seventeenth century 
the commitment to order remained, but it was law, not utopian 
rhetoric, that assumed the pre-eminent role in defining and 
maintaining social order.
BIBLIOGRAPHIC ESSAY
Investigations of social control by nature require ex­
tensive use of primary sources, specifically court records. 
The records which document the behavior of New Haven's pu­
ritans are, for the most part, complete and many have been 
published. All have been equally instrumental in providing 
data necessary for the completion of this study of order 
and disorder in early Connecticut.
Useful throughout have been Charles J. Hoadly ed., 
Records of the Colony and Plantation of New Haven, From 
1638 to 1649 (Hartford, 1857) and his companion volume Rec­
ords of the Colony or Jurisdiction of New Haven, From May, 
1653, to the Union... (Hartford, 1858). The former is 
really a collection of the earliest town records, although 
it does contain occasional records of the New Haven Colony 
General Court after 1643. The latter consists exclusively 
of colony records, including the proceedings of the Magis­
trates' Court, although the earliest accounts of these 
tribunals (1643 to 1653) are no longer extant. After 1649 
(through 1701) the New Haven town records, which include 
town meetings, occasional selectmen's records, and business 
transacted in the Plantation Court appear in Franklin B. 
Dexter and Zara Jones Powers eds., Ancient Town Records (3 
vols., New Haven, 1917-1962), although Vol. Ill, which
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begins in 1684, contains little information on judicial 
proceedings.
After the union with Connecticut in 1665 and the judi­
cial reorganization of 1666, most data was obtained from 
colony level records. For reasons outlined in the text, 
prodeedings of the Commissioners' Courts in New Haven no 
longer remain, if they were ever recorded in the first 
place. Although a MS volume entitled "Town Meetings of New 
Haven, 1665-1691," located in New Haven City Hall contains 
townsmen's (selectmen's) records, esp. 68-157, these do not 
include trials or hearings of petty offenders. They do, 
however, provide a partial accounting of individuals who 
were warned out of the community. By far, the most useful 
source in the post-1665 period was the MS "New Haven County 
Court Records, 1666-1841," (24 vols.), located at the Con­
necticut State Library in Hartford. Volumes I and II cover 
the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and are in 
fine condition. One drawback, especially for scholars 
working on crime and the local community, is that offenders 
who appeared before county officials were not listed by 
place of residence, thus necessitating for this study, a 
complete prosoprographical analysis of New Haven's popula­
tion. Other colony records found helpful include the 'Court 
of Assistants Records, 1665-1701," which were transcribed 
by Norbert B. Lacy in an unpublished Yale University M. A. 
thesis, a copy of which is located at the State Library.
At the time my research began, the Library did not possess
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its copy and I am indebted to Mr. Lacy and Sterling Library 
of Yale University for providing me with access to his 
transcription. Finally, records of the court of last re­
sort (the General Court) constitute the major portion of 
Charles J. Hoadly and J. H. Trumbull eds., Public Records 
of the Colony of Connecticut (15 vols. , Hartford, 1850-1890). 
For further information on New England court records in 
general consult William Jeffrey Jr., "Early New England 
Court Records— A Bibliography to Published Materials," 
American Journal of Legal History, I (1957), 119-147, and 
David H. Flaherty, "A Select Guide to the Manuscript Court 
Records of Colonial New England," in Ibid., XI (1967), 107- 
126.
A number of sources on New Haven and Connecticut, again 
mostly published, have been invaluable even if they do not 
deal specifically with social control. Especially crucial 
for prosoprographical research was Donald Lines Jacobus, 
Families of Ancient New Haven (9 vols., in 3, Baltimore, 
1974), supplemented by James Savage, A Genealogical Dictio­
nary of the First Settlers of New England (4 vols., Boston, 
1860-1862). These were used in conjuction with the spotty 
Vital Records of New Haven, 1649-1850 (2 vols., Hartford, 
1917-1924), Franklin B. Dexter comp., Historical Catalogue 
of the Members of the First Church of Christ in New Haven, 
Connecticut (New Haven, 1914), the MS "First Church of 
Christ and Ecclesiastical Society Records, 1639-1937,"
Volume I, located in the Connecticut State Library, and
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Jay Mack Holbrook, Connecticut 1670 Census (Oxford, Mass., 
1977), which is not a true census (unfortunately), but a 
collection of names drawn from a variety of sources.
Ever useful is the work of Isabel M. Calder, including 
The New Haven Colony (New Haven, 1934), her edition of the 
Letters of John Davenport Puritan Divine (New Haven, 1937), 
and her "John Cotton and the New Haven Colony," New England 
Quarterly, III (1930) and "John Cotton's 'Moses His Judi­
cials,'" Colonial Society of Massachusetts Publications,
XXVIII (1935), both of which should be read in conjunction 
with Bruce E. Steiner, "Dissension at Quinnipiac: The
Authorship and Setting of A Discourse About Civil Government 
in New Plantation Whose Design is Religion," New England 
Quarterly; LIV (1981). Other works of significance on New 
Haven and Connecticut include John Archer, "Puritan Town 
Planning in New Haven," Society of Architectural Historians 
Journal, XXXIV (1975); Leonard Bacon, Thirteen Historical 
Discourses... (New Haven, 1839); Richard L. Bushman, From 
Puritan to Yankee: Character and the Social Order in Con­
necticut , 1690-1765 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967); Bruce C.
Daniels, The Connecticut Town: Growth and Development,
1635-1790 (Middletown, Conn., 1979); Mary J. A. Jones, Con­
gregational Commonwealth: Connecticut, 1636-1662 (Middletown,
Conn., 1968); and Paul Lucas, Valley of Discord: Church
and Society along the Connecticut River, 1636-1725 (Hanover,
N.H., 1976).
The list of important sources that in one form or another
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touch upon the components of the well-ordered society is 
endless, but in addition to those cited in the introduction 
of this analysis, there are several recent studies which 
have helped clarify my thoughts about the shape of early 
New Haven society. Especially useful were T.H. Breen, The 
Character of the Good Ruler: A Study of Puritan Political
Ideas in New England, 1630-1730 (New Haven, 1970), and 
Stephen Foster, Their Solitary Way: The Puritan Social
Ethic in the First Century of Settlement in New England 
(New Haven, 1971), as well as their collaboration, "The 
Puritan's Greatest Achievement: A Study of Social Cohesion
in Seventeenth-Century Massachusetts," Journal ox American 
History, LX (1973), 5-22. Their interests clearly reflect 
those of their mentor Edmund Morgan who, early in his career, 
authored The Puritan Family: Religion and Domestic Rela­
tions in Seventeenth-Century New England (Boston, 1944) and 
later Visible Saints: The History of a Puritan Idea (New
York, 1963). Collectively these works examine puritan 
society, ideas, domestic relations, religion, and politics, 
all of which were important features of the well-ordered 
society.
Morgan was influenced by his teacher, Perry Miller, 
whose The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century (New
York, 1939), Orthodoxy in Massachusetts, 1630-1650 (Cam­
bridge, Mass., 1933), and Errand into the Wilderness 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1956) are standard fare for appreci­
ating the complex issues associated with puritan thought
306
and behavior. Yet some of Miller's interpretations, like 
his inflexible view of Calvin forwarded in his "The Marrow 
of Puritan Divinity," in Ibid., should be tempered by 
Micheal McGiffert, "American Puritan Studies in the 1960's," 
William and Mary Quarterly, XXVII (1970), 36-67; David Hall, 
The Faithful Shepard: A History of the New England Minis­
try in the Seventeenth Century (Chapel Hill, 1972) and works 
by other members of what Hall calls the "Yale School," in­
cluding Norman Pettit, The Heart Prepared: Grace and Con­
version in Puritan Spiritual Life (New Haven, 1966) and 
Robert Middlekauf, The Mathers: Three Generations of Puri­
tan Intellectuals, 1596-1728 (New York, 1S71). Finally, 
two original sources which have shed light on the puritan 
ideal are John Winthrop, "A Model of Christian Charity," in 
Allen B. Forbes ed., Winthrop Papers, (5 vols., Boston, 
1929-1947) and John Cotton, A Discourse About Civil Govern­
ment ... (Cambridge, Mass., 1663). And, illuminating many 
of the details of the Congregational Way, are the documents 
contained in Williston Walker ed., The Creeds and Platforms 
of Congregationalism (New York, 1893).
Secondary works focusing on law, its enforcement, and 
litigation also played an important role in understanding 
the disorders encountered by New Englanders. Providing an 
overall conceptual framework were a number of general intro­
ductions such as Donald Black, The Behavior of Law (New 
York, 1976) which examines law and social control from a 
sociological perspective; Roscoe Pound, Social Control
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Through Law (New Haven, 1942); the first chapter of Richard 
B. Morris, Studies in the History of American Law (New 
York, 1958) and Part I of Lawrence M. Friedman, A History 
of American Law (New York, 1973). William J. Bouwsma's 
"Lawyers and Early Modern Culture," American Historical Re­
view, LXXVIII (1973) correlates the rise of the legal pro­
fession with the need to regulate disorders in the late 
middle ages, while Warren 0. Ault's "Some Early Village 
By-Laws,” English Historical Review, XLI (1930), 208-231, 
demonstrates how important local ordinances were for regu­
lating life in English rural communities at roughly the 
same time. Dealing largely with the same period is Alan 
Harding, A Social History of English Law (Gloucester, Mass., 
1973 [1966]) which is nonetheless informative because of 
the way it explains the context of certain crimes as well 
as the derivation of complicated legal terms.
Bridging the gap between Europe and America are help­
ful works like Thomas G. Barnes and Joseph H. Smith, The 
English Legal System: Carryover to the Colonies (Los
Angeles, 1975), which features a pair of long essays, "The 
English Criminal Law in Early America," by Smith, and 
Barnes' "Law and Liberty (and Order) in Early Massachu­
setts;" Mark DeWolf Howe, "The Sources and Nature of Law 
in Colonial Massachusetts," in George A. Billias ed., Law 
and Authority in Colonial America (Barre, Mass., 1965),
1-16; G. B. Warden, "Law Reform in England and New England,” 
William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., XXXV (1979); and to
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a certain degree David Allen's stimulating Ln English Ways: 
The Movement of Societies and the Transferal of English 
Local Law and Custom to Massachusetts Bay in the Seven­
teenth Century (Chapel Hill, 1981).
Related more specifically to America and the New England 
region are David F. Flaherty, "An Introduction to Early 
American Legal History," in Flaherty ed., Essays in the 
History of Early American Law (Chapel Hill, 1969), 3-38, and, 
of course, George Lee Haskins, Law and Authority in Early 
Massachusetts: A Study in Tradition and Design (New York,
1960). Also informative was William K. Holdsworth, "Law 
and Society in Colonial Connecticut, 1636-1672," (unpub­
lished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1974), 
and a number of less ambitious studies including Julius 
Goebel's "King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Cen­
tury New England," Columbia Law Review XXXI (1931), which 
gives early acknowledgement to the role played by customary 
law; George Lee Haskins, "The Legal Heritage of Plymouth 
Colony," University of Pennsylvania Law Review CX (1962); 
appropriate chapters of Harry M. Ward, Statism in Plymouth 
Colony (Port Washington, N.Y., 1973); and Kinvin Wroth, 
"Possible Kingdoms: The New England Town from the Perspec­
tive of Legal History," American Journal of Legal History 
XIV (1971). Two articles focusing specifically on New 
Haven are Henry N. Townsend's worthy "Judicial Administra­
tion in the New Haven Colony before the Charter of 1662," 
Connecticut Bar Journal XXIV (1950), 210-234, and the less
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useful Dean B. Lyman Jr., "Notes on the New Haven Colonial 
Courts," in Ibid. , XX (1946), 178-189. Finally, the 
Eaton Code and Connecticut Code of 1673 can be found in 
John D. Cushing ed., The Earliest Laws of the New and 
Connecticut Colonies, 1639-1673 (Wilmington, Del., 1977).
In addition to the works of Edwin Powers, Kai Erikson, 
and Eli Faber, studies on crime and punishment have pro­
liferated in recent years. Though not focusing on New 
England, Douglas Greenberg's Crime and Law Enforcement in 
the Colony of New York, 1691-1776 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1976) is 
one of the few full-length quantitative assessments of 
criminal behavior in early America. However, some of the 
finest surveys of crime have been devoted to England. Two 
collections of essays that are noteworthy include Douglas 
Hay et al., Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in
Eighteenth-Century England (New York, 1975) and J.S. Cockburn 
ec*-> Crime in England, 1550-1800 (Princeton, 1977). The 
latter consists of many fine selections, but worth special 
mention because of the way crime is examined on the local 
level are J.A. Sharpe, "Crime and Delinquency in an Essex 
Parish, 1600-1640," and M.J. Ingram, "Communities and 
Courts: Law and Disorder in Early Seventeenth-Century
Wiltshire." Other helpful works of English social history 
that have aided to further illuminate criminal conduct are 
Barbara Hanawalt's "Fur Collar Crime: The Pattern of
Crime among the Fourteenth-Century English Nobility," 
Journal of Social History VIII (1975), 1-17 which describes
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the difficulties of controlling criminal behavior of nobles; 
Carol Z. Wiener, "Sex Roles and Crime in Late Elizabethan 
Hertsforshire," in Ibid., which devotes special attention 
to female lawbreakers; and Caroline Bingham, "Seventeenth- 
Century Attitudes Toward Deviant Sex," Journal of Inter­
disciplinary History, I (1971)— an examination of attitudes 
towards homosexuality. This should be read in conjunction 
with Randolph Trumbach, "London's Sodomites: Homosexual
Behavior and Western Culture in the 18th Century," Journal 
of Social History, XI (1977)^
Along the same line but focusing on New England is 
Robert F. Oaks' whose "'Things Fearful to Name': Sodomy
and Buggery in Seventeenth-Century New England," Ibid., XII 
(1978) suggests that homosexuality was more widespread than 
previously thought. Other works pertaining to moral order, 
but more general in scope include Charles Francis Adams' 
disappointing examination of Braintree, Massachusetts 
church records, "Some Phases of Sexual Morality and Church 
Discipline in Colonial New England," Massachusetts Histori­
cal Society Proceedings, 2nd Ser., VI (1890-1891), 477-516. 
Much better is David H. Flaherty's "Law and the Enforcement 
of Morals in Early America," Perspectives in American His­
tory , V (1971) because of the way it illustrates changing 
morality, especially in light of the puritan rhetoric 
found in studies like Ronald A. Bosco, "Lectures at the 
Pillory: The Early American Execution Sermon," American
Quarterly, XXX (1978), 156-176. Despite the rhetoric of
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execution sermons, at least two studies have stressed the 
flexibility and charity inherent in puritan justice. See 
Carol F. Lee, "Discretionary Justice in Early Massachu­
setts," Essex Institute Historical Collections, CXII 
(1976) and Jules Zanger, "Crime and Punishment in Early 
Massachusetts," William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., XXII 
(1965). For the activities of "delinquents" prone to im­
morality see Ross W. Beales Jr., "In Search of the His­
torical Child: Miniature Adulthood and Youth in Colonial
New England," American Quarterly, XXVII (1975) and Ray H. 
Hiner, "Adolescence in Eighteenth-Century America," His­
tory of Childhood Quarterly, III (1975). For Negroes 
consult Richard Slotkin, "Narratives of Negro Crime in New 
England, 1675-1800," ikmerican Quarterly, XXV (1973), 3-21, 
and for Indians, James P. Ronda, "Red and White at the 
Bench: Indians and the Law in Plymouth Colony, 1620-1691,"
Essex Institute Historical Collections, CX (1974), 200-215.
Finally, there is a small body of literature devoted 
primarily to exploring civil litigation. As one might 
expect these studies have been utilized to the fullest in 
an effort to illuminate the context of private controver­
sies in New Haven. The most important is certainly David 
Thomas Konig, Law and Society in Puritan Massachusetts: 
Essex County, 1629-1692 (Chapel Hill, 1979) which empha­
sizes the rise of law in defining the social order as the 
policies of perfection or what L' called the "communal 
ideal" crumbled. Also useful for comparative purposes was
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Jessica Kross Ehrlich, "'To Hear and Try all Causes 
Betwixt Man and Man': The Town Court of Newtown, 1659-
1692," New York History, LIX (1978) especially because it 
focuses on a single community during the seventeenth cen­
tury. Both of these studies should be supplemented by 
Herbert W. K. Fitzroy, "Richard Crosby Goes to Court, 1683- 
1697: Some Realities of Colonial Litigation," Pennsylvania
Magazine of History and Biography, LXII (1938) even though 
it examines more than just civil disputes. Also worthy of 
mention is the one good example of arbitration that I have 
found, "Arbitration Between Mr. Norton and Richard Arresby," 
Winthrop Papers, IV. And, perhaps deserving of attention 
is Robert Silverman's recent Law and Urban Growth: Civil
Litigation in the Boston Trial Courts, 1880-1900 (Princeton, 
1981).
